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CRIMINAL LAW
PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD
AMY F. KIMPEL*
Prosecutors and courts often charge a premium for the ability to avoid
or erase a criminal conviction. Defendants with means, who tend to be
predominantly White, can often pay for a clean record. But the indigent who
are unable to pay, and are disproportionately Black and Brown, are saddled
with the stigma of a criminal record. Diversion and expungement are two
popular reforms that were promulgated as ways to reduce the scale of the
criminal legal system and mitigate the impact of mass criminalization.
Diversion allows a defendant to earn dismissal of a charge by satisfying
conditions set by the prosecutor or court, thereby avoiding conviction.
Expungement seals or erases the defendant’s record of arrest or conviction.
Some diversion and expungement programs are cost-free, but most are not.
Yet a criminal record carries its own costs. A criminal record can limit where
an individual can live, go to school, and whether they receive public benefits.
As 93% of employers conduct background checks on job applicants, the
inability to avoid a criminal record can create barriers to employment and
the accumulation of wealth. Costly diversion and expungement programs
further calcify race and class divides, contributing to the construction of a
permanent underclass.
This Article examines the promises and pitfalls of diversion and
expungement as means to combat mass criminalization. These two
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mechanisms work in tandem to provide access to a “clean record,” but not
enough attention has been paid to the dangers they present due to differential
access to clean records based on financial means. This Article considers
legal challenges to the current schemes and explains how requiring
defendants to pay for a clean record enables courts and prosecutors to profit
from the perpetuation of racial caste. Ultimately, this Article argues that the
impacts of diversion and expungement programs are more modest than
reformers claim, and that these programs need to be offered at no cost if they
are to succeed in achieving the goal of reducing racial disparities in our
criminal courts and in society at large.
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INTRODUCTION
Every day, people pay to avoid or erase criminal records.1 This Article
details how criminal justice reforms that charge defendants for acts of mercy,
1

See infra Part I.
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epitomized by fee-based diversion and expungement, operate as regressive
taxes on the poor in ways that entrench rather than ameliorate the racialized
phenomenon of mass criminalization. Rather than shrinking the carceral state
as reformers claim, fee-based diversion and expungement programs can both
widen the net of mass criminalization while simultaneously exacerbating
racial disparities in the system. Ultimately, these reforms may serve to
legitimize a caste-like structure where criminal record status serves as a
proxy for race and class.
We are all criminals.2 The primary definition of a criminal is “one who
has committed a crime.”3 In this sense, given the expansive criminal legal net
we have woven with ever-proliferating American criminal laws, it is almost
impossible to function in the United States without committing a crime.4
Americans possess marijuana,5 drink alcohol underage,6 use their cell phones

2

See WE ARE ALL CRIMINALS, https://weareallcriminals.org [https://perma.cc/X89TLFQG].
3
Criminal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
criminal [https://perma.cc/U2R3-YYCN].
4
See, e.g., HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE
INNOCENT xxxii (2011).
5
More than half of American adults have tried marijuana. See Christopher Ingraham, 11
Charts That Show Marijuana Has Truly Gone Mainstream, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/19/11-charts-that-show-marijuana
-has-truly-gone-mainstream/ [https://perma.cc/DC48-C5DG]. Though marijuana is legal
under many state laws, it is still illegal to possess marijuana under federal law. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 812, 844; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
6
The drinking age is twenty-one in all fifty states, see 23 U.S.C. § 158, but even by age
eighteen, 58% of teens had had at least one drink. See NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE &
ALCOHOLISM, UNDERAGE DRINKING (2020), https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/sites/default/files/
Underage_Fact.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A3E-7MRC].
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while driving,7 speed,8 use hard drugs,9 shoplift,10 get into bar fights,11
possess illegal or unlicensed weapons,12 sext,13 urinate in public,14 trespass,15

7
Though most states prohibit handheld cell phone use and texting, in a recent survey
nearly 90% of drivers say they use their smartphones while on the road. Mark Moore, A
Disturbing Number of People Still Use Cellphones While Driving, N.Y. POST (Apr. 17, 2017),
https://nypost.com/2017/04/17/a-disturbing-number-of-people-still-use-cellphones-whiledriving/ [https://perma.cc/GK3Z-DAXF].
8
89% of drivers say they have driven faster than the speed limit and 40% have driven
more than twenty miles per hour over the limit. New Allstate Survey Shows Americans Think
They Are Great Drivers – Habits Tell a Different Story, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 2, 2011),
https://prn.to/2jkmrUq [https://perma.cc/HS3A-EYJ2].
9
DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, 10 FACTS ABOUT COCAINE (2018), https://www.drugpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/cocainefacts_august_2018_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EED-UXZD] (reporting that 14.4% of the U.S. population over age twelve has tried cocaine). In 2018 alone, 5.5
million people used cocaine, 5.6 million used hallucinogens, 1.9 million used
methamphetamines, over 800,000 used heroin, and 16.9 million misused psychotherapeutic
drugs. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2018 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 1, 14, 16, 18 (2019), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/
default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHNationalFindingsReport2018/NSDUHNationalFindings
Report2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z85R-8AEJ].
10
There are 27 million shoplifters in the United States, amounting to about one in every
eleven people. Jen Weigel, Steal These Shoplifting Facts, CHI. TRIB. (Jul. 28, 2011), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/ct-tribu-weigel-stealing-20110728-column.html [https://perma.cc/
KJ5E-JA2S].
11
Thomas McBee, Have Most Men Been in Bar Fights? CUT (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.thecut.com/2018/10/have-most-men-been-in-bar-fights.html (last visited Mar.
17, 2022) (determining data is inconclusive on this question).
12
See, e.g., Mary Frost, After 7-year Push, ‘Gravity Knives’ Are Decriminalized,
BROOKLYN EAGLE (May 30, 2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/05/30/after-7year-push-gravity-knives-are-decriminalized/ [https://perma.cc/Z57J-PP4A] (reporting at
least 1,800 people a year were charged with illegal possession of gravity knives in New York
City—often workers who were charged simply for possessing tools needed for work); see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 22210 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg. Sess.)
(criminalizing possession of billy clubs and other weapons).
13
About one in four teens send or receive sexts. See Eli Rosenberg, One in Four Teens
Are Sexting, a New Study Shows. Relax, Researchers Say, It’s Mostly Normal, WASH. POST
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/02/27/a-newstudy-shows-one-in-four-teens-are-sexting-relax-experts-say-its-mostly-normal/
[https://perma.cc/4ADV-ZKXU]. Teens engaged in sexting can be prosecuted for child
pornography. See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see also Amy
F. Kimpel, Using Laws Designed to Protect as a Weapon: Prosecuting Minors Under Child
Pornography Laws, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 299, 300, 324 (2010).
14
Though public urination is illegal in most states, seventy-one percent of men reported
having urinated in a bush or tree in a non-residential area. See Jack Gammon, United States of
Bad Hygiene and Habits, YOUGOV.COM (Jul. 14, 2014), https://today.yougov.com/topics/
lifestyle/articles-reports/2014/07/14/united-states-bad-hygiene
[https://perma.cc/7UJS-98
FK].

2022]

PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD

443

and fail to comply with the orders of law enforcement officers16—all of
which are or can be crimes under certain circumstances.
Though we are all criminals, not all of us have criminal records—but
the number who do is increasing. In the past few decades, the number of
adults in the United States who have criminal records has exploded. An
estimated twenty million Americans, 8.6% of the U.S. adult population, have
recorded felony convictions.17 The number of those with misdemeanor
convictions is several times higher.18 A criminal record does not require a
conviction—an arrest is enough for the taint of a “dirty” criminal record to
attach.19 Overall, federal and state criminal records repositories have criminal
records for one third of the U.S. adult population.20
15

Notably, low-income people of color are often charged for trespassing in their own
public housing projects. See Dorielle E. Obanor, Note, Dismantling Discrimination in the
Stairways and Halls of NYCHA Using Local, State, and National Civil Rights Statutes, 6
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 169, 171 (2016).
16
In overpoliced public schools, disobeying an order is suddenly converted from a
disciplinary infraction into a criminal offense. See ELORA MUKHERJEE, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM: THE OVER-POLICING OF NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS
10 (2007), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/nyclu_pub_criminalizing_
the_classroom.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ3E-7ULK] (noting that with 4,625 officers, the
School Safety Agent division of the New York Police Department would, on its own, be the
tenth largest police department in the country); see also MONIQUE W. MORRIS, PUSHOUT: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK GIRLS IN SCHOOLS 56–57, 76–77 (2016).
17
JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 1 (2015).
18
Id.; ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE
MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 251–58
(2018) (collecting data documenting scope of misdemeanor criminal justice system and
concluding that there were over 13 million misdemeanor filings in 2015); see also Sandra G.
Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. REV. 971, 1014–
15 (2020) (estimating more than 13 million misdemeanor cases filed annually or 40.4 per
1,000 people).
19
Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 826–44 (2015) [hereinafter
Jain, Arrests as Regulation] (explaining consequences of an arrest for defendants including
housing, benefits, and employment consequences); Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA.
L. REV. 987, 997–99 (2019) (discussing in detail the consequences of an arrest); see also Eisha
Jain, The Mark of Policing: Race and Criminal Records, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 162, 178–
79 (2021) [hereinafter Jain, The Mark of Policing] (“In a world where arrests create markers
that last long after the criminal case is complete . . . a host of other actors rely on criminal
records”).
20
The FBI has criminal records for over 80 million individuals. See FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, FEBRUARY 2022 NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM FACT SHEET
(2022) [hereinafter FBI FACT SHEET] (noting over 80 million individuals have criminal records
based on fingerprints); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2016 104, tbl.20 (2018) https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/
251516.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BMP-J3YD] (reporting 91 million unique criminal records
based on the Interstate Identification Index). In 2015, an estimated 70–100 million adults in
the U.S. had a criminal record—that’s about 1 in 3 or 1 in 2 based on the current adult
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At the same time, as more Americans are criminals and have criminal
records,21 American culture increasingly relies on a person’s record to sort
individuals.22 In the United States, criminal records—or the lack thereof—
are used to allocate housing, public assistance, education, and employment.
A criminal record is a major barrier to employment, and the impact of a
criminal record is more profound for Black people than White people.23
Specifically, 93% of employers screen job applicants for criminal records at
the hiring stage.24 One quarter of jobs require a state occupational license,

population of 209 million. See REBECCA VALLAS & SHARON DIETRICH, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT: HOW WE CAN ELIMINATE BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC
SECURITY AND MOBILITY FOR PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 1 n.1 (2014), https://cdn
.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/VallasCriminalRecordsReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5T97-5B7U]; see also Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans
Have Criminal Records as College Diplomas, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/just-facts-many-americans-havecriminal-records-college-diplomas [https://perma.cc/HKU9-VRJ9].
21
Importantly, many crimes are never reported to law enforcement at all. For example, in
2015, only
47% of the violent crimes and 35% of the property crimes tracked by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics were reported to police. . . . Even when violent and property crimes are reported to
police, they’re often not solved—at least based on a measure known as the clearance rate. That’s
the share of cases each year that are closed, or ‘cleared,’ through the arrest, charging and referral
of a suspect for prosecution. In 2015, 46% of the violent crimes and 19% of the property crimes
reported to police in the U.S. were cleared.

John Gramlich, Most Violent and Property Crimes in the U.S. Go Unsolved, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/01/most-violent-andproperty-crimes-in-the-u-s-go-unsolved/ [https://perma.cc/RFP6-KGV8].
22
This binary is an over-simplification—criminal records result in a nuanced and
complicated hierarchy based on a variety of factors including an individual’s supervision
status (those who are incarcerated or under supervision like parole or probation, as opposed to
those with past convictions and/or arrests) and offense of charge or conviction (sex offenders
and violent offenders are thought of differently than non-violent drug offenders or white-collar
offenders). See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND
SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 8–9 (2018) (discussing different
ways to conceptualize the criminal system’s relation to differentiating the labor pool).
23
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOCIO. 937, 957–58 (2003);
see also Lottie Joiner, How Families Pay the Never-Ending Price of a Criminal Record,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/howfamilies-pay-the-never-ending-price-of-a-criminal-record/433641/ [https://perma.cc/TY7DBNDY] (documenting higher unemployment rates for those with records); SHIMA
BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 87, 126 (2018) (same).
24
Roy Maurer, Nearly Half of Employers Continue to Ask About Criminal History on Job
Applications, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/
ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/Pages/Ban-the-Box-Criminal-History-JobApplications.aspx [https://perma.cc/N8H8-SKQS] (summarizing Sterling Talent Solutions’
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and licensing boards routinely consider conviction and even arrest history of
applicants.25 Many licensing laws contain blanket bans, barring those with
criminal convictions from obtaining licenses, while others have good
character provisions which grant licensing boards broad discretion to deny
applications based on criminal history.26
This has enormous economic consequences. Record-related workforce
exclusions reduce the annual Gross Domestic Product by between $78 and
$87 billion.27 Once employed, individuals with criminal records face lower
wages and lower lifetime earnings—with estimated aggregate lost earnings
as much as $370 billion annually.28 A criminal conviction is now considered
disqualifying for even the most menial jobs.29 This remains true even though

2017 Background Screening Trends & Best Practices Report which found that criminal record
searches are used by 93 percent of employers that conduct pre-hire screening).
25
Jeffrey Zients & Betsey Stevenson, Trends in Occupational Licensing and Best
Practices for Smart Labor Market Regulation, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 28, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/07/28/trends-occupational-licensing-andbest-practices-smart-labor-market-regulation [https://perma.cc/V9Z7-KSCD] (summarizing
DEP’T. OF TREASURY OFF. OF ECONOMIC POL’Y, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, & DEP’T.
OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonem
bargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WNF-GMZZ]); see also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189,
197 (1898) (approving of conviction-related bars for some professional licenses); Blake v.
Jossart, 884 N.W.2d 484, 498 (Wis. 2016) (finding license revocation of a childcare provider
based on a 30-year-old misdemeanor conviction constitutional).
26
Annie Zhang, Sanctioned Unemployment: The Impact of Occupational Licensing
Restrictions on Ex-Offenders, 57 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 251, 266–68 (2018) (describing how
those with criminal records are excluded from being barbers and cosmetologists based on
conviction records); see also DICK M. CARPENTER II, LISA KNEPPER, KYLE SWEETLAND &
JENNIFER MCDONALD, INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF THE
BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 40 (2d ed. 2017), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/11/License_to_Work_2nd_Edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH3R-AQXH].
27
CHERRIE BUCKNOR & ALAN BARBER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., THE PRICE WE
PAY: ECONOMIC COSTS OF BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT FOR FORMER PRISONERS AND PEOPLE
CONVICTED OF FELONIES 1 (2016), https://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/employmentprisoners-felonies-2016-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7YK-MC7L].
28
Joiner, supra note 23; TERRY-ANN CRAIGIE, AMES GRAWERT & CAMERON KIMBLE,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CONVICTION, IMPRISONMENT, AND LOST EARNINGS: HOW
INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM DEEPENS INEQUALITY 7 (2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/EconomicImpactReport_pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7P2Z-2Y6R] (estimating $372.3 billion in aggregate lost income annually).
29
Stacy A. Hickox, A Call to Reform State Restrictions on Hiring of Ex-Offenders, 12
STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 121, 152–53 (2016).
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criminal conduct is not a very good proxy for employability or promise in
the workplace.30
The differentiation based on the “clean” or “criminal” record binary is
neither benign nor neutral. As Michelle Alexander explained, the criminal
legal system31 has created a racial caste system that is the direct descendant
of the Jim Crow laws of the twentieth century and the enslavement of Black
Americans that preceded it.32 According to Alexander, criminal laws are used
to justify maintenance of the binary between White and Black Americans by
replacing explicit racial terms with a more implicit binary that distinguishes
“good” Americans with “clean” records from “bad” Americans with
“criminal” records.33
After decades of mass incarceration and mass criminalization,
Americans from both sides of the political spectrum are beginning to express
deep concern and call for reform.34 Policy makers and legislatures have
started to scale back—at least superficially. Some have started to
acknowledge that for certain crimes35 or defendants,36 the mark of a criminal
record is too harsh. Others have conceded that, at the very least, the current
system is too costly. These lawmakers have started to temper the binary of
30
See Friedman, supra note 20; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 197 (2010) (noting that White
professionals are the most likely of any group to have committed drug offenses).
31
There has been a shift recently from calling our system of criminal prosecution the
“criminal justice system” to the “criminal legal system” because the system does not do
justice. I also think that in its current iteration, the criminal system is also often not operating
legally. In some ways, I prefer the term “criminal justice system” because the system we aspire
to should seek to do justice, not merely to operationalize laws, but I will conform to the current
convention in this Article. More recently, there has been a shift to using “criminal legal
systems” in the plural because there are criminal court systems at the federal, state, and
municipal levels, but for simplicity’s sake I will use the singular throughout.
32
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 20–58.
33
Id. at 197 (noting that the fact that Blacks are convicted and made criminals at such
high rates for conduct-illegal drug activity—despite the fact that Whites participate in drug
activity at roughly the same rates—has produced racial stigma and defined what it means to
be Black in our era).
34
Ernest Drucker, Introduction, in DECARCERATING AMERICA: FROM MASS PUNISHMENT
TO PUBLIC HEALTH 2 (Ernest Drucker ed., 2018) (“[T]he emerging consensus that we simply
cannot lock up so many people in prisons and jails stands to be one of the greatest victories
for justice in America in our lifetimes.”).
35
Often marijuana crimes or other low-level first-time offenses. See, e.g., Birmingham to
Pardon 15,000 with Marijuana Convictions, AP NEWS (Apr. 20, 2021), https://apnews.com/
article/health-marijuana-alabama-government-and-politics-birmingham-78aaedc49176b9c6e
69347d85b978872 (last visited Mar. 17, 2022).
36
Often sympathetic defendants, like survivors of sex trafficking, young people, veterans,
or individuals suffering from mental illness. For an interesting discussion of offender-based
courts, see generally Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L. J. 1481 (2017).
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those with clean and criminal records with release mechanisms. The most
prominent—and those discussed in detail in this Article—are diversion and
expungement. Diversion allows a person who is charged37 with a crime to
avoid a conviction; typically, the defendant earns a dismissal of the charge
by satisfying certain conditions. Expungement, or record sealing, allows a
person with a conviction or arrest record to erase or conceal that fact. Both
allow a person who committed (or allegedly committed) a crime to remain or
return to the state of having a clean record.
The problem is that once a person is charged with a crime, government
actors—lawmakers, prosecutors, and judges—set the price tag for a clean
slate. Allowing the government to exploit profit from the criminal legal
system is nothing new—convict leasing, for-profit prisons, and asset
forfeiture are well-explored in legal and historical literature.38 But charging
a premium for diversion and expungement and permitting defendants to pay
to maintain or restore a clean record allows the criminal legal system to
perpetuate and calcify race and class divides. Given the historically rooted
socioeconomic disparities between White and Black communities, White
defendants will more often be able to preserve clean records while Black
defendants will be more likely to be branded criminals. Rather than
mitigating the impact of the vast American criminal legal system, this
dynamic reinforces the false binary of “good Whites” and “criminal
Blacks.”39
Like any framework, this is overly simplistic. To think of race as binary
in the United States is to erase the growing number of people in this country
who identify as Latinx, Asian, Indigenous, or multi-racial.40 It also ignores
37

There are also diversion programs that happen before a charge is filed in court. See infra
Section I.A.
38
See, e.g., MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH 1866–1928 (1996); DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME:
THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2009);
KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE RISE OF
HUMAN CAGING IN LOS ANGELES, 1771–1965 (2018); SHANE BAUER, AMERICAN PRISON: A
REPORTER’S UNDERCOVER JOURNEY INTO THE BUSINESS OF PUNISHMENT (2018); Caleb Nelson,
The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L. J. 2446 (2016); Eric Blumenson & Eva
Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35,
67 (1998).
39
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 197 (“African Americans are not significantly more
likely to use or sell prohibited drugs than whites, but they are made criminals at drastically
higher rates for precisely the same conduct.”).
40
In fact, U.S. Census estimates from 2019 indicate that 18.5% of the population identifies
as Hispanic or Latino while only 13.4% identify as Black or African American. Quick Facts,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219 [https://
perma.cc/V79V-VGAU]. And some estimates are that rates of incarceration for Native
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the intersection of identities. A straight Black woman may have a different
experience in the criminal legal system than a gay Black man or a trans AfroLatinx immigrant.41 Moreover, despite the racial wealth gap, the relationship
between race and class is not a simple one-to-one. There are many poor
Whites who are priced out of pursuing diversion and expungement. Likewise,
there are wealthy and middle-class people of color who will be able to afford
to pay for a clean record.42 Racial caste in America is complex,43 but any
reckoning of it is incomplete without considering criminal record status.
This Article draws on several literatures including those about policing
(and over-policing),44 specialty courts,45 criminal reentry,46 and criminal
debt.47 Though there is a rich literature on criminal records relief and
expungement, as well as scholarship discussing diversion, no article has
addressed the combined impact of these two mechanisms to provide access
to a “clean record” or the phenomenon of differential access to clean records
based on financial means. This Article also describes how racial inequalities
in the criminal legal system can fuel racial inequalities in American society
at large and how the reforms of diversion and expungement can, rather than

Americans are as high as seven times those of Whites in some states. See Roxanne Daniel,
Since You Asked: What Data Exists About Native American People in the Criminal Justice
System?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/
04/22/native/ [https://perma.cc/VY4S-6DGK].
41
See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) (explaining intersectionality and how the focus on
single-axis discrimination “marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened and obscures
claims that cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination”).
42
See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond New Jim
Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 54 (2012) (“[O]ne of mass incarceration’s defining features is
that, unlike Jim Crow, its reach is largely confined to the poorest, least-educated segments of
the African American community.”).
43
See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR DISCONTENTS (2020)
(describing the American racial caste system and how it operates).
44
See, e.g., ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING (2017).
45
See, e.g., Erin R. Collins, The Problem of Problem-Solving Courts, 54 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1573 (2021).
46
See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s RAP Sheet in the Information Age, 2015
WIS. L. REV. 321, 328 (2015); Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 969 (2013).
47
See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern
Debtors’ Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2018).
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mitigating those inequalities, further enable and conceal race-based
discrimination.48
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins with a description of
the parallel criminal justice reforms of diversion and expungement. It
catalogues the variety of mechanisms for diversion and expungement, the
aims and benefits of these programs, as well as the associated costs for
defendants. Part II discusses the operation of monetized relief from criminal
records. It begins with hypothetical models which demonstrate how feebased diversion programs can concentrate criminal records in Black and
Brown communities, and then follows with concerns about how perverse
financial incentives can undermine policy goals of the criminal legal system.
Part III contextualizes the environment in which paying for a clean record
occurs, locating this phenomenon within in the larger American landscape of
mass criminalization. A huge swath of the American population is saddled
with criminal records, the collateral consequences of which make it difficult
to succeed economically or acquire wealth. Compounding this is the fact that
the criminal record problem in American society disproportionately affects
Black and Brown Americans and perpetuates the racial wealth gap.49 Part IV
suggest policy proposals to better realize the stated purpose of diversion and
expungement and situates these reforms in the larger framework of prison
abolition.
Though there are methods of diversion and expungement that hold
promise, these reforms are more modest than policymakers and lawmakers
claim. Preconditioning diversion and expungement on payments allows
wealthy defendants to pay for a clean record, exacerbating race and class
divides rather than mitigating the harms imposed by our criminal legal
system. By charging a premium for diversion and expungement, criminal
courthouses profit from doing the work of institutional racism rather than
engaging in earnest reform.50

48
See Jain, The Mark of Policing, supra note 19, at 162 (describing how “criminal records
entrench racial inequality stemming from policing” and how criminal records credentialing
“enables and conceals race-based discrimination”).
49
BECKY PETTIT, INVISIBLE MEN: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE MYTH OF BLACK
PROGRESS 3 (2012) (describing how “[t]he decades-long expansion of the criminal justice
system has led to the acute and rapid disappearance of young, low-skill African American men
from portraits of the American economic, political, and social condition” while at the same
time “reinforc[ing] race and class inequalities in the United States”).
50
See NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016) (describing how criminal courthouses routinely
operate to do the work of institutional racism).
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I. THE PROBLEM OF PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD
Lawmakers are beginning to recognize the carnage wrought by the war
on drugs and rise of mass criminalization.51 They have begun to enact
criminal justice reforms—mechanisms to temper mass incarceration and
“ameliorate the enduring harms of criminal convictions.”52 Diversion—
which has been embraced as a means of reform—is a “popular form of
leniency that permits defendants to avoid formal convictions by submitting
to a period of supervision. When supervision ends, charges are dismissed.”53
Diversion is now well established in forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia.54 Drug courts—many of which operate diversion programs—have
expanded exponentially with more than 3,000 currently in operation nationwide.55
In the 2020 Presidential Debates, Joe Biden advocated drug courts as a
means of criminal justice reform—and the Democratic 2020 Platform
endorsed diversionary drug courts as well.56 Mental health courts are also on
the rise.57 Several states have created diversion programs for human
trafficking survivors58 and nearly half have diversion programs for

51
Eugene Scott, Trump Relies on His Criminal Justice Reform Creds While Prison Time
Is a Favorite Threat to His Opponents, WASH. POST (June 23, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/2020/06/23/trump-relies-his-criminal-justice-reform-creds-while-prisontime-is-favorite-threat-his-opponents/ [https://perma.cc/A98T-37LR]. See generally CORY
BOOKER, SHERROD BROWN, JULIÁN CASTRO, TA-NEHISI COATES, ALICIA GARZA, KIRSTEN
GILLIBRAND, KAMALA HARRIS, SHERRILYN IFILL, VAN JANES, AMY KLOBUCHAR, JARED
KUSHNER, BETO O’ROURKE, RASHAD ROBINSON, TOPEKA K. SAM, BERNIE SANDERS &
ELIZABETH WARREN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: IDEAS FROM
TODAY’S LEADERS (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report
_EndingMassIncarceration_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZCR-6DUY].
52
See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement
Practices, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 305, 305 (2018).
53
NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 235.
54
Pretrial Diversion, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 28, 2017), https:
//www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-diversion.aspx [https://perma.cc/
XKR9-AF8X].
55
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., DRUG COURTS 1 (2020), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
238527.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF2E-A8UM].
56
Scott Shackford, Joe Biden Envisions a Kinder, Gentler Drug War. We Should Demand
Its End, REASON (Oct. 23, 2020, 1:50 PM), https://reason.com/2020/10/23/joe-bidenenvisions-a-kinder-gentler-drug-war-we-should-demand-its-end/?amp [https://perma.cc/7X
3K-V526]; see also DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., 2020 PARTY PLATFORM 30, 37 (2020),
https://democrats.org/where-we-stand/party-platform/ [https://perma.cc/RD9V-VJ3K].
57
Courtney Black, Mental-Health Courts: Expanding the Model in an Era of Criminal
Justice Reform, 63 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 299, 308–09 (2020).
58
Collins, supra note 45, at 1575; Paige Pfleger, A Pioneering Ohio Courtroom Helps
Trafficking Victims Find Hope, NPR (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/07/76
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veterans.59 In 2019, eighteen states enacted twenty-six laws creating,
expanding, reorganizing, or otherwise supporting diversionary programs to
allow people charged with crime to avoid a criminal conviction record.60 For
example, in just two years, California passed laws creating pre-plea diversion
for drug offenses,61 mental health diversion,62 and diversion for primary
caregivers of minor children.63 Diversion is growing.
Legislatures and policy makers are also looking to expungement as a
means of criminal justice reform. In the past decade, several states have
enacted laws providing for expungement or sealing remedies due to the
perceived injustice of certain collateral consequences inhibiting reentry.
From 2009 to 2014, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia passed
laws expanding access to expungement or record sealing.64 In 2019 alone,
thirty-one states enacted sixty-seven such laws—making criminal records
relief one of the most popular criminal justice reforms. 65 Expungement of
criminal records is now available in nearly all states—with over two thirds
allowing expungement or sealing of conviction records.66
The move to embrace diversion and expungement seems
straightforward—both are reforms that ostensibly reduce mass
criminalization. One, diversion, is a front-end reform. The other,
expungement, is a back-end reform. The twin reforms of diversion and
expungement hold promise to assuage the ills of mass criminalization and
7850332/a-pioneering-columbus-courtroom-helps-trafficking-victims-find-hope
[https://
perma.cc/3BBG-5TLQ].
59
Pretrial Diversion, supra note 54.
60
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR., PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION: FAIR
CHANCE AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2019 21–23 (2020), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/Pathways-to-Reintegration_Criminal-Record-Reforms-in-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NR3V-PUM9].
61
Act of Oct. 14, 2017, ch. 778, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West 2017) (codified as CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1000, 1000.1, 1000.2, 1000.3, 1000.4, 1000.5, 1000.6, 1000.65).
62
Act of June 27, 2008, ch. 34, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West 2018) (codified as CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1001.35, 1001.36).
63
Act of Oct. 8, 2019, ch. 593, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West 2019) (codified as CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1001.83).
64
VERA INST. OF JUST., RELIEF IN SIGHT? STATES RETHINK THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, 2009-2014 12–17 (2014), https://www.vera.org/
publications/relief-in-sight-states-rethink-the-collateral-consequences-of-criminalconviction-2009-2014 [https://perma.cc/AM6G-786B].
65
NICOLE D. PORTER, SENTENCING PROJ., TOP TRENDS IN STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM, 2020, at 4 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/top-trends-instate-criminal-justice-reform-2020/ [https://perma.cc/XYH4-754Q] (listing “Second Chance
Reforms” like expungement as one of the top trends in criminal justice reform); see also
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR., supra note 60, at 10–20.
66
Brian M. Murray, Retributive Expungement, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 667–68 (2021).
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allow more Americans access to clean records. But operationalizing these
programs can be challenging. Diversion and expungement are often enacted
as revenue-generating or cost-saving reforms. When diversion and
expungement are fee-based or have financial barriers to entry, poor people
can be locked out. Meanwhile, the wealthy and middle class can buy their
way out of the harsh consequences of the criminal legal system, blunting their
appetite for more meaningful reforms.
A. THE PROMISE AND COSTS OF DIVERSION

There are several types of diversion. There are pre-filing and post-filing
diversion programs—meaning in some situations an individual is diverted to
services before a charge is even filed, whereas in others the case is not
diverted until after the court process has begun.67 Post-filing diversion can
either be pre-plea or post-plea. Pre-plea diversion programs do not require a
guilty plea and allow a defendant to go to trial if they fail out of the program,
while post-plea diversion programs require the entry of a guilty plea68 and
failure in diversion leads straight to conviction and sentencing.69 Some
diversion is based in statute while other programs have developed more
67
MICHAEL REMPEL, MELISSA LABRIOLA, PRISCILLA HUNT, ROBERT C. DAVIS, WARREN A.
REICH & SAMANTHA CHERNEY, NIJ’S: MULTISITE EVALUATION OF PROSECUTOR LED
DIVERSION PROGRAMS: STRATEGIES, IMPACTS, AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2018),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2017/Pretrial_Diversion
_Overview_ProvRel.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RB4-TPQX]. Some jurisdictions have also
experimented with police-led diversion before the charging decision even gets to the
prosecutor—for example, contacting community and family members of offenders and
leveraging community accountability rather than arresting and charging folks. See PAUL
BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 174–75 (2009) (describing one
successful program). One “diversion” program operated by Wal-Mart required shoplifters to
pay hundreds for educational programs or be subjected to prosecution. The program was
suspended shortly after a California judge determined it amounted to extortion. See Joe
Palazzolo & Sarah Nassauer, Wal-Mart Stops Shoplifting Diversion Program that Court
Described as Extortion, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
wal-mart-stops-shoplifting-diversion-program-that-court-described-as-extortion-2017-12-21
[https://perma.cc/2EBP-KKJG].
68
This is particularly problematic for non-citizen defendants because a guilty plea in a
diversion program would count as a conviction for immigration and deportation purposes even
if the defendant successfully completes diversion and gets her case dismissed. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(48)(A). Post-plea diversion programs do not offer non-citizen defendants any
refuge from immigration consequences.
69
For an in-depth discussion of post-plea diversionary schemes (also called “deferred
adjudication”), see MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & WAYNE A. LOGAN,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 563–70
(2019) (noting, at 567, that all but thirteen states allow for such programs in some
circumstances and thirty states allow deferred adjudication in a “meaningful number of felony
cases”).
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informally as manifestations of prosecutor discretion.70 This results in a
patchwork of diversion programs—different jurisdictions can have very
different rules, even in nearby counties within the same state.71
Either the prosecutor, judge, or both is typically the gatekeeper for
diversion programs.72 Prosecutors usually have power to offer diversion and
typically favor expansion of prosecutor-led diversion, rather than pre-filing,
judicial, or statutory diversion.73 And there is evidence that prosecutors are
more likely to grant diversion to White defendants than to their Latinx or
Black counterparts.74
Entrance criteria for diversion programs differ widely in requirements,
formality, and standardization. Requirements can differ depending on the
charge and the program. Some programs are standardized, while others take
more individualized approaches.75 Often diversion requirements include
educational classes related to the charged offense, for example theft
prevention, drug and alcohol abuse education, domestic violence
prevention.76 Community service is a frequent component of diversion
programs, as is attendance at Alcoholics or Narcotics Anonymous meetings
70

See David Noble, Mapping the Landscape of Prosecutor-Led Pretrial Diversion, 11
CRIM. L. PRACTITIONER 8, 12–18 (2020) (describing prosecutor-led diversion programs and
explaining how they began as ad hoc exercises of discretion and have shifted to more
formalized programs).
71
Shaila Dewan & Andrew Lehren, After Crime, the Price of a Second Chance, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-criminal-justicereform-diversion.html [https://perma.cc/9CHE-S2Z8] (noting that in Oregon DUI diversion is
common, but it is not allowed in Tennessee, and that while one county in Kansas offers drug
diversion, a nearby county does not); see also KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 22, at 16
(listing factors that contribute to the unique political culture of each local criminal court and
concluding “[i]t would be foolish to assume that the host of factors that make each jurisdiction
unique would not affect, for example, how caseload pressures translate into disposition
patterns”).
72
LOVE, ROBERTS & LOGAN, supra note 69, at 569.
73
NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 235; see, e.g., S.B. 1913, 2017 Leg., 85th Sess. (Tex.
2017).
74
Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion: An Analysis of Outcomes
Among Men Charged with Felonies and Processed in State Courts, 3 RACE & JUST. 210, 210,
226 (2013) (finding that prosecutors were more likely to grant diversion to White defendants
than similarly situated Latinx and Black defendants, and that the disparities disadvantaged
Black defendants more frequently than Latinx defendants).
75
See, e.g., REMPEL, LABRIOLA, HUNT, DAVIS, REICH & CHERNEY, supra note 67, at 21;
see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.36 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2022 Reg. Sess.)
(requiring an individualized treatment plan for the grant of mental health diversion).
76
Noble, supra note 70, at 14; see also MICHELA LOWRY & ASHMINI KERODAL, CTR. FOR
CT. INNOVATION, PROSECUTOR-LED DIVERSION: A NATIONAL SURVEY 19 (2019),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/prosecutorled_diversion.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VBK-Y5AE].
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for alcohol and drug related offenses.77 Drug treatment and testing are often
required, as are other types of group or individual counseling sessions.78
Some require completion of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy or restorative
justice programs.79 Many states have statutory diversion programs that allow
for expungement upon successful completion.80 Diversion can also exist in
“specialty” courts like drug courts,81 veterans courts, and mental health
courts—though some of these courts are strictly for post-conviction matters
where defendants are supervised during a probationary period after a
conviction is final, and are therefore not diversion programs.
Diversion is quite common, particularly in misdemeanor cases.82 Some
estimates are that as high as 33% of misdemeanors get diverted or
dismissed.83 In San Antonio, 25% of cases are disposed of using diversion.84
In Cook County, Illinois 2546% of misdemeanor cases resulted in dismissal
and in Texas municipal and justice courts, the conviction rate is under 50%.85
In New York the figure is close to 50%, and in Connecticut as many as 60%
are diverted.86
Sometimes, diversion focuses on specific types of crimes. For example,
many places that have not decriminalized possession of marijuana offer
diversion to first time marijuana offenders,87 and diversion for driving on

77
Angela J. Davis, An Introduction by Angela J. Davis, 11 CRIM. L. PRACTITIONER 4, 5
(2020).
78
Id.
79
See, e.g., LOWRY & KERODAL, supra note 76, at 19.
80
See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 780-117 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
81
REBECCA TIGER, JUDGING ADDICTS: DRUG COURTS AND COERCION IN THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 21 (2013) (noting that though drug courts began with a pre-plea model, now 58% of
adult drug courts are post-plea).
82
See, e.g., REMPEL, LABRIOLA, HUNT, DAVIS, REICH & CHERNEY, supra note 67, at
1517; Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 18, at 1005.
83
NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 43.
84
Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 18, at 1032 (noting that in San Antonio approximately
25% of misdemeanor cases were channeled into diversion).
85
KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 22, at 270 n.6 (cataloging data and explaining
difficulties in differentiating dismissals and diversion-based dismissals in court data).
86
NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 43.
87
Danny Clemens, Everything You Need to Know About Harris Co.’s New Pot Policy,
ABC 13 (Mar. 2, 2017), https://abc13.com/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-harriscospot-policy/1757801 [https://perma.cc/W6TV-M8NN] (reporting that the new Misdemeanor
Marijuana Diversion Program “will divert all misdemeanor marijuana cases . . . instead
redirecting low level drug offenders into a decision-making class”); Mayson & Stevenson,
supra note 18, at 1038 (noting that Cook County, Illinois has a diversion program for firsttime possession of marijuana). This is common practice in New York. See KOHLERHAUSMANN, supra note 22, at 86–88 (describing frequent use of “adjournment contemplating

2022]

PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD

455

suspended license cases is common.88 Felony diversion programs are much
less common, and more rigorous—particularly if the crime is characterized
as a violent offense.89 Diversion is usually not about “weak evidence” but
rather the “sentiment that it is morally unnecessary for the heavy machinery
of criminal justice to come down on every defendant accused of a low-level
offense if the person can prove himself to be responsible and governable.”90
Diversion is not without its problems. First, as a mechanism to avoid a
criminal record, diversion is not perfect—it sometimes does leave a mark on
your record.91 For example, the arrest record and the fact that there was a
grant of diversion typically remain public record. The other primary concern
about diversion is that it results in a phenomenon called “net-widening.”92
Though the results of a diverted prosecution are less harsh, the cost of the
prosecution also goes down, so it is easier to sweep people into the criminal
system than it would have otherwise been.93 Counterintuitively, diversion
reforms can “expand the scope of state control over the lives of those
entangled in the justice system” and increase opportunities for government
actors to intervene in the private lives of Americans.94 For example, drug

dismissal” or ACD for marijuana cases); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.55, 170.56
(McKinney, Westlaw through L.2022 Ch. 110).
88
See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 235; see also Driver’s License Suspension
Programs, PROSECUTOR-LED DIVERSION TOOLKIT, https://www.diversiontoolkit.org/driverslicense-suspensions/ [https://perma.cc/EXR5-6Q26] (including case studies from Marion
County, Indiana and Durham, North Carolina).
89
EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 3031 (2019). Bazelon’s book chronicles the
experiences of one young man charged with a gun possession offense who successfully
completes a diversion program in New York City over 2 years. Id. at 12331, 14346,
196219, 23949.
90
KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 22, at 74 (quoting a prosecutor explaining, “We’re
evaluating the case and saying that based on the fact that maybe you have never been arrested
before, or based on the fact that you are young and it’s your first offense, or based on the facts
of this case—this is a case that is worth us dismissing it, if you don’t get in trouble again.
That’s all we’re saying. That you are entitled to that clean slate. That we’re going to give the
opportunity to have this clean slate, despite this case.”).
91
NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 235.
92
See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Models of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs
in the United States and Beyond, 4 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 331, 333 (2020).
93
NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 219 (describing the net-widening effects of diversion and
noting that “[r]eforms aimed at making the system more lenient can thus paradoxically lead
to the punishment of more people.”).
94
Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 59799
(2016).
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arrests increased dramatically as drug courts expanded.95 And the sentences
of those who fail in diversionary programs can sometimes be significantly
longer than they would have been had the defendant simply accepted a
conviction at the outset.96 For petty misdemeanor offenses, diversion
converts the possibility of a short jail sentence into potentially months or
years of supervision and court control. Though lawmakers claim diversion as
a move away from mass incarceration, it is often sold to judges and
lawmakers as a means of increased control and leverage over low-level
offenders.97
Well-run diversion programs can reduce collateral consequences for
defendants, produce cost savings, and reduce recidivism—“a win, win,
win.”98 Diversion appeals to a variety of different stakeholders because of its
ability to satisfy these diverse policy goals. However, the ideological
ambivalence and competing priorities of cost savings, public safely, and
reducing collateral consequences can create tension.99 For example, when
rehabilitation is promoted based on cost-effectiveness rather than adherence
to egalitarian principles, stakeholders may decide some resource-needy
defendants are not worth rehabilitating.100
Diversion can also be expensive for the defendants who are “diverted.”
Some prosecutors charge—as much as $750 per misdemeanor charge and
$1,400 per felony charge—and typically much of the money must be paid up
front.101 Costs include diversion application fees, program fees, and
95
Id. at 635. Drug arrests went from 1,008,300 in 1990 (the year after drug courts were
created) to 1,375,600 in 2000 (with 665 drug courts in existence) to 1,693,100 in 2006 (with
1,756 drug courts in existence). Id.
96
Id. at 604 n.50 (“[S]entences for failing participants in New York City drug courts were
typically two-to-five times longer than the sentences for conventionally adjudicated
defendants”); Collins, supra note 45, at 1628 & n.307 (noting that problem-solving courts are
not “get out of jail free” programs and participation in such programs does not decrease the
likelihood that a defendant will be incarcerated).
97
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
106970 (2015).
98
See, e.g., REMPEL, LABRIOLA, HUNT, DAVIS, REICH & CHERNEY, supra note 67, at
2530.
99
See, e.g., id. at vi (noting in this report on prosecutor-led diversion programs, the two
“most commonly endorsed goals [of diversion programs] were: (1) administrative efficiency
and cost savings (by routing cases away from traditional prosecution and directing resources
to other more serious cases); and (2) reducing convictions and collateral consequences for
defendants”).
100
Collins, supra note 36, at 1499; see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Neorehabilitation and
Indiana’s Sentencing Reform Dilemma, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 867, 87475 (2013).
101
Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, Alabama Prosecutor Sets the Penalties and Fills
the Coffers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/alabamaprosecutor-valeska-criminal-justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/79H3-AAVQ].
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additional charges like court costs, supervision fees, prosecution costs, drug
lab fees, and public defender fees.102 In these courtrooms, defendants often
plead guilty and accept a conviction because they cannot afford the steep
costs of diversion.103
In Tennessee, defendants are often offered a simple form of diversion—
dismissals upon payment of court costs—which can easily run as much as
$500 for a simple drug possession case.104 If the costs are not paid quickly,
the opportunity for dismissal is lost. Court costs for convictions can run even
higher.105 Thus, defendants who can pay up front get the double benefit of
the dismissal and the lower cost due to avoiding the conviction. Even in
relatively progressive states like California, a premium is charged for
participation in diversion. For example, under California’s diversion statute,
the law authorizes an additional diversion enrollment fee of up to $300 for a
misdemeanor charge and $500 for a felony charge.106 The statute also
requires a diversion restitution fee of between $100 and $1000 dollars.107
Because diversion is voluntary and premised on an exercise of prosecutor
discretion—not an entitlement as of right—fees are rarely waived for the
poor.108
Diversion entry fees and court fees are only part of the total cost. Often
participants in diversion programs must pay separate costs for the
programming and educational classes required. For example, the class
required for “Johns” diversion programs—common diversion programs for
first-time arrestees charged with solicitation of prostitution—costs $350 in
Salt Lake City,109 $500 in North Dakota,110 $600 in Los Angeles County,111
and $750 in Minneapolis.112 Domestic violence cases can be dismissed for
102

Dewan & Lehren, supra note 71; see also Case Action Summary, Alabama v. Caleb
Elisha Moore, Nos. 55-CC-2015-386, 55-CC-2015-386 (2016).
103
Shaila Dewan, Forcing a District Attorney’s Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/insider/forcing-a-district-attorneys-hand.html [https://
perma.cc/LF3B-DE2G].
104
See, e.g., Joy Radice, Access-to-Justice Challenges for Expungement in Tennessee, 30
FED. SENT’G REP. 277, 277 (2018).
105
Id.
106
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.15(a), (c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.).
107
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.90(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
108
Dewan & Lehren, supra note 71.
109
AMARA LEGAL CTR., SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DIVERSION PROGRAMS: SEX WORK
AND SEX TRAFFICKING 102 (2018), https://www.amaralegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/
survey-of-united-states-diversion-programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CJR-NJMV].
110
Id. at 79.
111
Id. at 20.
112
Id. at 62.

458

KIMPEL

[Vol. 112

participation in a sixteen-week batterer’s intervention course, but the costs to
participate can run $40 a session, for a total of $640.113 Drug testing typically
costs $25 a test and tests can be ordered multiple times a week.114 Some
courts even charge defendants a fee to perform court-mandated community
service.115
High costs certainly keep some defendants from benefitting—when the
New Orleans district attorney lowered costs for diversion from $1,200 to
$200, participation tripled.116 This prompts the question of how many
individuals in New Orleans have criminal records simply because they could
not pay the $1,200 before the fee was lowered. For those defendants who
elect to participate in diversion, the costs can be unmanageable.117 Some
defendants forgo college or even resort to selling plasma to make their

113

See ALICIA VIRANI, UCLA SCH. OF L. CRIM. JUST. PROGRAM, THE FINANCIAL IMPACT
COURT-ORDERED BATTERERS’ INTERVENTION PROGRAMS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 5
(2021), http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/dvcouncil/research/Docs/UCLA_Financial_Impact_
BIP.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3NJ-NXC8] (noting that the median price per class in L.A. County
was $25 with 24% charging $26–$40 and 4% charging over $40). In the author’s experience
as a public defender in California, the cost per session was the same for the sixteen week and
fifty-two week class. If the defendant fails diversion, they are ordered to complete a fifty-two
week class as part of probation at triple the cost. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.097(a)(6)
(McKinney, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
114
See Elizabeth Brico, The Cost of Drug Testing Is Making It Harder for Poor People to
Afford Treatment, TALK POVERTY (May 15, 2018), https://talkpoverty.org/2018/05/15/cost-dr
ug-testing-making-harder-poor-people-afford-treatment/#:~:text=Today%20these%20tests%
20generally%20cost,%2415%20per%20test%20in%202012 [https://perma.cc/GB8J-N59J].
115
In Santa Clara County, the court required the defendant to enroll with Sentencing
Alternatives Program, Inc. (SAP) to monitor and verify the defendant’s participation in
community service hours. SAP charged an enrollment fee and another fee depending upon the
number of community service hours assigned by the court. See Program Fees, SENT’G ALT.
PROGRAM, INC., https://www.sapsj.com/our-fees/ [https://perma.cc/73XJ-HPRU]. Other
courts assess the administrative fee for monitoring the community service hours themselves.
See Traffic Court – Community Service Work, SUPER. CT. OF CALIF.: MARIN CNTY.,
https://www.marincourt.org/traffic_comm_service.htm [https://perma.cc/4BGA-VSS8]. In
other counties, the volunteer centers themselves charge a fee to do community service hours.
See UCLA LABOR CTR., WORK, PAY, OR GO TO JAIL: COURT-ORDERED COMMUNITY SERVICE
IN LOS ANGELES 6 (2019), https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/UCLA_
CommunityServiceReport_Final_1016.pdf [https://perma.cc/69CC-3QY3] (noting that in
2013 to 2014, the volunteer center registration fees amounted to almost $5 million in Los
Angeles County).
116
Dewan & Lehren, supra note 71.
117
For a neat interactive tool to simulate the experience of diversion, see Andrew W.
Lehren, Scott Blumenthal & Shaila Dewan, The Prosecutor’s Deal, the Defendant’s Dilemma,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/12/us/law-quizcriminal-justice.html [https://perma.cc/5ZYN-VY66].
OF
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diversion payments.118 Others go without food, delay paying rent or buying
prescription medication, or resort to high-interest payday loans.119 In one
survey of 1,011 justice-involved Alabamians in 2018–2019, 42% admitted to
committing additional crimes to get money to pay diversion costs.120 This
should come as no surprise given that “[s]tudies suggest that unmanageable
economic sanctions are criminogenic”—meaning they increase rather than
decrease recidivism.121
These additional costs might be justified if there was robust data
demonstrating the efficacy of the programs being required. But often the
required programing is untested or has been proven ineffective.122 For
example, one popular domestic violence prevention program has been shown
to have no impact on reoffending rates.123 The evidence on the effectiveness
of compulsory drug treatment—like that in drug court—is mixed with studies
suggesting the voluntary treatment may be preferable.124 This suggests that
118
Shaila Dewan, Caught with Pot? Get-Out-of-Jail Program Comes With $950 Catch,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/us/marijuana-diversionprogram-maricopa-arizona.html [https://perma.cc/8VH9-R9Z8].
119
ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUST., IN TROUBLE: HOW THE PROMISE OF DIVERSION
CLASHES WITH THE REALITY OF POVERTY, ADDICTION, AND STRUCTURAL RACISM IN
ALABAMA’S JUSTICE SYSTEM 56, 19 (2020), https://www.alabamaappleseed.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/02/Alabama-Appleseed-Diversion-Report-2020-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ
S6-5KY4] (noting that 45% of survey takers reported taking out a payday loan).
120
Id. at 19 (noting 29% sold drugs, and 24% stole).
121
Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural Reform, 69
DUKE L.J. 1529, 1563 (2020); see, e.g., Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett,
Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United
States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1785 (2010) (noting that several respondents in a nationally
representative survey of inmates in state and federal correctional facilities indicated that
criminal debt obligations encouraged them to return to crime); see also Colgan, supra note 47,
at 63 (compiling studies of the effects of unmanageable economic sanctions).
122
Collins, supra note 45, at 1578 (discussing the dearth of data on the efficacy of
problem-solving courts and noting that with respect to drug courts, some studies showed
reduced recidivism, some no impact, and one found increased recidivism rates); see also
Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Rethinking Federal Diversion: The Rise of Specialized Criminal
Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 47, 84–87 (2017) (summarizing studies which found that
though well-run drug courts can significantly reduce recidivism, fewer than half of drug courts
tracked completion rates and recidivism, when tracked, was often only tracked for short
periods; also noting that most evaluations of veterans courts were descriptive and did not
include outcome evaluations).
123
Collins, supra note 45, at 1589–90 (summarizing studies); Practice Profile:
Interventions for Domestic Violence Offenders: Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, NAT’L INST.
JUST. (Sept. 12, 2013), https://crimesolutions.ojp.gov/ratedpractices/16#pd [https://perma.cc/
97D3-WKED] (conducting meta-analyses and finding no statistically significant effect on
recidivism rates or victimization rates of partners for cognitive behavioral therapy).
124
D. Werb, A. Kamarulzaman, M.C. Meacham, C. Rafful, B. Fisher, S.A. Strathdee &
E. Wood, The Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment: A Systematic Review, 28 INT. J.
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communities may be better off expanding access to voluntary drug treatment
rather than arresting low-level drug offenders and funneling them into drug
courts. Moreover, there is evidence that over-programming low-needs
defendants increases rates of recidivism.125
Diversion can also keep a case pending for longer than if a defendant
simply took a plea deal and conviction—particularly in misdemeanor cases.
The longer the case is pending, the greater the costs to the defendant.
Additional court appearances and attendance at meetings with court officers
cost time and money—time off work, childcare costs, and transportation
costs.126 Indigent defendants may spend more time in court than wealthier
defendants because judges tend to prioritize cases in which the defendant has
retained counsel—decreasing wait times for paid attorneys while relegating
unrepresented defendants to the back of the line.127
Costs relating to pretrial release conditions also increase as the case
takes longer to resolve due to a period of diversionary supervision by the
court. For example, electronic home monitoring requires an initial “hook-up”
fee, but the bulk of the costs are based on monthly maintenance fees—
meaning that for each month of diversion, the defendant might have to pay
simply to stay out of jail on pretrial release.128 Some defendants linger in a
diversion program longer simply because they cannot make final payments,
accruing more supervision and drug testing costs in the meantime.129 Many

DRUG POL’Y 1, 6 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4752879/
[https://perma.cc/P6NH-6Y76]. For a discussion of the benefit of purveying social services in
the community rather than through the court system, see Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration
Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1632–34
(2012).
125
James Bonta, Suzanne Wallace-Capretta & Jennifer Rooney, A Quasi-Experimental
Evaluation of an Intensive Rehabilitation Supervision Program, 27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
312, 324 (2000), (finding that nontreated low-level offenders had lower recidivism rates than
treated low-level offenders). We know this intuitively. We do not send our teenaged child to
in-patient drug treatment for breaking curfew and getting drunk once—such an extreme
intervention would sever the teen’s positive social networks and expose her to individuals with
drug problems and criminal histories. This disruption is more likely to exacerbate a drug or
alcohol problem then nip a burgeoning addiction in the bud.
126
Jenny E. Carroll, Beyond Bail, 73 FLA. L. REV. 143, 185–86 (2020).
127
Henry Ordower, J.S. Onesimo Sandoval & Kenneth Warren, Out of Ferguson:
Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax Distribution, and Constitutional Limitations, 61
HOWARD L.J. 113, 122 (2017).
128
Carroll, supra note 126, at 187–88.
129
ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUST., supra note 119, at 8 (describing one individual
whose program took three years and $8,425 to complete); see also id. at 32–33 (describing
process of keeping defendants in diversion and under court supervision when they still owe
diversions costs).
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low-income defendants fail diversion because they cannot pay.130 In failure,
these defendants lose both the benefit of a clean record and whatever costs
they have paid for the diversion program—with some ultimately ending up
in jail.131 Some defendants may even rationally decide at some point that
going to jail or prison is “easier” than completing the program.132 In failing
diversion, some defendants end up spending more time in jail or prison than
if they had avoided diversion and accepted a conviction in the first place.133
Given these financial barriers to participation and the presence of the
racial wealth and income gaps—it is anticipated that people of color will have
difficulty accessing diversion programs.134 Studies show that though Black
people tend to be over-represented in the criminal legal system, they tend to
benefit less than White people from diversion programs.135 It is also likely

130

Eaglin, supra note 94, at 631–32 (noting that in Texas drug court programs supervision
can be shortened for successful participants—but not if they have not paid for treatment).
131
Dewan & Lehren, supra note 101.
132
Cary Aspinwall, ‘We’re Going Home!’: More than 500 Oklahoma Inmates Freed in
Historic Release, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/
nov/05/oklahoma-inmates-prison-historic-mass-release [https://perma.cc/354Z-YN6Z] (describing one woman who entered a drug court program for a marijuana possession charge who
“struggled for three years to meet all the requirements of drug court, including paying
hundreds of dollars for drug tests from the money she earned at an $8.10-an-hour job as a
nurse’s aide. Last year, she said, she decided it was just easier to go to prison.”).
133
TIGER, supra note 81, at 25 (noting that some drug court participants spent more time
in jail than their counterparts who just pled guilty and were sentenced).
134
See infra Section II.A.; see also ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUST., supra note
119, at 13 (“There is reason to be concerned that African-American Alabamians are
disproportionately blocked from participating in diversion programs because they lack access
to wealth.”); see infra Section IV.A.
135
Collins, supra note 36, at 1506 (explaining racial disparities in who is excluded from
rehabilitative court programs and the outsized role of criminal history as a means to exclude
participation); Douglas B. Marlowe, Introduction, 1 J. FOR ADVANCING JUST. 1, 1 (2018),
https://advancejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/AJ-Journal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
R3DK-98FA] (“African American individuals are underrepresented in drug courts by 15 to 20
percentage points” and less likely to successfully graduate than their White male counterparts)
(citations omitted); Lisa M. Shannon, Afton Jackson Jones, Shondrah Nash, Jennifer Newell
& Connie M. Payne, Examining Racial Disparities in Program Completion and Post-Program
Recidivism Rates: Comparing Caucasian and Non-Caucasian Treatment Court Participants,
1 J. FOR ADVANCING JUST. 63, 80 (2018) (describing a study of Kentucky drug court
participants and showing that for White participants, the most common drug of choice tended
to be opioids while the most common drug of choice of non-White participants was
marijuana—suggesting that White defendants are referred to diversionary programs for more
serious drug addiction problems than non-White defendants); Schlesinger, supra note 74, at
210; CONNOR CONCANNON, EXAMINING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN PROSECUTOR’S
BAIL REQUESTS AND DOWNSTREAM DECISION MAKING 51–52 (2020), https://academicworks
.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5085&context=gc_etds
[https://perma.cc/95QG-
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that much of the money for diversion comes not from the poor defendants
themselves, but from their poor family members.136 These costs harm not
only criminal defendants but also impoverish families—particularly in lowincome communities of color. Notably, there is no correlation between costs
of diversion and wealth of a particular community; in fact, some poorer
jurisdictions charge more for diversion due to budgetary shortfalls.137
On the flip side, fee-based diversion is used by the wealthy and middle
class to shield their children and themselves from the harsh impact of the
criminal legal system.138 For example, Alabama’s current Commissioner of
Pardons and Parole, Cam Ward, was able to get a 2015 DUI charge dismissed
when he, a state senator at the time, participated in a pre-trial diversion
program costing $2,400.139 Ward explained that he received “pretty much the
same punishment as everybody who goes through that program,” failing to
recognize that many would not be able to afford the program at all.140
In some ways, it is odd to charge people for the programming required
in diversion. Defendants are not thought of as having to pay the cost of their
own incarceration, which is significantly more expensive than the
educational and rehabilitative programs prosecutors and courts require for
diversion.141 Defendants are never told they cannot be sentenced to prison
because there are no beds available—but diversionary programs are
frequently denied because of program or “bed space” constraints.142
Similarly, defendants can be denied diversion because programs have not
worked in the past—again, prison is not shelved as an option simply because
7LKK] (finding that Black defendants were eleven percent more likely to be indicted than
White defendants and that some non-indictments were due to diversion).
136
Joshua Page, Victoria Piehowski & Joe Soss, A Debt of Care: Commercial Bail and
the Gendered Logic of Criminal Justice Predation, 5 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS. 150,
152 (2019).
137
Dewan & Lehren, supra note 101 (noting that diversion in poor Houston County,
Alabama often costs $2,000 while in wealthier San Bernardino, California, diversion caps out
at $400).
138
Dewan & Lehren, supra note 71 (noting that Caleb Moore, son of former Alabama
Supreme Court Justice Roy Moore, paid $900 for diversion of possession of marijuana and
Xanax charges).
139
Megan Miller, Sen. Cam Ward Admits Guilt, Enters Trial Diversion Program for DUI
Arrest, CBS 42 WIAT (Sept. 2015), https://www.cbs42.com/news/crime/sen-cam-wardadmits-guilt-enters-trial-diversion-program-for-dui-arrest/amp/ [https://perma.cc/G64D-Z8
5T].
140
Id.
141
But see Jessica Lussenhop, The U.S. Inmates Charged Per Night in Jail, BBC NEWS
MAG. (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34705968 [https://perma.cc/5K
P5-4S4F] (noting that forty-nine states allow charging defendants for incarceration costs).
142
See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 147, 227 (2017).
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it has been proven ineffective for a particular defendant in the past.143 Many
rehabilitative programs are cost-effective in terms of reducing crime and
providing other benefits to taxpayers, but the cost is often borne by the
defendant alone.144
Diversion programs can be run without charging defendants.145
Veteran’s diversion programs are supported by VA benefits.146 Many drug
diversion programs rely on treatment funded by Medicaid expansion.147 In
other circumstances, the municipality absorbs the costs. For example, Cook
County, Illinois has a diversion program with no financial barriers to
participation and handles about 5,000 defendants a year.148 As one prosecutor
there explained, “To tell somebody that if you can pay for this, you can get
your charges dismissed, but if you are poor you are going to go through the
system? That’s completely unfair.”149 It is unfair—but it is still pervasive
within diversion programs across the United States.150
B. THE PROMISE AND COSTS OF EXPUNGEMENT

The term “expungement” technically refers to record destruction and
purging, but it has emerged as the umbrella term, often used to refer to
statutory schemes that seal or mitigate records rather than erase them
entirely.151 It is referred to by a variety of names: expungement, record

143

Id. at 123.
PAUL D. BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 52 (2010) (noting
every dollar invested in drug treatment saves taxpayers another $7.46 in other costs).
145
In fact, some have convincingly argued that when prosecutors do no bear the “full costs
of their decisionmaking [this] encourages them to exceed optimal criminal enforcement.” See,
e.g., Russell Gold, Paying for Pretrial Detention, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1255, 1289 (2020).
146
See, e.g., Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive Approach, 35 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357, 368 (2009) (“Service delivery is made possible
through the collaboration of numerous community partners[],” including the VA Health Care
Network and the Veterans Benefits Administration).
147
See California Courts, Partnering with County Behavioral Health to Service JusticeInvolved Populations: Part I, at 8:26, YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2019), https://bit.ly/3zDRUlD
[https://perma.cc/4AZQ-6GZK].
148
Dewan & Lehren, supra note 71.
149
Id.
150
For example, in Alabama the median cost of a diversion program is $1,600. ALA.
APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUST., supra note 119, at 5. In Georgia, the average amount paid
for pre-trial diversion is $1,932. CARL VINSON INST. OF GOV’T, THE ESTIMATED ECONOMIC
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS OF ACCOUNTABILITY COURT PROGRAMS IN GEORGIA (2017),
https://cjcc.georgia.gov/press-releases/2018-05-09/estimated-economic-impacts-andbenefits-accountability-court-programs [https://perma.cc/AL2Q-5AQJ].
151
See Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery, Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal
Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 378, 380 (1970); see also
144
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sealing, record destruction, obliteration, dismissal, set aside, expunction,
purging, annulment, and nullification and has varying effects depending on
the statutory framework of the jurisdiction.152 A majority of states allow for
sealing or expungement of convictions—though most only allow
expungement of first-time or low-level convictions.153 All but three states
(Arizona, Idaho, and Wisconsin) allow for sealing or expungement of nonconviction records.154 Fundamentally, these provisions in law “recognize that
a person should not be forever judged and burdened by his or her criminal
record.”155
Expungement law has been developing for eight decades156 and there is
a “national patchwork” of approaches.157 In the past, expungement and
sealing were typically restricted to arrest and non-conviction information—
but recent laws have expanded to conviction information in most states. 158
Sometimes expungement—of either convictions or arrests not resulting in
conviction—is automatic.159 In other circumstances, expungement isn’t
automatic even when it intuitively seems as though it should be, such as in
LOVE, ROBERTS & LOGAN, supra note 69, at 548–55 (describing the diversity of state law
expungement and sealing mechanisms).
152
See Kogon & Loughery, supra note 151, at 379. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-142a (Lexis through 2021 Reg. & Spec. Sess.) (allowing for physical destruction of nonconviction records) with IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-38-9-10 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 11,
2022) (allowing for sealing and redacting but not physical destruction).
153
See LOVE, ROBERTS & LOGAN, supra note 69, at 545–46.
154
See id. at 551–52.
155
Pinard, supra note 46, at 990.
156
Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?: Prosecutorial Discretion and
Expungement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2838 (2018).
157
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 122 (1983) (examples and citations
omitted).
158
Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at
the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 367 (2016); see, e.g., IND. CODE
§ 35-38-5-1(a) (repealed 2014); Joseph C. Dugan, I Did My Time: The Transformation of
Indiana’s Expungement Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1321, 1335 (2015) (“[I]ndividuals could petition for
expungement if they were arrested and released without charge or if the charges filed against
them were dropped due to mistaken identity, no offense in fact, or absence of probable cause”);
see also MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE BY STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 113–24 (2006) (containing a
chart noting which states did not allow for expungement of conviction as well as what states
generally allow it).
159
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11361.8, 11361.9 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of
2022 Reg. Sess.) (automatic expungement of past marijuana convictions), NY CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 160.59 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2022 Ch. 110) (automatic sealing of
disposition favorable to the defendant); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC., § 10-105(a)(5)
(LexisNexis, Lexis through 2021 First Spec. Sess.) (allowing automatic expungement of nonconviction records).
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the context of a formal exoneration.160 Some statutory schemes make
granting expungement mandatory if eligibility criteria are met, while in other
schemes, the judge retains discretion to grant or deny expungement once
eligibility is established.161
Most expungement schemes seal conviction or non-conviction records
and prevent disclosure to private employers, though some allow disclosure
to private employers in certain circumstances.162 Typically, information can
be accessed and disclosed to state licensing bodies, a serious limitation as
more and more Americans jobs require an occupational license.163 Criticisms
of efficacy of record sealing and expungement have persisted for decades.164
Many laws understood to erase criminal records do a less than thorough job
and can sometimes put an individual in a trap of deciding between revealing
a conviction which should be expunged or risk being caught in a lie if the
record comes up later.165 In particular, legal scholars like Jenny Roberts and
James Jacobs express concern about the reliability of FBI databases and
commercial background check vendors databases, and question whether it is
possible to reliably expunge a criminal record in the age of big data.166
In addition, access to justice barriers mean that often expungement is
available to relatively few individuals with criminal records.167 Expungement
schemes in many states are complicated and difficult for a lay person to
navigate.168 Meanwhile, free legal services are scarce and inadequate to help
160
See Amy Shlosberg, Evan J. Mandery, Valerie West & Bennett Callaghan, The
Expungement Myth, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (2011); Hannah Brewer, Expungement in
Texas, 60 S. TEX. L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2019) (discussing the process of getting an
expungement for an exoneree).
161
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303(E)(2) (LexisNexis, Lexis through
2021 First Spec. Sess.); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 977–78 (Westlaw through 2021 Sess.)
(judge does not have discretion to deny expungement if defendant is statutorily eligible);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(5)(a)(1)-(12) (Lexis through Ch. 22 of 2022 Reg. Sess.) (judge
must balance public interests against petitioner’s interest in expungement if eligible and
retains discretion to deny).
162
See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 973 (Westlaw through 2021 Sess.).
163
See Kogon & Loughery, supra note 151, at 385. But see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-910(b) (West, Westlaw through Mar. 11, 2022) (disallowing suspension, expulsion, refusal to
hire, admit, or license on the basis of expunged records).
164
Kogon & Loughery, supra note 151, at 378.
165
Id. at 385.
166
Roberts, supra note 46, at 344–45. See generally JACOBS, supra note 17 (describing
criminal records as “eternal” in the internet age).
167
See Kogon & Loughery, supra note 151, at 386; see also Colleen V. Chien, America’s
Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gap, 119 MICH. L. REV. 514, 590 tbl.A-2 (2020)
(describing and quantifying second chance gaps).
168
See Eliza Hersh & Gabriel Chin, Building a Functioning Framework for Reentry and
Restoration of Rights: Lessons from California’s “Mystery House”, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 283,
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the number of people eligible for records relief.169 Thus, “[f]or the vast
number of ex-offenders, largely members of lower-class and minority
groups, sealing and expungement are meaningless terms.”170 In California,
less than one percent of felons eligible for records relief have applied, and
even fewer have actually been granted relief.171
That being said, expungement provides some relief to the harsh
discrimination faced by those with criminal records in the employment
context.172 The primary reason individuals are interested in records relief like
expungement or sealing is because of its perceived impact on finding a job.173
Empirical studies find that obtaining an expungement increases rates of
employment and wages, and that these trends are sustained over time.174
Moreover, recidivism rates for individuals who have obtained record
expungement relief are low, assuaging fears that expunging records creates
risks to public safety.175 Expungement holds promise for individuals marked
by criminal records who want a fresh start.
Expungement also has costs, beginning with a fee for obtaining a copy
of one’s own criminal record from state law enforcement agencies—the
necessary first step for most sealing and expungement petitions.176 Costs to
file expungement petitions vary—by type of petition, county, and state. Some

283 (2018) (describing California’s expungement scheme as a “ramshackle maze of
overlapping and frequently inconsistent provisions”); see also Radice, supra note 104, at 177.
169
Indigent defendants are generally not entitled to counsel to help with criminal records
relief. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (no due process right to appointed
counsel post-conviction aside from first appeal of right); see, e.g., Pitts v. State, 113 S.W.3d
393, 397 (Tex. App. 2003) (no right to appointed counsel for expunction proceedings).
170
See Kogon & Loughery, supra note 151, at 386.
171
Hersh & Chin, supra note 168, at 286.
172
Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal Record
Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (2018) (finding
expungement or record sealing improved employment rates and wages in a sample in
California’s Bay Area; average employment rates grew in the years after the intervention from
roughly 75% to 80%–85%, while earnings increased by about one third in the time period after
the record sealing intervention).
173
JENNY MONTOYA TANSEY & KATHERINE CARLIN, CODE FOR AMERICA, CLOSING THE
DELIVERY GAP 14 (2018), http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/codeforamerica-cms1/
documents/Closing-the-Delivery-Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CGP-XHP3].
174
J.B. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical
Study, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2460, 2500 (2020) (finding that the impact is greater for women and
Black people who obtain set-asides).
175
Id. at 2514 (finding that rates are even lower than the general population of the state).
176
Hersh & Chin, supra note 168, at 286 (noting that there is an indigency waiver, but
even the reduced cost can be prohibitive).
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fees are fairly modest—$50 in Michigan and $30 in Maryland.177 In
California, filing fees charged by counties vary and can be as much as
$150.178 Louisiana, with the highest cost, charges $550 per petition.179
Some expungement statutes require a defendant to have paid off all
costs—fees, fines, and restitution—associated with her original case.180 This
of course presents a “Catch-22” because those in most need of record relief
are those whose records obstruct them from obtaining gainful employment
and who are therefore likely to have outstanding court debt.181 One study
found that many individuals interested in records relief were concerned about
their ability to pay off outstanding fines and fees from their original cases,
with a significant fraction unable to pay these costs—some of which were
more than $2,000.182
New research explores the contours of the “second chance gap” in
expungements—namely what percentage of people who are eligible for
record cleaning relief do not apply. Some estimate that 30-40% of those with
criminal records—or approximately twenty to thirty million individuals—are
entitled to clean their record either partially or fully.183 Nearly a third of those
with clearable criminal records in one sample had clearable felonies and more
than a fifth had fully clearable records.184 But many individuals with
expungable records do not even apply. In California, after Proposition 47
reduced many crimes from felonies to misdemeanors and entitled defendants
to retroactive records relief, only 9% of those eligible applied for record
177
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621d (h)(9) (2021); Expungement (Adult), MD. CTS., https://
mdcourts.gov/legalhelp/expungement [https://perma.cc/X74T-U479].
178
There is some evidence that at least some courts charge more than $150. See TANSEY
& CARLIN, supra note 173, at 24 (noting that some courthouses in Solano County charged
$240 to file an expungement petition).
179
Matt Sledge, A Criminal Record Clean Slate Is Expensive in Louisiana, but a New
Lawsuit Aims to Change That, NOLA.COM (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.nola.com/news/
courts/article_1d8fdea8-2c04-11ea-9c46-c701a11a7646.html#:~:text=But%20moving%20fo
rward%20comes%20at,like%20one%20day%20in%20court [https://perma.cc/3R3R-GU5T].
180
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(k)(1)(D) (Lexis through Ch. 598 of 2022 Reg.
Sess.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(m) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2022 Reg. Sess.);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-905(A) (Westlaw through Mar. 3, 2022); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-72-706(1)(e) (Lexis through Mar. 7, 2022); WIS. STAT. § 973.015(b) (Lexis through Act
139 of 2021–22 Leg. Sess.); see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. & COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., THE HIGH COST OF A FRESH START 6–19 (2022), https://www.nclc
.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/Report-High-Cost-of-Fresh-Start.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5MP-FXKM] (cataloguing how court debt can be a barrier to expungement
and analyzing statutory framework in each of the fifty states).
181
Hersh & Chin, supra note 168, at 286.
182
TANSEY & CARLIN, supra note 173, at 22.
183
Chien, supra note 167, at 528.
184
Id. at 563.
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mitigation.185 Studies in Michigan and Washington found that only 6.5% and
3% of those eligible, respectively, had applied for records relief.186
Even nominal filing fees can prove a barrier. In in the Michigan study,
the $50 application fee for an expungement—which could not be waived—
was considered a major barrier and key explanation as to why only 6.5% of
those eligible for expungement had filed within the first five years of
eligibility.187 Along with the costs of fingerprinting, getting the application
notarized, and getting a certified copy of the conviction record, the total cost
was closer to $100, which was cost-prohibitive for those living in poverty or
struggling with unemployment.188
There is an alternative. Several states have expungement procedures
without filing fees, or (even better) have automatic or automated
expungement. In 2018, California passed a law which allowed expungement
of marijuana convictions.189 Then San Francisco District Attorney George
Gascón partnered with Code for America, a non-profit that helps
governments utilize technology effectively, to automatically expunge 9,000
expungement-eligible convictions.190 In announcing the decision, the District
Attorney explained that the convictions “excluded” people from
“participating in society” and that most of those punished during the war on
drugs could “ill afford to pay an attorney” to deal with the “cumbersome”
expungement process.191 He noted the racial disparities in marijuana arrests
and that his city was “taking the lead to undo the damage that this country’s

185

Id. at 597, tbl B-2.
Prescott & Starr, supra note 174, at 2492; Colleen V. Chien, Zuyan Huang, Jacob
Kuykendall & Katie Rabago, The Washington State Second Chance Expungement Gap 2
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529777 [https://perma.cc/6YVT-P5HJ].
187
Prescott & Starr, supra note 174, at 2503–04.
188
Id.
189
Act of Sept. 30, 2018, ch. 993, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West 2018) (codified at CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.9 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2022 Reg. Sess.))
(requiring that prosecutors review all cases to see whether reduction or expungement of past
marijuana convictions was required under Prop 64).
190
Matthew S. Schwartz, San Francisco to Expunge Thousands of Marijuana
Convictions, NPR (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/26/698045482/sanfrancisco-to-expunge-thousands-of-marijuana-convictions [https://perma.cc/4PT7-SQBU].
Now, Code for America has expanded its efforts to work with all fifty-eight California
counties. See Press Release, Code for America, Code for America Expands Clear My Record
to California’s 58 Counties (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.codeforamerica.org/news/code-foramerica-expands-clear-my-record-to-californias-58-counties
[https://perma.cc/KT3G-BH
QN].
191
Schwartz, supra note 190.
186
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disastrous, failed drug war has had on our nation and on communities of color
in particular.”192
San Francisco is not alone. Pennsylvania passed a law that granted
broad-based automatic expungement of non-conviction records in 2018
which held the promise of sealing 30 million criminal records by June of
2020.193 In 2019, Utah, California, and New Jersey authorized automated
broad-based relief for conviction and non-conviction records, while six other
states made relief automatic for specific offenses or dispositions.194 In 2020,
in the midst of a global pandemic, Michigan passed an expansive
expungement statute that will automatically expunge misdemeanors after
seven years and felonies after ten.195 In signing the bill, Governor Whitmer
called the legislation a “game changer.”196 Her Lieutenant Governor
explained, “This is bigger than criminal justice reform. This is about
economic opportunity and full participation in our economy and our
society.”197
If expungement is to live up to its promise as a method of substantive
criminal justice reform, these measures are the way it will do so. Petitionbased expungement with even modest fees will only calcify racial and class
disparities in criminal records by affording the wealthy an escape mechanism
for which the poor cannot pay.
C. CASE STUDIES

As discussed, not all diversion and expungement programs charge fees,
but many do.198 To illustrate how profit-seeking diversion and expungement
schemes operate, let us zoom in and consider two drug possession cases from
Alabama; one of a White college student charged in a small county on the
Florida border, the other of a Black mother charged in Tuscaloosa, Alabama.
Until recently, Alabama only allowed expungement of charges not resulting
192

Id.
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR., supra note 60, at 3.
194
Id. at 3, 12–14.
195
Angie Jackson, Gov. Whitmer Signs Bill Expanding Criminal Record Expungement in
Michigan, DET. FREE PRESS (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/
michigan/2020/10/12/michigan-expungement-bills-law-governor-whitmer/3532215001/
[https://perma.cc/VKJ9-GRNU]; see also H.B. Nos. 4980–85, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2020). Michigan’s Attorney General has indicated the automatic expungement will not go into
effect before 2023. See Expungement of Criminal Offenses in Michigan, MICH. DEP’T. OF
ATT’Y GEN., https://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-359-82917_104464---,00.html [https://
perma.cc/32ZG-JSSL].
196
Jackson, supra note 195.
197
Id.
198
See supra Sections I.A & II.B; see also infra Appendices A & B.
193
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in conviction199—so for most defendants the only way to maintain a clean
record was to participate in a diversion program that would result in the
charges being dismissed.
1. Drew200
In March 2015, police stopped Drew, a wealthy White college student,
for speeding as he traveled through Covington County, Alabama on his way
to Florida for spring break.201 After police searched his car, Drew was
charged with one felony—possession of hashish—and four misdemeanors—
possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, illegal possession
of alcohol, and being a minor in possession of alcohol.202 Beating all the
charges at trial was a longshot. Luckily, the prosecutor offered him
diversion.203
The diversion agreement required Drew to plead guilty to all five
charges, complete twenty-four hours of community service, participate in
drug treatment or education, attend alcoholics or narcotics anonymous
meetings (AA or NA), pay “court costs”204 and a “deferred prosecution
program administrative fee” to the district attorney’s office.205 If he failed to
199
ALA. CODE §§ 15-27-1, -2 (Westlaw through Act 2022-199 of the 2022 Reg. Sess.)
was amended in July 2021 to allow expungement of some low-level convictions. States that
permit expungement of non-conviction records for adults (including non-conviction after
completion of diversionary programs) but do not allow for expungement of adult convictions
include Florida (FLA. STAT. §§ 943.0585, 943.059 (2021)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-860, 42-8-62 (Lexis through 2021 Sess.)), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 853-1(e) (2013)), and
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2264 (2021)); see also 50-State Comparison: Expungement,
Sealing & Other Record Relief, RESTORATION RIGHTS PROJ. (Oct. 2021), https://cc
resourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisonjudicial-expungementsealing-and-set-aside/ [https://perma.cc/9SFV-A5DX].
200
I have chosen to use only the first name of the defendants in both case studies to avoid
further publicizing their criminal court involvement. Both defendants’ full names are available
in publicly available court records.
201
Ex parte D.S., 294 So. 3d 835, 837 (Al. Ct. Crim. App. 2019).
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Court costs are costs nominally associated with the cost of filing and processing a
criminal case. According to a recent empirical student, virtually all convicted misdemeanor
defendants are required to pay court costs with median court costs ranging anywhere from
$100 to $500 depending on the jurisdiction. Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 18, at 1014. For
more information about court costs in Alabama specifically, see ALA. APPLESEED, UNDER
PRESSURE: HOW FINES AND FEES HURT PEOPLE, UNDERMINE PUBLIC SAFETY, AND DRIVE
ALABAMA’S RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE 21 (2019), https://www.alabamaappleseed.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/AA1240-FinesandFees-10-10-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G8GEKD2].
205
Order, State v. D.S., No. 23-DC-2015-218 (Ala. Dist. Ct. Jul. 18, 2017), Dkt. No. 26;
see also ALA. CODE § 12-19-150(b) (Westlaw through Act 2022-46 of the 2022 Reg. Sess.)
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complete the program requirements, Drew would be adjudged guilty,
convicted, and sentenced to a year in jail.206 But if he successfully completed
the program, the guilty pleas would be set aside and the charges dismissed
with prejudice.207 Drew paid the following for his diversion program:
“Court costs” for Case No. 23-DC-2015-518
(Possession of Controlled Substance)
“Court Costs” for Case No. 23-DC-2015-519
(Possession of Marijuana in the Second Degree)
“Court Costs” for Case No. 23-DC-2015-520
(Possession of Drug Paraphernalia)
“Court Costs” for Case No. 23-DC-2015-521
(Minor in Possession of Alcohol)
“Court Costs” for Case No. 23-DC-2015-522
(Illegal Possession of Alcohol)
Deferred prosecution program administrative fee
Total:

$945.00
$689.50
$432.00
$387.00
$387.00
$600.00
$3,440.50208

This total does not include the amount he paid for his attorney, nor does
it include the costs associated with the drug treatment or education program,
which runs a minimum of $295.209
Drew successfully completed diversion and the charges against him
were dismissed.210 After that, Drew filed expungement petitions for each of
the five charges.211 At the time, expungement petitions in Alabama were
$300 each case and because each charge is filed as a separate case, Drew had

(allowing a judge to dismiss a case on his or her own motion or that of the district attorney,
and to condition the dismissal order upon payment of court costs).
206
Order, State v. D.S., No. 23-DC-2015-218 (Ala. Dist. Ct. Jul. 18, 2017), Dkt. No. 26.
207
Id.
208
For a point of reference, the fine for the regulatory violation of Iowa Premium Beef
Plant in Iowa, the only penalty for contributing to the outbreak at their meatpacking plant
which resulted in 338 of the plant’s workers testing positive, was $957. See Ryan J. Foley,
Iowa Fines Beef Plant $957 After Huge Coronavirus Outbreak, ABC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/iowa-fines-beef-plant-957-huge-coronavirusoutbreak-73223319 [https://perma.cc/B56B-3L4Q].
209
See Accountability Courts - Educational Programs, ALA. ADMIN. OFF. OF COURTS,
https://www.alacourt.gov/EducationalPrograms.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
210
Ex parte D.S., 294 So. 3d at 837.
211
In Alabama, each charge is typically filed as a separate case even if it stems from the
same incident.
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to file five petitions, for a total of $1,500.212 All told, to both avoid conviction
and apply for expungement cost Drew at minimum:
“Court costs” and diversion fees for all cases
Minimum drug program costs

$3,440.50
$295.00

Filing Fee for 5 Expungement Petitions
Total:

$1,500.00
$5,235.50

This, in a state where the median per capita income is $28,934 and
14.9% of the population lives in poverty.213 This sum is virtually unattainable
to many Alabamians and Americans.
2. Kiasha
In February 2014, twenty-three-year-old Kiasha and her boyfriend were
arrested in a fast food parking lot in Tuscaloosa, Alabama after officers found
marijuana inside their car.214 The marijuana was her boyfriend’s, but both
were charged with felony possession of marijuana because the officers
determined the marijuana was not for personal use.215 At the time, Kiasha
was two months pregnant and working in food service, but had aspirations to
become a medical assistant.216 Like Drew, she had no prior criminal history.
Eventually, like Drew, Kiasha was offered diversion.217 Unlike Drew, Kiasha
is Black woman who, based on her indigency, qualified for a public defender.

212
Recent changes to the expungement law increased the filing fee to $500 a petition, but
allow one expungement petition to cover all charges stemming from the same arrest of
incident, which would have the effect of lowering the cost of expungement in a situation like
Drew’s. See ALA. CODE § 15-27-4 (Westlaw through Act 2022-46 of the 2022 Reg. Sess.).
213
See Alabama Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/
AL/BZA210219 [https://perma.cc/LTF5-LE8G].
214
See Deposition of Officer B. Carroll, State v. K.H., No. 63-2014-DC-356 (Ala. Dist.
Ct., Feb. 14, 2014); see also ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR L. & JUST., SOUTHERN POVERTY L.
CTR., ALABAMA’S WAR ON MARIJUANA 36 (2018), https://www.alabamaappleseed.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/COM_Decriminalization-of-Marijuana_WEB-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z89G-B88D] [hereinafter ALABAMA’S WAR].
215
See Deposition of Officer B. Carroll, State v. K.H., No. 63-2014-DC-356 (Ala. Dist.
Ct., Feb. 14, 2014); see also Indictment, State v. K.H, Case No. 63-2016-CC-1524 (Ala. Dist.
Ct., June 24, 2016).
216
ALABAMA’S WAR, supra note 214, at 36–37.
217
Id.
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The enrollment fee for the district attorney’s “second chance” diversion
program in Tuscaloosa was $1,000.218
Kiasha could not afford her second chance. Due to the financial costs
and time commitment, Kiasha declined to participate in diversion and instead
pleaded guilty to two lesser offenses—both misdemeanors—possession of
marijuana for personal use and possession of drug paraphernalia.219 Pursuant
to the plea agreement, Kiasha was sentenced to twelve months in jail, but the
imposition of the jail sentence was suspended and she was placed on two
years’ probation.220 She was assessed $1,440 in court costs and was charged
$40 each month in supervision fees for probation.221 Kiasha was under court
supervision from her arrest in February 2014 until probation was deemed
satisfied in the fall of 2020. As of October 2020, the outstanding balance on
her case was still $1,849.222 The drug convictions will likely make it
significantly harder for Kiasha to support her young family and to realize her
dreams of becoming a medical assistant. In 2021, Alabama law changed to
allow expungement of low-level convictions like Kiasha’s, but she will not
be eligible until after she has paid all court-ordered costs.223
It may trouble many that Drew was able to buy his way out of a
conviction224 while Kiasha was not. Drew, a White man from a wealthy
mostly White town,225 was able to avoid the stigma of being branded a
218

See Tuscaloosa County’s Second Chance Program Overview, TUSCALOOSA CNTY.
DIVERSION PROGRAMS, INC., https://www.tcdpinc.org/overview [https://perma.cc/8TSKJMY9]; see also ALABAMA’S WAR, supra note 214, at 36–37 (noting that though waivers of
the $1,000 enrollment fee based on inability to pay are sometimes given—the waivers are not
determined until after the defendant enters a guilty plea and registers for the program).
Presumably, Kiasha would have had to plead to the felony charge to enter diversion.
219
Plea Agreement and Sentencing Probation Order, State v. K.H., No. 63-2016-CC-1524
(Ala. Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 2017).
220
Id.
221
ALABAMA’S WAR, supra note 214, at 38.
222
Fee Sheet, State v. K.H., Case No. 63-2016-CC-1524 (Ala. Dist. Ct., Oct. 14, 2020).
223
ALA. CODE § 15-27-1(b)(1) (Westlaw through Act 2022-46 of the 2022 Reg. Sess.).
224
The judge in Drew’s case initially denied expungement, but after being reversed by the
appellate court, the judge granted expungement of the felony charge. See Ex parte D.S., 249
So. 3d 835 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (reversing denial of expungement); see also State v. D.S.,
No. 23-CC-2018-216 (Ala. Dist. Ct., Nov. 14, 2019) (denying expungement in this case as a
subsequent petition considering grant in Case No. 23-CC-2018-215).
225
Case information in DC-2015-518 lists Drew as a White male and includes his home
address in Weston, CT; see also Weston, Connecticut, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.com/
city/Weston-Connecticut.html [https://perma.cc/F49F-RXQA] (listing median household
income as over $200,000 and demographics of the town as more than 90% White). It also
appears that Drew is now employed as a commercial leasing manager at a “premier vertically
integrated real estate firm,” a job that would have been difficult to secure with a felony record.
Drew’s employment information was obtained from his publicly available LinkedIn account.
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criminal when so many others in Alabama and in the United States, including
poor people and people of color like Kiasha, cannot. Though the problems of
charging for diversion and expungement are illustrated in high relief in
Alabama, Drew and Kiasha’s cases are not unique—so what troubles us
about these cases is more than an isolated incident. Drew’s appeal was a
consolidated appeal. Five other defendants—also all White226—faced
possession of marijuana charges stemming from traffic stops in Covington
County around spring break. All five were, like Drew, charged, granted
diversion, avoided conviction and then obtained expungement—all at a
significant cost. Meanwhile, Black people are four times more likely than
White people to be arrested for marijuana possession in Alabama227 and 3.64
times more likely in the United States.228 Many, like Kiasha, are unable to
afford diversionary programs.
These cases are a Rorschach test for the criminal legal system. They
demonstrate that despite widespread availability of diversion programs,
financial barriers to entry make these programs differentially accessible to
the poor and the well-off. Though Drew was able to avoid conviction, Kiasha
was not. Moreover, because of his access to cash, Drew was under court
supervision for only a fraction of the time Kiasha was, despite similar
charges. Are these examples evidence of the promise of diversion and
expungement, or a cautionary tale about the perils of trying to use diversion
and expungement to fix what is broken in our system? This Article argues
the latter and that without adequate framing, diversion and expungement can
exacerbate some of the very evils they were set out to address.
II. THE OPERATION OF MONETIZED RELIEF
Diversion and expungement do not operate on a level playing field.
Racial disparities operate at every discretionary decision point in the criminal
To protect his privacy in line with supra note 200, I will not cite it here, but it has been verified
by the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminologysee also Company, BUILDING & LAND TECH
https://www.bltoffice.com/company/ [https://perma.cc/HP9Z-YB8E].
226
Case information in DC-2016-769, CC-2018-283, CC-2018-79. CC-2018-281 lists the
defendants as White males; case information for CC-2018-285 does not list the race of
defendant, but it lists his address as Hartsville, SC and an individual of that same name who
attended high school in Hartsville, SC appears White from his Facebook profile, see Luke
Valle, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/luke.valle.7 (last visited Mar. 24, 2022). The
opinion also says he was a Clemson student, and the Facebook profile has Clemson Football
listed as user’s sports team.
227
ALABAMA’S WAR, supra note 214, at 7.
228
ACLU, A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES: RACIALLY TARGETED ARRESTS IN THE ERA OF
MARIJUANA REFORM 5 (2020), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/tale_
of_two_countries_racially_targeted_arrests_in_the_era_of_marijuana_reform_revised_7.1.
20_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M92T-FHDX] (finding a nation-wide disparity of 1 to 3.64).
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legal system and there are good reasons to think that even absent financial
barriers, White defendants benefit more often from diversion and
expungement than their Black and Brown counterparts. But because of
differential access to financial resources in communities of color, fee-based
diversion and expungement fuel racial disparities in the prevalence of
criminal records. If that were not concerning enough, the existence of feebased diversion and expungement programs creates perverse financial
incentives. Self-interested government actors choose programs that condition
criminal records relief on payment, even though these seemingly neutral
programs will almost undoubtedly result in greater racial disparities.229 This
allows courts and prosecutors to profit from the perpetuation of racial caste.
A. BY THE NUMBERS

Imagine a city, Sample City, that is evenly divided between White and
Black residents and consider the impact of a marijuana possession diversion
program with a cost of $400. If Sample City has arrest patterns for marijuana
possession like those of the United States, Black residents will be about four
times more likely to be charged with marijuana possession than White
residents, despite relatively equivalent rates of drug use.230 This leads to a
marijuana arrest population that is 20% White and 80% Black, despite the
1:1 ratio of White and Black residents in Sample City. Assuming that 40%
of those arrested can pay for diversion, then that reduces the number of
people who will be convicted but does not change the racial disparities
resulting from the differential arrest rates which remain 1:4. This ignores the

229

See supra note 94.
ACLU, supra note 228, at 5 (finding a nation-wide disparity of 1 to 3.64); see also
Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, 44
CRIME & JUST. 49, 56 (2015) (noting drug usage rates are roughly the same for White and
Black individuals). There is also some evidence that when marijuana prosecution rates decline
due to acts of prosecutorial discretion, racial disparities in arrest rates can actually increase.
See V.M. SMIEGOCKI, P.R. METZGER & A.L.B. DAVIES, THE DALLAS PROJECT, FEWER, NOT
FAIRER 3 (2021), https://www.smu.edu/-/media/Site/Law/Deason-Center/Publications/
Prosecution/DALLAS/Fewer_Not_Fairer.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/BP52-6T9J] (finding
that when marijuana arrest rates declined by 31%, the racial disparity in arrest rates between
non-Black and Black people rose from 1:4 to 1:4.4).
230
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possibility that a prosecutor’s racial bias might also impact the availability of
diversion.

But because of the racial wealth and income gaps, it is unlikely that
diversion will be equally accessible to White and Black arrestees in Sample
City. According to Federal Reserve data from 2019, 79% of White
Americans can pay their bills even if they encounter a $400 emergency,
whereas only 56% of Black Americans can.231 Let us assume that those who
can handle a $400 emergency are generally able to pay for diversion and do
so. If that is the case, then about 11% of those who end up with criminal
records will be White, and about 89% will be Black. The fee-based diversion
amplifies the racial disparity in the arrests by concentrating criminal records
in the Black population.

231

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF
U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2019, FEATURING SUPPLEMENTAL DATA FROM APRIL 2020 24 (2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-report-economic-well-being-ushouseholds-202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UNK-DLGC] [hereinafter FED. REPORT]; see also
Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS (May
17, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerscommunities/shed_data.htm [https://
perma.cc/YKN3-PCCJ] (containing raw data underlying the report which was then used to
generate these figures).
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Consider another city, Model City, with equal proportions of White,
Black, and Latinx residents,232 fee-based diversion will similarly exacerbate
racial disparities in conviction rates. Let us assume that Black residents
continue to be four times as likely to be arrested as White residents and that
Latinx residents are twice as likely to be arrested as White residents, leading
to a marijuana arrest population that is 14% White, 57% Black, and 29%
Latinx. Using the same $400 diversion program and Federal Reserve data,
which finds that 62% of Latinx people can weather a $400 emergency,233 the
results are a marijuana conviction population that is about 8% White, 64%
Black, and 28% Latinx.

232
In the real world, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Because Hispanic/Latinx
is an ethnic rather than racial category, Latinx people can be White, Black, indigenous, mixed
race, etc.
233
FED. REPORT, supra note 231, at 24; see also Survey of Household Economics and
Decisionmaking, supra note 231 (containing raw data underlying the report which was then
used to generate these figures). The Federal Reserve study uses the term “Hispanic” which is
not entirely equivalent to Latinx—Hispanic includes people from Spain but excludes those
from Brazil because it is not a former Spanish Colony, whereas Latinx excludes those from
Spain because it is not part of “Latin America,” but includes those from non-Spanish speaking
countries like Brazil.
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This is despite there being equal numbers of White, Black, and Latinx
residents in the city and roughly equivalent rates of drug use in each
demographic group. Again, rather than mitigating racial disparities, diversion
either preserves or amplifies the racial disparities present in the arrest
population.
Fee-based expungement has a similar impact. The population of
individuals with criminal records contains racial disparities resulting in an
over-representation of people of color amongst those with records. Again,
conditioning records relief on payment of a large sum makes expungement
more likely to be available to White people with records concentrating
criminal records in communities of color and particularly in the Black
community. This is especially pernicious because employers tend to
discriminate against Black individuals with records at higher rates than
Whites with criminal records.234 Moreover, fee-based diversion and
expungement programs are more prevalent in the South—the region which
over half of Black Americans call home.235
234

Pager, supra note 23, at 957–58.
Christine Tamir, The Growing Diversity of Black America, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 21,
2021) https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2021/03/25/the-growing-diversity-of-black
-america/ [https://perma.cc/597F-ZA2L] (“In 2019, the South was the region with the highest
share of the country’s Black population, with 56% of this population living there. The Midwest
235
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B. PERVERSE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

Prosecutors and judges do not merely charge for diversion and
expungement to cover program costs. Diversion can be quite profitable for
prosecutors, and many exploit the programs for self-interested benefits. A
New York Times investigation revealed that prosecutors were routinely
using diversion as a revenue stream and charging as much as $5,000 for
participation for a single offense.236 One district attorney’s office, covering a
population of around 120,000, was able to generate one million dollars in
revenue for itself through diversion programs in just five years—sometimes
offering diversion where public safety concerns counseled against doing
so.237 Likewise, lawmakers pass expungement statutes with high fees
anticipating that they will be “significant revenue generator[s].”238
This creates a system of perverse financial incentives. Courts and
prosecutors may let financial motivations override other policy priorities.
Prior to Arizona’s recent decriminalization of marijuana in the fall of 2020,239
Maricopa County raised $1.6 million annually through its marijuana
diversion program—and the prospect of losing that profit served as a
disincentive to decriminalize.240 The revenue function of traffic and other
low-level offenses can supplant the public safety function, making safety
“secondary or irrelevant to the administration of the police and . . . courts.”241
One study found that a 1% increase in the percentage of a city’s budget that
was generated by economic sanctions is associated with a 6.1 percentage
point decrease in the violent crime clearance rate and an 8.3 percentage point
decrease in the property crime clearance rate.242 Fee-based diversion may not
only further entrench the problematic aspects of our criminal legal system,
but it may also result in making us less safe.
Even diversion and expungement programs created with good
intentions may be implemented by actors who do not share reformist goals

and Northeast each held 17% of this population, while the West was home to one-tenth of the
Black population.”); see also Appendices A and B.
236
Dewan & Lehren, supra note 71.
237
Dewan & Lehren, supra note 101.
238
Radice, supra note 104, at 279.
239
Ray Stern, Arizona Courts Prepare for Pot Legalization and Expungement Law, PHX.
NEW TIMES (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/marijuana/arizona-courtsprepare-for-pot-legalization-and-expungement-law-11515458.
240
Dewan, supra note 118.
241
Ordower, Sandoval & Warren, supra note 127, at 133.
242
Colgan, supra note 121, at 1564 (citing Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances & Hye
Young You, Exploitative Revenues, Law Enforcement, and the Quality of Government
Services, 56 URB. AFF. REV. 5, 8, 17, 21–22 (2020)).
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and then use the programs to leverage profit.243 Fee-based diversion creates
perverse incentives for law enforcement and prosecutors to charge low-level
offenses to generate revenue.244 Those cases generate a need for a greater
criminal legal system administrative apparatus—more clerks, judges, and
paper to process the larger caseload.245 And this in turn creates a greater need
for revenue and reliance on fee-generating prosecutions.
Perhaps it seems strange that enlightened criminal justice reformers
would use the mechanisms of diversion and expungement to generate
revenue and extract money from criminal defendants and their communities,
rather than simply using these programs to mitigate the impact of our overly
harsh criminal legal system. But government actors have always sought to
capitalize on the criminal legal system—both by extracting profit from
punishment and by seeking profit in exchange for leniency. Historically, this
has taken many forms.246 “Following the Civil War, Southern States enacted
Black Codes to subjugate newly freed slaves and maintain the prewar racial
hierarchy. Among these laws’ provisions were draconian fines for violating
broad proscriptions on “vagrancy” and other dubious offenses.”247 Today,
fines are the most common form of punishment levied in the United States.248
Poverty penalties punish defendants by adding on additional late fees,
payment plan fees, and interest when defendants cannot pay on time.249 Civil
asset forfeiture is another way that governments and law enforcement can
reap profits from the criminal legal system.250
243
CHRIS W. SURPRENANT & JASON BRENNAN, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: HOW FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES CORRUPTED AND CAN FIX THE US CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 102 (2020).
244
See Colgan, supra note 121, at 1553.
245
Id. at 1550–52.
246
See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 67 (1998). See generally Michele Goodwin, The
Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL
L. REV. 899 (2019); MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH 1866–928 (1996); DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER
NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II
(2009); KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE RISE
OF HUMAN CAGING IN LOS ANGELES, 1771–1965 (2017); SHANE BAUER, AMERICAN PRISON: A
REPORTER’S UNDERCOVER JOURNEY INTO THE BUSINESS OF PUNISHMENT (2018); Caleb Nelson,
The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446 (2016).
247
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019).
248
Daniel S. Harawa, How Much Is Too Much? A Test to Protect Against Excessive Fines,
81 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 67 (2020).
249
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 155 (noting that collection fees in Alabama can be as
high as 30% of the original debt and 40% of the original debt in Florida).
250
See David Pimentel, Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuses: Can State Legislation Solve the
Problem?, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 173, 175–86 (2017) (providing an overview of civil asset
forfeiture).
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Relatedly, some theorists conceptualize the entire misdemeanor system
as an instrument of regressive taxation resulting in massive redistribution of
wealth—taking largely from those with lowest incomes.251 Fee-based
diversion and expungement can be thought of as a part of this redistributive
criminal legal system. The system is pervasive and intrusive; for example in
Ferguson, Missouri the municipal court issued 9,000 arrest warrants in 2013
alone—this is a city with only 21,000 residents—mostly low-income Black
people.252 In places like Ferguson, Missouri, law enforcement practices are
“consciously revenue driven” and discriminatory to Black Americans. 253
Ferguson is not unique; municipalities routinely exploit tickets to collect
revenue. One town in northern Florida with a population of just 1,000 people
issued over 11,000 traffic citations in one year, generating $500,000 in
revenue for the town—half of its annual revenue.254 Big cities also rely on
the income from fines and fees associated with criminal cases. In 2017,
Atlanta projected collecting $28 million in fines and forfeitures, New Orleans
$46 million, and Chicago $359 million—accounting for 4.6%, 7.5%, and
9.7% of their respective annual revenues.255 Empirical analysis suggests that
municipalities with larger Black populations are more likely to rely heavily
on fines and forfeitures to raise income.256 Similarly, many of the more
expensive expungement and diversion programs occur in the South or in
other areas with larger Black populations.257
Once government actors see a way to turn a criminal justice reform into
a tool to generate revenue, the tool can be perverted from its original purpose.
There is good reason to think that this has happened in many diversion and
expungement schemes. Though envisioned as benevolent reforms, many
251

NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 117.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIV. RTS. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 3, 6 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SX9AER8].
253
Ordower, Sandoval & Warren, supra note 127, at 115.
254
SURPRENANT & BRENNAN, supra note 243, at 94–95 (describing how AAA wrote up
Waldo for its speed traps and then went so far as to purchase billboards along U.S. Route 301
which to warn motorists about the risk).
255
Id. at 95.
256
Id. at 96 (finding that cities with one Black city council member reduce this correlation
by half).
257
See generally infra Appendices A & B. Likewise, many of the cities and towns that
receive significant revenue from fines and fees in criminal cases are located in the South and
Midwest. See Mike McIntire & Michael H. Keller, The Demand for Money Behind Many
Police Traffic Stops, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/31/us/
police-ticket-quotas-money-funding.html [https://perma.cc/FW3G-X5FN] (containing a map
of cities and towns that generate more than 10% of revenue from fines and fees).
252
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governments have put a price tag on second chances—compromising the
value and promise of the twin programs of diversion and expungement.
III. THE LARGER AMERICAN CRIMINAL RECORD PROBLEM
To fully understand the problem of paying for a clean record, this
Article will zoom out and consider the sociohistorical context in which these
fee-based diversion and expungement schemes operate. The United States’
criminal legal system is unmatched in its scope and punitiveness. The United
States has the highest rates of incarceration,258 community supervision,259 and
prevalence of criminal records.260 The system is also marked by shocking
rates of racial disparities261 and operates to reinforce racial caste262 and
perpetuate the racial wealth gap.263
A. THE PREVALENCE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS

The expansion of criminal records in the United States is the product of
two contemporaneous trends—mass criminalization and the proliferation of
technologies allowing for expanded access to criminal records. Mass
criminalization means that more people have contact with law enforcement
and the criminal courts. “Although mass incarceration is perhaps the most
serious and pressing problem with the criminal justice system in the United
States, most criminal cases are misdemeanors and often do not result in jail
or prison time. The problem is thus better characterized as one of mass
criminalization.”264 Meanwhile, technological developments mean that data
United States Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
profiles/US.html [https://perma.cc/62R7-UW2G] (noting that the U.S. locks up 698 per
100,000 residents—the highest rate of any nation).
259
Alessandro Corda & Michelle S. Phelps, American Exceptionalism in Community
Supervision, AM. PROBATION & PAROLE ASS’N PERSPS., Spring 2017, at 20 (noting that rates
of community supervision are five times higher than the European average per capita).
260
See supra Section II.A.
261
See, e.g., Leah Sakala, United States Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, 2010,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/2010rates/US
.html [https://perma.cc/YX2U-N7RG]; see also Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon
and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2180 (2013) (“In 1960, three years before
Gideon, the [B]lack incarceration rate was approximately 660 per 100,000. By 1970, it had
fallen some, to slightly under 600 per 100,000. In 2010, the rate of incarceration among
[B]lack males was an astronomical 3,074 per 100,000. For men hoping to avoid prison, being
both poor and [B]lack is a lethal combination. More than two-thirds of [B]lack males who do
not have college degrees will be incarcerated at some point in their lives. Black male high
school dropouts are more likely to be imprisoned than employed.”).
262
See supra Section II.B.
263
See supra Section II.C.
264
Roberts, supra note 46, at 325.
258
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about arrests and criminal cases can be stored more efficiently and be
accessed more easily. At the same time, as more people have contacts with
the criminal legal system, the record-keeping capabilities of the system have
expanded and the public has greater access to criminal records.265 Almost all
states now have publicly available Internet databases of criminal records.266
Instead of a dusty file cabinet stored at a remote off-site location, records—
and even arrest photos—can now be accessed from the comfort of home with
the click of a mouse.267
One in three adults in the United States has a criminal record.268
Approximately twenty million Americans, or about one out of every twelve
adults, have felony convictions.269 This is roughly the population of New
York state or Florida. The number of adults with misdemeanor convictions
is several times higher.270 And millions of Americans have non-conviction
records showing charges that were later dismissed or arrests that never even
resulted in a criminal charge.271 The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
adds over ten thousand names to its criminal records databases daily.272 It
265

This is not to say that criminal record databases are complete and accurate—far from
it. For example, one study found that in 2012 only eighteen states had RAP sheet databases
that included disposition data for more than eighty percent of arrests. JACOBS, supra note 17,
at 42.
266
Roberts, supra note 46, at 328.
267
Eumi K. Lee, Monetizing Shame: Mugshots, Privacy, and the Right to Access, 70
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 557, 566 (2018).
268
Craig Arnold & Jamie Dimon, Nearly 70 Million Americans Have Criminal Records.
We Must Give Them a Second Chance, CNN (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/
27/perspectives/second-chance-hiring-dimon/index.html
[https://perma.cc/SA55-TQ2Y].
The FBI has criminal records for over 78 million individuals. See FBI FACT SHEET, supra note
20 (over 78 million individuals have criminal records based on fingerprints); OFF. OF JUST.
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION
SYSTEMS, 2016, at 104 tbl.20 (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/251516.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9NLJ-NNAR] (reporting 91 million unique criminal records based on the
Interstate Identification Index).
269
JACOBS, supra note 17, at 1 (emphasis omitted).
270
No studies document the total number of individuals with misdemeanor conviction
records, but misdemeanors typically make up 70% of a state’s criminal caseload—this
suggests that there are at least twice as many people with misdemeanor convictions as felonies.
See Prescott & Starr, supra note 174, at 2462 n.3 (citing Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson,
Contributions, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 746 n.81 (2018)).
271
Criminal records can be generated when a person is arrested (police or arrest
records)—regardless of whether she is ever charged—and when a person is charged and
prosecuted in court (court records)—regardless of whether she is convicted. In one dataset,
20.92% of criminal records contained a felony conviction, 66.99% contained a misdemeanor,
and 38.72% contained a non-conviction disposition. Chien, supra note 167, at 590 tbl.A-2.
272
Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find
Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/
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also operates the largest biometric database in the world—containing the
fingerprints of over seventy-eight million people.273 These records fall
disproportionately on poor people and people of color. A staggering twothirds of Black men without a college degree will be incarcerated at some
point in their lives.274
Alongside the newly internet-accessible courts, there is also a growing
market for criminal background checks, resulting in a four billion dollar
industry.275 In 1972 Congress passed a law allowing the FBI to do
background checks for non-law enforcement purposes and to allow private
entities to obtain criminal record information for a fee.276 Initially, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) prohibited dissemination of criminal history
information that was more than seven years old, but Congress eliminated that
restriction in 1998—now FCRA only prohibits reporting arrests not resulting
in conviction that are older than 7 years old.277 In 2005, the FBI processed
9.8 million criminal background checks for non-criminal-justice agencies
and private organizations.278 In 2013, the number had almost doubled to
seventeen million, which was slightly less than half of all FBI background
checks.279 Today, noncriminal justice background checks eclipse background
checks for criminal justice purposes.280 Moreover, government entities are no
longer the only purveyors of criminal records information—increasingly
private industry is the primary source of criminal background checks due to
the commodification of criminal history information in our increasingly
digital society.281 Nowadays, employers, landlords, and educational
institutions use criminal records more often than law enforcement agencies
articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402
[https://perma.cc/8VZP-3PLS]; see also JACOBS, supra note 17, at 18 (describing the FBI’s
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) databases, which provide support to federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies).
273
This database is called the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
JACOBS, supra note 17, at 35; see also FBI FACT SHEET, supra note 20.
274
Butler, supra note 261, at 2180.
275
JACOBS, supra note 17, at 71.
276
Id. at 45 (citing Pub. L. 92-544, 86 Stat. 1115 (1972)).
277
Id. at 75 (unless for a job with a salary of $75,000 or more—then older arrests can be
reported); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2), (b).
278
JACOBS, supra note 17, at 46.
279
Id.
280
Noncriminal Justice Background Checks & the NICS, SEARCH, https://www.search
.org/solutions/criminal-history-records/noncriminal-justice-background-checks-and-the-nics/
[https://perma.cc/EA2F-8J94].
281
Alessandro Corda & Sarah E. Lageson, Disordered Punishment: Workaround
Technologies of Criminal Records Disclosure and the Rise of a New Penal
Entrepreneurialism, 60 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 245, 248–49 (2020).
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and prosecutors.282 A criminal record (or lack thereof) matters more outside
the courtroom than inside it.
B. CRIMINAL RECORDS, SOCIAL ORDERING, AND RACIAL CASTE

It should come as no surprise that more background checks are
conducted for non-criminal justice purposes because Americans use criminal
records to order civil society in almost every sphere. The American Bar
Association database has catalogued tens of thousands of collateral
consequences of criminal cases and convictions.283 Criminal background
checks are used to decide who to employ, educate, house, give benefits to,
allow to vote,284 and even who to date.285 Colleges and universities ask
applicants about criminal and arrest history and use arrests and convictions
to make admissions decisions.286 Drug convictions can disqualify students
from being able to obtain federal student loans, making higher education
unattainable.287 Landlords routinely conduct criminal background checks on
prospective tenants,288 a practice which may perpetuate longstanding patterns
282
Noncriminal Justice Background Checks & the NCIS, supra note 280; see also Lee,
supra note 267, at 566.
283
Roberts, supra note 46, at 327; see also NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ [https://perma.cc/3F8DPJVN].
284
Roughly 2.5% of the U.S. voting population is temporarily or permanently
disenfranchised due to a felony conviction. RACHEL BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS:
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION 49, 116 (2019).
285
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, INSTANT CHECKMATE, https://www.instant
checkmate.com/faqs/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2022) (“In the dating world, online especially, you
can never be too careful. It’s a good idea to run a background check on potential dates before
meeting them in person.”); see also Amy Tenney, Looking for Love in the Online Age Convicted Felons Need Not Apply: Why Bans on Felons Using Internet Dating Sites Are
Problematic and Could Lead to Violations of the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, 2 CRIM. L.
PRAC. 89 (2015).
286
Brewer, supra note 160, at 236; Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling On:
Collateral Consequences and Community Supervision, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1884 (2015)
(citing Robert Stewart, Requiring Criminal History Disclosures in the College Application
Process, Address at the Law and Soc’y Meetings (May 31, 2014); see also CTR. FOR CMTY.
ALTERNATIVES, THE USE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS:
RECONSIDERED 7–22 (2010), http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/Reconsideredcriminal-hist-recs-in-college-admissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK9G-TQPA] (analyzing
survey data on how colleges and universities use these questions in practice); Simone IspaLanda & Charles E. Loeffler, Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal Record: Stigma Reports
Among Expungement-Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY: INTERDISC. J. 387, 390 (2016).
287
BARKOW, supra note 284, at 92.
288
SEARCH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION 20 (2005), http://www.search.org/files/pdf/
RNTFCSCJRI.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6Z2-J3L5].
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of racial housing segregation.289 Of all the collateral consequences of
criminal records, employment barriers are likely the most damaging.290 States
have statutes barring those with certain convictions from being hired or
licensed in certain fields.291 And employers discriminate, both lawfully and
unlawfully, on the basis of criminal records.
The Supreme Court endorsed criminal-record-based discrimination in
1898 in Hawker v. New York.292 The Court determined it was reasonable to
consider a conviction as an adjudication of the fact of the defendant’s bad
moral character by the state.293 The Court acknowledged that the “test of
character is not in all cases absolutely certain, and that sometimes it works
harshly” but found that the legislature had power to make a rule of “universal
application” that did not account for the possibility of later reformation of the
defendant.294 With the approval of the Supreme Court, licensing laws
proliferated in the 1920s and had two aims: to reduce minority (and in
particular Black) access to certain fields and trades and to restrict competition
to these jobs.295 These laws persist. For example, in Virginia there are 146
employment-related collateral consequences for felony convictions.296 A
person with a felony conviction cannot own a barber shop in New York or
Texas.297 In Iowa, a drug possession conviction disqualifies an individual
from becoming a licensed electrician.298
Record-based distinctions often become unmoored from the
particularities of the criminal conviction or contact—simply the mark of the

289

See Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 693–94 (2020).
Murray, supra note 158, at 365.
291
See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 287 nn.40–45 (2011); Brian M. Murray,
Beyond the Right to Counsel: Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1139, 1150 (2015).
292
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 197 (1898). Hawker was a doctor with a
conviction for performing an abortion. Id. This conviction was later used to bar him from
practicing medicine. Id.
293
Recently, scholars have argued that due to court failures and systemic racism, prior
convictions should not be relied upon as an indicator of culpability or bad moral character.
See Montré Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the Prior
Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 526 (2009); Anna Roberts, Impeachment by
Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 563 (2014); John D. King, The Meaning of a
Misdemeanor in a Post-Ferguson World: Evaluating the Reliability of Prior Conviction
Evidence, 54 GA. L. REV. 927, 955 (2020).
294
Hawker, 170 U.S. at 197.
295
SURPRENANT & BRENNAN, supra note 243, at 116.
296
BARKOW, supra note 284, at 94.
297
Id.
298
Id.
290
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criminal record itself is enough for disqualification from civil life.299 Data
suggests that employers will hire those with little or no experience over those
with criminal convictions.300 And employment discrimination toward those
with criminal records is stronger than that toward welfare recipients or
undocumented immigrants.301 One recent study found that even minor felony
records can significantly decrease the likelihood of receiving a callback for a
job.302 Reducing prison sentences (which could reduce mass incarceration)
does not remedy this second-class status—indeed, most felons are not even
sent to prison.303
Also, one does not need the label of “felon” to feel the sting and impact
of a criminal record.304 Juvenile records can have serious collateral
consequences in adulthood—despite the myth that these records disappear
on one’s eighteenth birthday.305 Even an arrest record for a minor offense that
is dismissed before charges are filed can have employment consequences and
result in loss of a job or a job opportunity.306 However, studies do suggest

One legal scholar even refers to this state as “civil death.” See Gabriel J. Chin, The
New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1789, 1790 (2012).
300
Brewer, supra note 160, at 231; see also Bruce Western, Jeffrey R. Kling & David F.
Weiman, The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 410, 412;
Amy Shlosberg, Evan J. Mandery, Valerie West & Bennett Callaghan, Expungement and
Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 353, 383 (2014).
301
Brewer, supra note 160, at 231.
302
Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, The Effect of Criminal Records on Access to
Employment, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 562 (2017) (finding those without a conviction record
were 63% more likely to receive a callback than those with criminal conviction records even
though the records were for relatively minor drug and property felonies).
303
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 94.
304
Christopher Uggen, Mike Vuolo, Sarah Lageson & Ebony Ruhland, The Edge of
Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment,
52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 637 (2014) (finding that a record of a misdemeanor arrest reduced the
chance of a callback for White and African American males by 4 percent; surveys of job
applications found that employers most often require information about ‘‘criminal
convictions’’ and do not distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies).
305
Joy Radice, The Juvenile Record Myth, 106 GEO. L. J. 365, 365 (2018).
306
See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 142, at 189–93, 215 (recounting one such instance). For
more information about the collateral consequences of arrests, see Adam M. Gershowitz,
Prosecutorial Dismissals as Teachable Moments (and Databases) for the Police, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1525, 1530 (2018) (listing costs of an arrest: “incarceration, the need to post
bail, internet-accessible arrest records, mug shots, immigration and housing consequences
because agencies track arrest records, the prospect of job loss because of incarceration, and
difficulty in finding new work”); Jain, Arrests as Regulation, supra note 19, at 826–44
(discussing in detail the non-criminal consequences of an arrest); Roberts, supra note 20, at
997–99.
299
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that conviction records have more serious employment consequences than
arrest and non-conviction records alone.307
Criminal records do not fall evenly throughout the U.S. population. Poor
people of color “disproportionately bear the mark of a criminal record.”308
Criminal records continue to have a disproportionate impact on Black people
as compared to White people, and even as compared to other racial and ethnic
minority groups.309 Black communities, specifically Black men, are
overburdened with criminal records. In some cities, as many as 80% of young
Black men have criminal records.310 A recent study showed racial disparities
in filing rates of misdemeanor cases in seven jurisdictions—the most striking
of which was that Black people were twelve times as likely to be charged
with drug and public order offenses as Whites in Chicago.311 In two other
jurisdictions, Black people were eight times as likely to get arrested for
marijuana possession than Whites.312 By 2008, “a young black man without
a high school diploma was more likely to be in prison or jail than to be
employed in the paid labor force.”313 Professor James Forman describes the
“cumulative impact” of mass criminalization,314 the expansion of
employment-related collateral consequences, and increased access to
criminal records through new technology as “devastating” to the Black
community.315 As he explains, “pretext policing led to more arrests,
technological changes made the arrests impossible to escape, and legal
changes turned a single arrest into a lifetime of exclusion and
subordination.”316 Rather than lessening, racial disparities in the criminal
legal system have worsened in the past fifty years.317

307

Peter Leasure, Misdemeanor Records and Employment Outcomes: An Experimental
Study, 65 CRIME & DELINQ. 1850, 1851, 1853–54 (2019).
308
Pinard, supra note 46, at 969.
309
Devah Pager, Bart Bonikowski & Bruce Western, Discrimination in a Low-Wage
Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 784 (2009).
310
JACOBS, supra note 17, at 2 (citing ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 7).
311
Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 18, at 1005.
312
Roberts, supra note 46, at 331. It is widely known that rates of drug use are similar for
Black Americans and White Americans. Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and Punishment in the
Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, 44 CRIME & JUST. 49, 65 (2015).
313
PETTIT, supra note 49, at 64.
314
Roberts, supra note 46, at 331.
315
FORMAN, supra note 142, at 219.
316
Id.
317
See Butler, supra note 261, at 2178. Admittedly, data from the most recent few years
show modest reversal of this trend. See John Gramlich, Black Imprisonment Rate in the U.S.
Has Fallen by a Third Since 2006, PEW RSCH. FACT TANK (May 6, 2020), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/06/share-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-in-prison-
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Additionally, the presence of a criminal record exacerbates racial
discrimination in hiring practices and tends to have a greater negative impact
on the job prospects of Black people with criminal records than on White
people with the same records.318 One study showed that Black men without
criminal records were slightly less likely to be given a callback than White
men with criminal records—showing a baseline of racial discrimination
toward Black applicants even absent criminal records.319 The same study
showed that the callback rates of Black men with criminal records were the
lowest of all.320 The impact of criminal records can even have spillover
effects into entire neighborhoods or communities, causing employers to
avoid applicants from certain neighborhoods with disproportionate numbers
of people who have been marked, branding the whole community.321 Because
Black communities “disproportionately absorb” individuals with the mark of
criminal arrest and conviction, these communities as a whole suffer.322
Generally, higher rates of criminal records create large numbers of
unemployable men, and this falls primarily on poor communities of color.323
Efforts to mitigate criminal-records-based discrimination, like “ban the box”
legislation (which prohibits employers from asking about conviction history
in job applications) might cause employers to rely on race as a proxy for
criminality and end up harming Blacks as a group.324 Due to this toxic

2018-vs-2006/ [https://perma.cc/B6HN-2LBK] (showing 1:5 disparities between White and
Black imprisonment rates—a reduction from the nearly 1:8 rates in 2006).
318
See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 59 (2007) (detailing how Black applicants are more harmed than White
applicants with the same record, even with all other qualifications remaining equal); Devah
Pager, Bruce Western & Naomi Sugie, Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment
Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 195, 199 (2009) (noting that criminal records reduced callback interviews for Black
applicants as much as twice as White applicants).
319
DEVAH PAGER, MARK OF A CRIMINAL RECORD 57 (2002) (noting that the White tester
with no record received a callback 34% of the time, with a criminal record 17% of the time,
while the Black tester with no record received a callback 14% of the time, with a criminal
record 5% of the time.)
320
Id.
321
BARKOW, supra note 284, at 49.
322
Michael Pinard, Race Decriminalization and Criminal Legal System Reform, 95
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 122 (2020). See generally Bell, supra note 289 (describing how
policing and mass criminalization contribute to residential segregation).
323
BUTLER, supra note 67, at 33.
324
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 152–53; see also Alana Semuels, When Banning One
Kind of Discrimination Results in Another, ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic
.com/business/archive/2016/08/consequences-of-ban-the-box/494435/ [https://perma.cc/GQ
C3-HGWJ]; Amanda Y. Agan & Sonja B. Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and
Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment 2 (U. Mich. L. & Econ., Research Paper No.
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combination of racism and criminal-records-based discrimination (in
combination with other factors), historically the unemployment rate for
Black people is double that of White people.325
Obviously, there are White victims of mass criminalization as well.326
And the narrative of mass incarceration is not as straightforward as Jim
Crow—there were and continue to be Black proponents for the war on drugs
and broken windows style policing.327 The criminal legal system “infiltrates”
the lives of all poor people, but it is “singularly relentless and merciless”
when it comes to Black communities.328
C. THE RACIAL WEALTH & INCOME GAPS

The racial wealth gap is important to this Article for two reasons. First,
the racial wealth gap has been perpetuated by legal regimes that intentionally
or unintentionally disadvantage Blacks and other communities of color. The
pervasiveness of criminal records discrimination and the concentration of
criminal records in poor communities of color contribute to and perpetuate
the racial wealth gap. Second, because of the racial wealth gap (which is
much starker than the racial income gap), Black communities and individuals
will be disproportionately excluded from fee-based diversion and
expungement. Black individuals will be far less likely than their White
counterparts to be able to pay for a clean record.
The racial wealth gap in the United States is profound. In 2015, Black
Americans, who comprise 13% of the population, owned less than three
percent of the country’s wealth.329 In 2016, the average White family’s
wealth was more than ten times that of the average Black family.330 The racial
wealth gap is even more stark for households with minor children, where

16-012, 2016), (finding evidence of increased discrimination by race after implementation of
Ban the Box laws prohibiting employers from asking about criminal records before job
callbacks).
325
Pinard, supra note 46, at 972.
326
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 204–08.
327
Id. at 208–17; see generally FORMAN, supra note 142 (describing the role of the Black
community in waging the war on drugs).
328
Pinard, supra note 322, at 120.
329
See WILLIAM DARITY JR., DARRICK HAMILTON, MARK PAUL, ALAN AJA, ANNE PRICE,
ANTONIO MOORE & CATERINA CHIOPRIS, WHAT WE GET WRONG ABOUT CLOSING THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP 3 (2018).
330
Nick Noel, Duwain Pinder, Shelley Stewart III & Jason Wright, The Economic Impact
of Closing the Racial Wealth Gap, MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 2019), https://www.mckinsey
.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/the-economic-impact-of-closing-the-racial-wealth
-gap [https://perma.cc/7VBA-UGUT] (noting this racial wealth gap increased from $100,000
in 1992 to $154,000 in 2016).
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Black families have one cent for every dollar of the wealth of White
families.331 And the gap persists even amongst the poor—White households
living near the poverty line have $18,000 in average wealth while similarly
situated Black households typically have zero wealth.332 Black Americans
continue to be residentially segregated and are five times as likely to live in
high poverty neighborhoods as White Americans.333
The racial wealth gap originates from the legacy of slavery and the
failure to provide the formerly enslaved with land grants of forty acres.334
American housing policy perpetuated the racial wealth gap.335 Federal
“redlining” practices prevented Black families from accessing housing
wealth and discouraged investment in neighborhoods with even small Black
populations.336 The private market reinforced residential segregation,
directing wealth to White neighborhoods and away from Black
communities.337 In the 1970s and 80s Black inner-city communities felt the
harsh impact of globalization and deindustrialization.338 Many individuals in
inner-city Black communities lacked a college education due to longstanding
segregation and racial disparities in public education and many lacked
transportation to commute to the suburbs, where manufacturing jobs
relocated during this era.339 Then, due to the war on drugs, large numbers of
poor Black and Brown individuals were branded criminals. Lawful criminalrecords-based discrimination compounded existing income and employment

331
Christine Percheski & Christina Gibson-David, A Penny on the Dollar: Racial
Inequalities in Wealth Among Households with Children, 6 SOCIUS: SOCIO. RES. FOR DYNAMIC
WORLD 1 (2020).
332
DARITY, HAMILTON, PAUL, AJA, PRICE, MOORE & CHIOPRIS, supra note 329, at 2.
333
Nikole Hannah-Jones, What Is Owed, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 20, 2020), https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/24/magazine/reparations-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/2J
L5-VPFC].
334
Trymaine Lee, A Vast Wealth Gap, Driving by Segregation, Redlining, Evictions and
Exclusion, Separates Black and White America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019).
335
Allyson Gold, Redliking: When Redlining Goes Online, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1841,
1844 (2020) (noting that Americans hold 2/3 of their wealth in real property).
336
Ian Appel & Jordan Nickerson, POCKETS OF POVERTY: THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF
REDLINING 6 (2016); see also Eliza Wallace, Addressing Racial Inequality by Investigating
Mortgage Denials, POLICYMAP (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.policymap.com/2020/01/
addressing-racial-inequality-by-investigating-mortgage-denials/
[https://perma.cc/2WKTTTUE].
337
Gold, supra note 335, at 1857–58.
338
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 50.
339
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 50–51; Helen Hershkoff & Nathan Yaffe, Unequal
Liberty and a Right to Education, 43 N.C.C. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2020).
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disparities between White and Black people, exacerbating the racial wealth
gap and other disparities in American society.340
It should trouble every American that whether a person has a criminal
record may have more to do with access to cash than with character or history
of wrongdoing. But once understood in the context of the larger American
criminal record problem and the racial wealth gap, the phenomenon of paying
for a clean record is even more troubling. As demonstrated above, fee-based
diversion and expungement programs serve to entrench rather than
ameliorate the racialized phenomenon of mass criminalization. Monetized
relief from criminal records can exacerbate racial disparities in the system by
insulating wealthier White defendants from the harsh consequences of
criminal cases while providing no sanctuary for poor defendants who are
more likely to be Black or Brown. Moreover, criminal conviction status
matters in many spaces outside of the courtroom—limiting the employment,
educational, and housing opportunities of those with criminal records.
Sometimes whole neighborhoods and communities are marked with this
negative credential. Ultimately, reforms that allow individuals to pay for
clean records may serve to legitimize a caste-like structure where criminal
record status serves as a proxy for race and class.
Diversion and expungement can be used as incremental reforms to
move toward a more just system, but they must be implemented in a way that
allows them to be used equitably to shield both rich and poor alike. And
financial incentives need to align with shrinking rather than growing the
carceral state.341
IV. STEPS TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EQUITABLE SYSTEM
Diversion and expungement are tools with the potential to shrink the
footprint of the criminal legal system, but these tools must be used mindfully.
As discussed above, Black communities and poor people have historically
been targeted for criminalization and branded with criminal convictions.342
This has resulted in a criminal legal system which is both too pervasive in
general (i.e., the mass criminalization problem) and which is marked by
deeply embedded racial and class-based disparities (i.e. the New Jim Crow).
Addressing the first of these harms without accounting for the latter could
deepen disparities in the system.
340
ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 141; see also CRAIGIE, GRAWERT & KIMBLE, supra note
28, at 6.
341
Gold, supra note 145, at 1284–90 (detailing prosecutor’s financial incentives in the
criminal legal system and how they currently fail to provide disincentives to
overincarceration).
342
Pinard, supra note 322, at 133.
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As more join the fight for an end to mass incarceration and mass
criminalization, it is imperative to look at the proposed alternatives critically.
Many reforms that look like progress at first glance, expand the carceral state
or worsen the problems we seek to remedy like the perpetuation of racial and
social caste.343 As described above, some of the manifestations of diversion
and expungement simply create a way for the wealthy to pay for a clean
record rather than creating equitable access to relief from the stigma of a
criminal record. With an understanding of the very real dangers of
implementing diversion and expungement as superficial reforms that merely
serve as window dressing for a deeply problematic criminal legal system, this
section looks at ways to tailor diversion and expungement to best capitalize
on their promise.
A. POLICY PROPOSALS

First, given the racial disparities in policing, charging, and prosecution
rates344—data about the race of beneficiaries of diversion and expungement
must be tracked so that lawmakers, voters, and impacted communities know
whether diversion and expungement programs are benefiting people like
Kiasha and Drew equally, or whether these programs are being used to
further race and class divides. Communities need the ability to ascertain
whether programs are growing or shrinking the carceral state and whether
they are decreasing or increasing disparities in the system. Policymakers
must be attuned to the dangers of net-widening presented by diversion
programs. If diversion is being used to enlarge the number of people being
brought into the criminal legal system, then it is not working as intended.
Numbers of cases both before and after diversion should be tracked to make
sure that police and prosecutors are not using diversion to fuel cheaper
prosecutions or avoid making hard decisions about who to charge in the first
343
See generally MAYA SCHENWAR & VICTORIA LAW, PRISON BY ANY OTHER NAME
(2020) (documenting how many reforms, rather than shrinking the web of criminal legal
systems, “weave new strands of punishment and control”); see also TIGER, supra note 81, at
41–42 (“Punishment reforms are often initiated by people interested in crafting a more
humane, enlightened, and effective approach than that of the previous generation. In the course
of implementation, these reforms become subject to administrative routines and efficiency
leading, often, to worse consequences than the problems the reforms intended to fix. Further,
reformers are often blinded to the possible deleterious effects of their reforms, seeing them
only in the light of ‘benevolence’ and progress.”).
344
See, e.g., Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel
Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi
Shroff & Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across
the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 744 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/
s41562-020-0858-1 [https://perma.cc/Q8MW-A33X]; Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 270,
at 1005 (noting racial disparities in charging rates in nearly all eight jurisdictions studied).
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place. For example, if communities do not think marijuana offenders need
prison or jail time, why prosecute marijuana cases at all? And why is
marijuana possession a crime in the first place?
The presence of expungement can make legislatures less cautious about
expanding criminal liability because of the possibility of a release mechanism
later. Likewise, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges may think less of
branding someone a criminal if they feel that the mark is reversible. Data
must also track whether the presence of expungement is correlated to a rise
in prosecution rates. This comprehensive data collection requires funding and
funding data collection obviously involves trade-offs.345
Second, courts (particularly municipal courts) should not be evaluated
as tools to generate revenue.346 Fines and fees associated with diversion and
expungement frequently go toward the funding the criminal legal system—
paying for the courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement. This is not a feature
unique to diversion and expungement schemes—lawmakers have been using
administrative fees imposed on criminal defendants to recoup system costs
since at least the 1960s. The connection between the cost of funding the
system and the amount an individual criminal defendant is charged for
diversion or expungement must be severed. One possible solution is to have
costs for entry and participation in diversion and for access to expungement
be calibrated based on an individual’s ability to pay. One model, is the
European “day-fine,” where fees or fines are based on percentage of
defendant’s income so that rich and poor defendants are fined in proportion
to their earnings.347 However, there is reason to believe that even graduated
costs may undermine rather than support the possibility of broader reform. 348
It is worth considering whether community members should have a say
in the costs of expungement and diversion. Communities may decide that
they want the ability to reintegrate individuals with criminal cases into

345
See generally Jessica M. Eaglin, Racializing Algorithms, 111 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 32–40) (describing how data-driven technologies are often
falsely viewed as costless solutions to the problems of mass incarceration).
346
Lorri Montgomery, Top National State Court Leadership Associations Launch
National Task Force on Fines, Fees and Bail Practices, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. (Feb. 3,
2016),
https://www.ncsc.org/newsroom/news-releases/2016/task-force-on-fines-fees-andbail-practices [https://perma.cc/4NNW-KVK9]; see also Ordower, Sandoval & Warren, supra
note 127, at 117–18.
347
NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 236; Oklahoma has utilized the day fine model as well.
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1)(y) (2014).
348
See generally Colgan, supra note 121, 1580–81 (describing limitations of graduated
sanctions); see also Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-To-Pay Determinations
Are Inadequate to Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 175, 187–217 (2019) (detailing critiques of “ability to pay” regimes).
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society at no cost to the individual, and community members may be better
positioned than judges or prosecutors to gauge the financial realities faced by
court-involved individuals.349 Another solution would be for diversion and
expungement to be offered cost free as a default (particularly if defendants
qualify for appointed counsel or lack counsel) and allow the prosecutor to
bear the burden of proving that a defendant is able to pay the fees and costs
associated with these programs. More simply, the imposition of fees and
costs on criminal defendants who wish to participate in diversion or access
expungement could be abolished and these programs funded through other
means. At the very least, unmanageable fees for diversion and expungement
should be eliminated.350 Individuals, particularly those who are indigent,
should not be made to subsidize their own punishment and the poor should
not be charged for diversion.351
Third, programs required for diversion should be narrowly tailored and
effective rather than seen as a replacement for carceral punishment.
Individuals should not have to pay for programs that have not been proven
effective; the government should be the entity funding experimental
programs it believes to be beneficial. Nor should individuals be required to
participate in programs that are a mismatch for their needs. For example, drug
programs should not be ordered for defendants as a matter of course but
should only be deployed when individuals screen as being in need of drug
treatment or intervention.352 Obviously, it is far easier for low-income
defendants and defendants of color to access treatment programs when they
are provided at low cost. For example, the mental health diversion program
in California relies on the County Behavioral Health system, which is
resourced by Medicaid expansion dollars.353 Many defendants can access
drug treatment through Medicaid expansion as well.354 Veterans treatment
349
See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of ‘The People’ in Criminal Procedure, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 279–82 (2019); see also Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New
Penology, 20 STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 419, 450–60 (2009) (proposing a role for the
grand jury in drug court operation).
350
Prescott & Starr, supra note 174, at 2554 (concluding that fees should be eliminated in
the expungement context); see also Colgan, supra note 121, at 1566 (advocating for a
prohibition on using economic sanctions in criminal cases to fund criminal legal system
actors).
351
NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 237.
352
For example, using the screening tools approved by the American Society of Addiction
Medicine. See CNTY. OF L.A. PUB. HEALTH, LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT TOOL ADULTS (PAPER VERSION) (2017) (deriving from the American Society of Addiction Medicine
Criteria Multidimensional Assessment).
353
See California Courts, supra note 147.
354
See CAL. COUNCIL CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. HEALTH, THE IMPACT OF MEDI-CAL
EXPANSION ON ADULTS FORMERLY INCARCERATED IN CALIFORNIA STATE PRISONS 5 (2018),
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courts have likewise leveraged the services its participants have access to
through the Veterans Administration.355 If a treatment or education program
is promising and provides public safety and rehabilitative benefits, then
communities rather than individual poor people charged with crimes should
pay for it. As described above, making poor defendants pay for diversion,
treatment, and expungement cuts down the promise of these programs, limits
economic opportunity, and calcifies our race and class divides.
Fourth, expungement should be automated. As discussed above,356
several states have recently passed laws automating the expungement
process. “[A]utomation has great potential to clear many records that are now
subject to expensive and procedurally burdensome individualized civil
sealing procedures, which can require legal sophistication, and/or substantial
time and effort to navigate.”357 Technologies and laws that facilitate
automatic expungement and purging of arrests or convictions hold great
promise.358 Pennsylvania recently passed a law to fully automate record
sealing of non-conviction and old conviction records.359 Michigan did so
even while a pandemic was raging.360
Fifth, diversion and expungement should be expanded to address wider
populations. Diversion and expungement programs often only target firsttime, low-level, nonviolent offenders.361 Reform efforts targeting this
“narrow subpopulation” will never fully address our national problem of
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ccjbh/wp-content/uploads/sites/172/2019/12/Offender-Medi-CalUtilization-Study-Research-Report-CCJBH-FINAL.pdf?label=Medi-Cal%20Utilization%20
Report%20&from=https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ccjbh/publications/ [https://perma.cc/J59A-G2
2G].
355
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.80 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
356
Supra Section I.B.
357
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION:
FAIR CHANCE AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2018 11 (2019), https://ccresourcecenter.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Fair-chance-and-expungement-reforms-in-2018-CCRC-Jan2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND5H-5GH7].
358
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2022
Reg. Sess.) (requiring automatic purging of marijuana arrests and convictions following
legalization of marijuana in California).
359
Pennsylvania Clean Slate Act of 2018, S.B. 529, H.B. 1419 Reg. Sess. 2017 (Pa. 2017)
amending 18 PA. C.S.A. §§ 9121(b), 9122 (West 2016) (requiring automatic sealing of nonconviction records and non-violent misdemeanors after 10 crime-free years).
360
Jackson, supra note 195.
361
Eaglin, supra note 94, at 626. See generally CTR. FOR HEALTH & JUST., A NATIONAL
SURVEY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES (2013), https://www
.centerforhealthandjustice.org/tascblog/Images/documents/Publications/
CHJ%20Diversion%20Report%20Appendices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V33C-L47R]
(cataloguing diversion programs and noting over fifty programs targeted toward first-time
offenders).
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mass incarceration and mass criminalization.362 They are too modest and only
tinker around the edges. If reformers believe these programs work, then
governments must expand them to more politically difficult populations—
people charged or convicted of violent offenses or those with multiple
convictions. Higher-risk individuals may be better served by intensive
diversion programs than low-level first-time offenders who would likely selfcorrect without court interventions.363
Finally, diversion and expungement alone cannot do it all. They are
modest tools. The problems they are set out to address are bigger than they
can solve. As many criminal legal experts have described, the problems with
the criminal legal system are longstanding and profound. Reformers need to
shrink the criminal codes, remove onerous collateral consequences of
convictions (like professional licensing restrictions), provide greater access
to preventative social services, fund public defenders, and drastically change
the mindset of communities when it comes to policing and prosecuting crime.
B. THE DANGERS OF REFORMIST REFORMS

During the summer of 2020, after the killings of George Floyd, Breonna
Taylor, Ahmaud Aubery and Rayshard Brooks (among others) sparked
world-wide protests for the Black Lives Matter movement, the rhetoric of
“defund the police” and prison abolition emerged in the national narrative.364
Abolition is best understood not as the immediate closure of prions, but as “a
gradual project of decarceration, in which radically different legal and
institutional regulatory forms supplant criminal law enforcement.”365 Even if
one does not agree with the end goals of abolition, it is a useful exercise to

362

Eaglin, supra note 94, at 626.
James Bonta, Suzanne Wallace-Capretta & Jennifer Rooney, A Quasi-Experimental
Evaluation of an Intensive Rehabilitation Supervision Programs, 27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
312, 325 (2000) (finding that nontreated low-level offenders had lower recidivism rates than
treated low-level offenders).
364
See, e.g., Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May
Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/92
8N-FP4E]; Scottie Andrew, There’s a Growing Call to Defund the Police. Here’s What It
Means, CNN (June 17, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/us/what-is-defund-policetrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/2CWY-F45X]; Caleb Ecarma, “We Tried Band-Aiding the
Problem”: Black Lives Matter Activists Split on How Radical Change Should Be, VANITY
FAIR (June 19, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/06/black-lives-matter-protestssplit-police-brutality-solutions [https://perma.cc/83B6-QM88].
365
Allegra McLoed, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156,
1161 (2015).
363
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critique particular reforms through an abolitionist lens.366 To assess whether
a particular policy “aids in dismantling the carceral state, abolitionists
distinguish between reforms that diminish the power and function of criminal
legal systems and mere technocratic reforms that may provide relief in
individual cases but also entrench or legitimize such systems.”367 Using an
abolitionist framework, diversion and expungement with entry costs can be
thought of as “reformist reforms” rather than “abolitionist reforms.” 368 As
noted above, diversion often has a net-widening effect, ensnaring more
people in the criminal legal system.369 The fees for diversion and
expungement provide additional resources to the criminal legal system. This
further entrenches the existing criminal legal system by expanding its power.
Moreover, these policies and reforms reinforce the system’s centrality in
meting out justice and mercy and legitimize the role of criminal records in
stratifying our society and perpetuating caste.
Both expungement and diversion position the prosecutor and court as
the central figures in “fixing” our mass criminalization problem. In this way,
these programs seem to rehabilitate the prestige of the court and prosecutor
and enhance their power.370 It is very possible that courts and prosecutors
will use the tools they have—including diversion and expungement—to
expand their power and social control. Indeed, judges like diversion because
the problem-solving court model, where diversion is often dispensed, gives
a judge discretion and authority that is waning in much of the criminal
sentencing context due to the increased reliance on plea-bargaining.371 When
judges and other actors are given more discretion, that increases
opportunities for bias to operate.372 The presence of diversionary programs
366

Amna A. Akbar, Towards a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 443
(2018) (proposing that scholars use an abolitionist framework to evaluate criminal justice
policy).
367
See Colgan, supra note 121, at 1550.
368
Id. at 1550–52.
369
See, e.g., Maricopa County’s marijuana program, infra Part IV.C.
370
See TIGER, supra note 81, at 135.
371
Collins, supra note 45, at 16–21.
372
See, e.g., Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in
Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 77 (2015) (finding greater racial disparities in
federal sentencing after the Booker decision made the guidelines advisory); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009) (finding
evidence of implicit racial bias in favor of White defendants among White judges and some
Black judges); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking,
and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 350 (2007) (finding, through an empirical study,
“that the race of a civil plaintiff or criminal defendant can act implicitly to cause people to
misremember a case’s facts in racially biased ways”); Jelani Jefferson Exum, Sentencing

2022]

PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD

499

that are well-liked by judges and other institutional actors can also cause
resistance to more meaningful change.373 For example, judges resisted
proposals to lessen penalties for drug offenses because they feared doing so
would undercut drug courts.374
Fee-based diversion and expungement also have the potential to
legitimize criminal-records-based discrimination. By tempering the
harshness of the criminal legal system, diversion and expungement may
“disincentivize widespread systemic reform.375 And if diversion and
expungement opportunities are limited to those with financial means, then
these practices enshrine the socio-economic biases of the criminal legal
system and give them the imprimatur of legitimacy. Essentially, these
reforms allow the appearance of fairness while allowing the system to remain
“inherently unfair.”376 In this way, diversion and expungement might act as
release mechanisms that “help the broken system continue to operate in
perpetuity despite its flaws.”377 Though fewer people may have criminal
records, criminal records may become even more concentrated in poor
communities of color and wealthy Whites may be increasingly insulated from
the effects of the harsh criminal legal system.
C. RECENT LAWSUITS AS ABOLITION CONSTITUTIONALISM

Aside from raising serious policy concerns, fee-based diversion and
expungement could raise constitutional concerns as well. Two avenues for
constitutional challenges present themselves. The first is a challenge under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on either
class or race.378 The second is a challenge based in the Excessive Fines

Disparities and the Dangerous Perpetuation of Racial Bias, 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. &
SOC. JUST. 491, 498–500 (2020) (noting that the recent trend in federal and state sentencing
was increasingly longer sentences for Black men than for White men); Robert J. Smith &
Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 806 (2012) (arguing that implicit racial biases play a
role in prosecutor’s charging decisions).
373
See TIGER, supra note 81, at 135.
374
Collins, supra note 45, at 43–51 (discussing how judges have opposed criminal justice
reforms that would undercut drug courts).
375
Collins, supra note 36, at 1510.
376
Colgan, supra note 121, at 1580.
377
Collins, supra note 36, at 1508 (opining in the context of problem-solving courts).
378
But note that class distinctions are generally not subject to heightened scrutiny because
the poor are not a protected class, and most schemes will survive rational basis review. See
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980). Likewise, facially neutral schemes will only
trigger heightened scrutiny for race-based claims if they were motivated by racial animus,
which is generally difficult to prove. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
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Clause of the Eighth Amendment.379 Comprehensive treatment of the
application of these constitutional doctrine to the context of fee-based
diversion and expungement schemes is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, recently lawsuits have been utilized to put political pressure on
prosecutors and legislatures with an eye toward systemic abolitionist reform.
Currently, a lawsuit is pending in Arizona against Maricopa County
regarding its marijuana diversion program.380 The central claims are wealthbased discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather than challenging diversionary programs with
high entry costs generally, the complaint alleges specific unsavory practices
utilized by the county attorney in operationalizing the scheme. For example,
the letters inviting defendants to participate in diversion threatened prison
time if convicted to incentivize participation. But the defendants offered
diversion were first-time offenders who were not in fact eligible for jail or
prison sentences.381 Moreover, defendants could be terminated for failing to
drug test even when they were turned away from drug testing for not being
able to pay the $15–17 fee.382
The complaint also paints a picture of the revenue-generating incentives
of the prosecutor’s office, noting that the diversion program had generated
fifteen million dollars for the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office between
2006 and 2016.383 The complaint details how the county attorney lobbied
against marijuana decriminalization legislation, which would have cost him
the lucrative diversion program.384 It was also likely not lost on the attorneys
pursuing the case that if the county attorney ends the program, that might end
the net-widening effect of marijuana diversion and result in either a decline
in the number of marijuana arrests or ultimately in the decriminalization of
marijuana in Arizona. The lawsuit made the diversion scheme look more like
extortion than a diversionary program. Crucially, the lawsuit challenged the
social assumptions that the diversion program was a depoliticized solution or
benevolent reform.
379

The Excessive Fines Clause was incorporated against the states in Timbs v. Indiana,
139 S. Ct. 682, 691 (2019), and scholar Beth Colgan posits that it supports challenges against
excessive costs of diversion. See Colgan, supra note 47, at 24 n.126.
380
Michael Kiefer, Maricopa County Attorney Sued over Marijuana Diversion Program,
AZCENTRAL (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2018/08/
24/maricopa-county-attorney-sued-over-marijuana-diversion-program/1089031002/ [https://
perma.cc/3CZU-ABE2]; see also Briggs v. Montgomery, No. CV-18-2684-PHX-JAS, 2019
WL 2515950 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2019).
381
See Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 12, Briggs, 2019 WL 2515950 .
382
Id. at 19–21.
383
Id. at 23.
384
Id. at 10.
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When a new county attorney took over, she announced sweeping
changes to the program, including the elimination of the diversion case fees
which had ranged from $630 to $1,200.385 The elimination of these fees
resulted in record numbers of felony defendants participating in the diversion
program and avoiding prison—participation ballooned to 1,300 participants
a month from an average of around 300.386 Without the lucrative diversion
fees, the political opposition of the county attorney to decriminalizing
marijuana dampened. Indeed, after changes to the diversion program
rendering it less profitable, Arizona was able to pass a proposition legalizing
recreational marijuana.387
Another lawsuit filed in Louisiana challenges its expungement scheme,
which has the highest petition filing fee in the nation at $550 per record
event.388 The claims in the complaint are that the expungement scheme
violates both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Like the Arizona diversion case, the lawsuit homes
in on the specifics. It highlights the statutory language of Louisiana’s
expungement scheme which recognizes that “the inability to obtain an
expungement can prevent certain individuals from obtaining gainful
employment” and that by providing increased access to employment, the
expungement regime improves community reentry and serves public
safety.389 The complaint then details the costs of expungement—for some
385
Record Numbers for New Felony Diversion Program Provides Alternative to
Prosecution, MARICOPA CNTY ATT’Y’S OFF. (June 24, 2020), https://www.maricopacounty
attorney.org/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=726 [https://perma.cc/RCE4-KS2R].
386
Id.
387
Bob Christie & Suman Naishadham, Arizona, 15th State with Legal Pot, Sees
Recreational Sales, AP NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/arizona-phoenixmedical-marijuana-health-recreational-marijuana-95e630bac9a26a3c2e855eba101a7e2c (last
visited Mar. 24, 2022) (noting passage of Proposition 207 which legalized possession of less
than an ounce of marijuana and that afterwards “Arizona prosecutors dropped thousands of
marijuana possession cases”). County attorney Allister Adel, who had stopped charging
exorbitant fees for marijuana diversion programs and did not campaign against the marijuana
decriminalization ballot measure, indicated during her campaign that she would respect the
voters’ decision if it were passed. See Lauren Castle, Maricopa County Attorney Candidates
Allister Adel, Julie Gunnigle Square Off in Debate, AZCENTRAL (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/10/16/maricopa-countyattorney-candidates-allister-adel-julie-gunnigle-debate/3671231001/ [https://perma.cc/G6DJXXNU].
388
See Sledge, supra note 179; E.B. v. Landry, No. 19-CV-862-JWD-SDJ, 2021 WL
1201667 (M.D. La. Mar. 30, 2021); see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 983(A)
(Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (setting maximum expungement fee for non-DUI cases at
$550).
389
Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 12, Briggs v. Montgomery, No. CV18-2684-PHX-JAS, 2019 WL 2515950 (D. Ariz., Jun. 18, 2019).
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plaintiffs with multiple convictions and arrests this costs thousands—and the
dire financial circumstances of the plaintiffs to make the argument that due
to the exorbitant cost and lack of fee waiver for the indigent, the law does not
meet even a rational basis standard. The complaint alleges that the
“application of the state law is irrational because not only does it not serve a
legitimate government purpose, but it actively undermines the stated purpose
of the expungement laws as enacted by the legislature.”390 The plaintiffs seek
not wholesale statutory reform, but simply the possibility of a fee waiver for
petitioners too poor to pay.391 But the lawsuit provided leverage for a state
bill that would have automated expungement in Louisiana and eradicated
expungement fees.392 Though the bill did not pass, the Louisiana Senate
passed a resolution to study the impact of the collateral consequences of
criminal convictions and propose legislative solutions.393
Both lawsuits target decidedly flawed, superficial, or disingenuous
efforts at criminal justice reform. Regardless of the rulings on the Equal
Protection Clause claims, the lawsuits have publicized the shortcomings of
these so-called reforms and pushed for something better—in one case
facilitating the passage of a proposition to decriminalize low-level marijuana
possession and in the other creating momentum for collateral consequences
relief more broadly. These lawsuits advance a vision of the Constitution that
can be utilized to dismantle the carceral state. They demonstrate the practice
of “Abolition Constitutionalism” described by theorist Dorothy E. Roberts.
As Roberts writes:
[A]bolitionists acknowledge that building a prisonless society is a long-term project
involving incremental achievements. . . . [A]bolition means developing practical
strategies for taking small steps that move us toward making our dreams real and that
lead us all to believe that things really could be different. Some of those steps will entail
engaging with the state. In demanding state action that promotes prison abolition,
abolition activists can use constitutional provisions instrumentally to assert and
sometimes win their claims.394

CONCLUSION
Many Americans from both sides of the political spectrum have
embraced the cause of criminal justice reform. But we are still deeply
ambivalent about the reasons for reform and its end goal. Some advocate for
massive structural changes based on commitment to ending the era of
390
391
392
393
394

Id. at 32.
Id. at 35.
See H.B. 604, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2021).
See S.R. 100, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2021).
Dorothy E. Roberts, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 108 (2019).
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criminal social control of poor people and people of color.395 While others
only seek to reduce the size of the criminal justice behemoth because it has
become financially unmanageable or because it has started to target people
like them.396 Some government officials embrace supposed reforms only to
profit financially.397 The American problem is not solely the proliferation of
criminal records—it is also the societal attitude about those with criminal
records which perpetuates racial caste and the creation of a permanent
underclass.
This Article should not be read as a blanket argument against
expungement or diversion. Well-conceived diversion systems that lack
financial barriers to entry, avoid widening the net of the carceral state, and
connect people to worthwhile services that keep communities safe are a good
idea. Such diversion programs can be used to divert both people and funding
away from jails and prisons back into communities. Similarly, expungement
programs that lack financial and access to justice barriers can improve the
lives of individuals with criminal records without compromising public
safety. But these reforms are more modest than policymakers and politicians
often claim. We cannot solve the problems of mass criminalization with
expungement alone or in combination with diversion.398 As J.B. Prescott and
Sonja B. Starr explain, “[o]n balance, the population of people living with
criminal records is continuing to grow quickly; [diversion and expungement
are] like a bucket removing water from an ever-rising ocean.”399
As governments implement diversion and expungement programs, they
must track data to ensure that these reforms are not used to grow the scope
of our overly punitive and vast criminal legal system. Moreover, reformers
must ensure that the pruning of convictions that results from these programs
395

ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 230–36.
For example, at the sentencing of President Trump’s former business associate Roger
Stone, prosecutors asked for a below guideline sentence and noted the harshness of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. District Court Judge Amy Berman-Jackson responded, “For those of
you new to this and who woke up last week to the fact that the . . . guidelines are harsh, I can
assure you that defense attorneys and many judges have been making that point for a long
time, but we don’t usually succeed in getting the government to agree.” Darren Samuelsohn
& Josh Gerstein, Stone Sentenced to over 3 Years in Prison, POLITICO (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2020/02/20/stone-sentenced-to-over-3-yearsin-prison-1262519 [https://perma.cc/W9AH-QD2H].
397
Dewan, supra note 119 (describing a prosecutor who has profited off diversion fees as
“a prodigious user of diversion, he has shown little inclination toward its goals of mercy and
rehabilitation” and noting that his county has one of the ten highest rates of death row prisoners
per capita).
398
Roberts, supra note 46, at 343.
399
Prescott & Starr, supra note 174, at 2510 (noting that Michigan adds 300,000 new
convictions a year).
396
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does not further exacerbate the racial and class disparities in our criminal
legal system and entrench racial caste. When cost-benefit analysis becomes
the sole guiding principal for reform, we often lose sight of the larger social
justice framework needed to achieve meaningful change.400
Remedying the harms wrought by our decades-long experiment with
mass criminalization is one of the defining challenges of the current political
moment. Diversion and expungement can serve as mere window dressing—
superficial reforms to hide the ugliness of a deeply dysfunctional criminal
legal system. Or they can be modest first steps in the direction of more a just
and equitable system—one that is just out of sight, somewhere over the
horizon.
APPENDIX A: COSTS OF DIVERSION401
This Appendix documents the real costs of “diversion.” This appendix
focuses on prosecutor-led and judicial diversion, which occur after a charge
is filed with the court, rather than law enforcement assisted diversion which
occurs before filing. Unlike expungement, which is typically statutory and
somewhat uniform throughout the state, diversion programs vary by charge,
defendant type, and jurisdictional unit.402 Some programs are statutorily
defined, but more often programs are defined by local authorities, even if
they are authorized by statute. As such, this table is not exhaustive and does
not claim to tally the costs of all diversion programs, but merely attempts to
show the real costs off a sampling of diversion programs across all states. 403
This table also indicates whether the costs associated with diversion can be
waived based on indigence (*). The costs included may also not be
comprehensive because many costs are determined by the details of a
defendant’s supervision and programming costs which vary depending on the
length of time they are in the program and other factors.

400
Marie Gottschalk, The Folly of Neoliberal Prison Reform, BOS. REV. (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://bostonreview.net/articles/marie-gottschalk-neoliberal-prison-reform-caught/ [https://
perma.cc/695S-N6L9].
401
All statutes within this appendix are current through 2021 State Legislative Sessions
unless otherwise listed.
402
See supra Section I.A.
403
Many programs do not include information about costs associated in website
descriptions. Where possible, the author included information about programs that specifically
addressed costs or affirmatively stated that there were no costs or no additional costs.
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Sample Diversion Programs and Costs
ALA. CODE § 12-17-226.1 allows district attorneys to
establish pretrial diversion programs for certain
offenses (§ 12-17-226.2) if the defendants meet
minimum statutory criteria for admission (§ 12-17226.3). Administration fees for pretrial diversion, up
to $1,000, are to be set by the district attorney
creating the program and may be reduced or waived
based on a determination that the defendant will
remain indigent for the foreseeable future (§ 12-17226.8, citing § 13A-12-281(a)). The defendant is also
required to pay court costs, restitution, fines, fees, and
the costs of any drug testing or other services (§§ 1217-226.6, -226.9).
 In Tuscaloosa County, the “Second Chance”
Diversion program, has an administration fee of
$1,000 and an additional $100 a month is charged
if a defendant requires more than a year to
complete the program;404 court costs are also
required.
 In Covington County, the administrative fee for
diversion is $600;405 court costs are also required.
 In Alabaster Municipal Court, diversion for a DUI
charge (including court costs and other fees) is
$2400.406
There is no state statute authorizing diversion,407 but
Anchorage has a municipal code authorizing
diversion in some misdemeanor offenses.408 The code
authorizes community service hours of up to eighty

See Second Chance Program Overview, TUSCALOOSA CNTY. DIVERSION PROGRAMS,
INC., https://www.tcdpinc.org/overview [https://perma.cc/CV6L-HSFG].
405
See supra Section I.C.1.
406
Megan Miller, Sen. Cam Ward Admits Guilt, Enters Trial Diversion Program for DUI
Arrest, CBS 42 WIAT (Sept. 9, 2015, 5:05 PM), https://www.cbs42.com/news/crime/sencam-ward-admits-guilt-enters-trial-diversion-program-for-dui-arrest/
[https://perma.cc/GQ4D-5NW4].
407
See Cory R. Lepage & Jeff D. May, The Anchorage, Alaska Municipal Pretrial
Diversion Program: An Initial Assessment, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 6 (2017); though ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.078 (Lexis through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess.) authorizes the court to suspend
entry of judgement which functions much like diversion.
408
ANCHORAGE, AK, MUNI. CODE § 08.05.060 (2016), http://anchorage-ak.elaws.us/code/
coor_title8_ch8.05_sec8.05.060 [https://perma.cc/5Y4K-LFTL].
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hours, and a fee of up to $500; payment of restitution
is another permitted condition.409
One study conducted in 2015 found that in 93% of
cases, the diversion grantee paid a $250 fine, while
7% of diversion grantees completed community
service.410 There is a $25 fee to complete community
service.411
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-362 allows county
attorneys to establish diversion programs.
 The City of Tucson has a diversion program for
misdemeanors costing $275 (not inclusive of costs
for restitution, monthly assessments, and “other
fees related to the diversion program”).412
 Maricopa offers a felony diversion program run by
service provider SAGE Counseling. The initial
assessment fee is $150, at which point the
participant is placed in a treatment track based on
their needs, with treatment fees as follow:413
o Track One: $400-$680
o Track Two: $400-$680
o Track Three: $1,200-$2,600
o Track Four: $3,400-$3,900
o Track Five: $480
o Track Six: $1,775-$2,100
o Drug Testing Fees (Frequency of testing
varies by track and participant needs)
 $13.90 per urinalysis test
 $19.50 per oral swab/saliva test
o Restitution is capped at $2,000
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-98-201 allows for judicial
districts to establish drug court programs, including

Id.
Lepage & May, supra note 407, at 18.
411
Pre-Trial Diversion: Frequently Asked Questions, MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE,
https://www.muni.org/departments/legal/criminal/pages/pretrialdiversion.aspx [https://perma
.cc/B6Z8-36GV].
412
Diversion, CITY OF TUCSON, https://www.tucsonaz.gov/prosecutor/diversion [https://
perma.cc/9HH8-SNRL].
413
MARICOPA CNTY ATT’Y’S OFF., MCAO FELONY DIVERSION PROGRAM (Rev. Aug. 9,
2021) (on file with author).
410
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diversion programs.414 There is no information about
costs in the statute, nor is there information about
costs of programs readily available on public
websites.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1001–1001.97 authorize the
establishment of a wide array of pretrial diversion
programs (e.g. mental health diversion, veteran’s
diversion, parental diversion, etc.). Sections 1001.15
and 1001.16 set maximum administrative fees for
diversion at $300* for misdemeanors and $500* for
felonies, and § 1001.90 sets a diversion restitution fee
in all cases of between $100 and $1,000.* Generally,
services are paid for by the defendant (e.g., drug
diversion class can cost $395).415
 Santa Cruz County’s drug diversion program fee is
$705.416
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-101 allows district
attorneys to establish pretrial diversion programs.
Diversion agreements may include requirements that
defendants pay court costs, restitution, and
supervision fees (of $50 a month for the up to 2-year
period of diversion).
 The Fifth Judicial Circuit’s Adult Diversion
program charges a $50 monthly fee, in addition to
“restitution and costs of prosecution.”417
 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38c(h) establishes a
diversion program for those charged with family
violence offenses. The application fee is $100*
and the program fee is $300.*

However, based on a report from 2014, it appears most drug courts are postadjudication and are not therefore diversion programs. See ARK. CMTY. CORR., ARKANSAS
ADULT DRUG COURT RECIDIVISM STUDY/COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 3 (2014), https://doc
.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/DrugCourtRecidivismPerformanceNov2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VK2-D739].
415
PC1000 Deferred Entry of Judgment Program, All Online, AJ NOVICK GRP., https://
www.alcoholdrugclass.com/pc1000.aspx?AFLID=X23BM92C [https://perma.cc/JNU6-KH
MV].
416
Deferred Judgment Drug Program, CNTY. OF SANTA CRUZ, https://www.santacruz
health.org/HSAHome/HSADivisions/BehavioralHealth/SubstanceUseDisordersServices/
DeferredJudgmentDrugProgram.aspx [https://perma.cc/HA3R-S3JJ].
417
Adult Diversion, COLO. FIFTH JUD. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.da5.us/programsupport [https://perma.cc/9C6H-Y4S2].
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 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56e establishes a pretrial
diversion for non-serious crimes and motor
vehicle violations. It has an application fee of $35,
a program fee of $100, and if the defendant is
required to participate in a hate crimes program,
that program fee is an additional $425.
 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56g establishes a Pre-trial
Alcohol Education Program for people charged
with DUI offenses. The application fee is $100,
the evaluation fee is $100, and the program fee is
$350* (10-week educational program), $500* (15week educational program), or the (unspecified)
cost of a treatment program.*418
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4218 establishes authority
for the judge to grant, with the state’s consent,
“probation before judgment,” which functions as
post-plea diversion. Terms of the program may
include payment of “a pecuniary penalty,” court
costs, or restitution.
The U.S. Attorney’s Office has several diversion
programs—several of which appear to be cost-free or
only require the payment of restitution (based on the
website description).419
FLA. STAT. §§ 948.08, 948.16 establish pretrial
intervention programs including drug, mental health,
and veteran’s court diversion programs. Section
948.09 sets the cost of misdemeanor supervision at a
minimum of $40 a month and also requires the
defendant to pay for any electronic monitoring.
 DUI diversion program costs are listed at $500
and $1,000 depending on whether the program is
tier I or II.420

418
See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56g (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.);
STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, A GUIDE TO SPECIAL SESSIONS & DIVERSIONARY PROGRAMS IN
CONNECTICUT 10 (2013), https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/cr137P.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L4J4-926G].
419
See Diversion Programs, D.C. U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.justice.gov/usaodc/diversion-programs [https://perma.cc/Q4DH-E6BU].
420
Pretrial Diversion, FLA. SAFETY COUNCIL, https://www.floridasafetycouncil.org/
Category/pretrial-diversion [https://perma.cc/Y2DF-9RJL].
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 The State Attorney’s Office for Orange and
Osceola Counties offer several diversion
programs, many of which require the participant to
watch free educational videos on the State
Attorney’s website.421
 The State’s Attorney for Brevard and Seminole
County offers misdemeanor diversion—but the
program is entirely funded at participant expense.
The program fee is $360–$720 (depending on
length of time); there is also a prosecution fee of
$50, payment of restitution and investigation fees
to law enforcement (where applicable), and the
possibility of drug, alcohol, and mental health
evaluation and treatment at participant expense.422
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-18-80 allows the prosecuting
attorney for each judicial district to create and
administer a pretrial intervention and diversion
program. A program fee of up to $1,000* can be
charged to the defendant, and restitution can also be
ordered.
 Cobb County’s diversion program charges an
administrative fee of $200, restitution to victims,
reimbursement for appointed attorney’s fees, a
drug screening fee, and also indicates that the
participant may be required to undergo drug and
alcohol or mental health evaluations and
treatment at their own expense.423
 Diversion in Cherokee County costs
administrative program fee of $405*, up to $361
for drug and alcohol testing, and restitution; all
these must be paid in full at the initial
orientation.424

421
Diversion Programs, STATE ATT’Y’S OFF. FOR ORANGE AND OSCEOLA CNTYS.,
https://www.sao9.net/diversion-programs.html [https://perma.cc/N5NL-VXYW].
422
Misdemeanor Pretrial Diversion Program, STATE ATT’Y’S OFF. FOR 18TH JUD. CIR.,
http://sa18.org/page/misdemeanor-diversion.html [https://perma.cc/RC3W-VPRC].
423
Pretrial Diversion, COBB CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y, https://www.cobbcounty.org/courts/
district-attorney/pretrial-diversion [https://perma.cc/59NH-MAJD].
424
BLUE RIDGE JUD. CIR., OFF. OF THE DIST. ATT’Y, BLUE RIDGE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR ELIGIBILITY, ACCEPTANCE, AND
ADMINISTRATION PROTOCOL 3–4 (2018), https://www.cherokeega.com/District-Attorneys-
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HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 853-1, 853-4 authorize deferred
acceptance of guilty and no contest pleas which
functions as diversion. Hawaii law mandates a
compensation fee is $35–55* for misdemeanors and
$105–505* for felonies, imposition of a fine, and
$75* or $150* in probation services fees (depending
on whether the term of probation will be more or less
than a year).
IDAHO CODE § 19-3509 allows prosecuting attorneys
to establish diversion programs for DUI charges in
certain eligible cases. Participants are required to pay
a diversion fee of $157.50*, an interlock ignition
deposit of $15, as well as installation of an interlock
ignition device425 and, if the offense is drug-related,
undergo twelve months of drug testing, all at
participant’s expense.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 166/1 et seq. establishes a
drug court diversion program; the “program shall
include a regimen of graduated requirements [],
including but not limited to: fines, fees, costs,
restitution.”426 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 167/1 et seq.
establishes a veterans and service members treatment
court, which includes diversion. 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 168/1 establishes a mental health court which
includes diversion options.
Cook County has eight operational diversion
programs—the three defined in statute above and an
additional five deferred prosecution programs.427
One survey found that roughly half (26 of 54)
prosecutor-led diversion programs in Illinois charged

Office/_resources/Pretrial-Diversion-Program/Policy-and-Procedure-manual-updated2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV2L-V9UH].
425
Which cost $50 to $150 to install and $50–$175 to operate each month, meaning a
first-time DUI offender participating in diversion may pay as much as $2,250. See New
Program Could Erase 1st-time DUI Charges, If Lawmakers Approve It, IDAHO STATESMAN
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/
article202513799.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2022).
426
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 166/25 (2017).
427
COOK CNTY. STATE’S ATT’Y’S OFF., DIVERSION (2019), https://www.cookcountystates
attorney.org/sites/default/files/files/documents/diversion_flyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/F25C2ZP9].
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participants program fees; program fees in one
program ranged from $10 to $1,500.428
IND. CODE § 33–39–1–8 allows prosecutors to
establish diversion programs for misdemeanors and
low-level felonies. Section 33–37–4–1 sets initial user
fees for diversion at $50 (misdemeanors) or $75
(felonies) and then establishes a $20 monthly user fee
and permits additional program fees and costs
“reasonably related to the defendant’s
rehabilitation.”*429
 Delaware County has a diversion program for
low-level offenders; participants must pay
deferred court costs of $164, a program fee of
$125, a community service fee of $100, and a
prosecutor’s office fee based on the grade of the
charged offense $90 (class C misdemeanor), $170
(class B misdemeanor), $290 (class A
misdemeanor), or $600–$1551 (level 5 & 6
felony offense).430
 Johnson County has a diversion program for
misdemeanors. The fee is $254 for a class C
misdemeanor, $334 for a class B, and $454 for a
class A.431 Participants may also have to pay for
evaluation and treatment for “drugs, alcohol,
anger control or domestic violence” and/or pay
restitution.
 St. Joseph County has a diversion program for
misdemeanor offenses; participants must pay a
$170 “user’s fee” and $164 in court costs.432

CTR. FOR HEALTH AND JUST. AT TASC, A SURVEY OF PROSECUTORIAL DIVERSION IN
ILLINOIS 20 (2017), https://www.centerforhealthandjustice.org/tascblog/Images/documents/
Publications/IL-ProsecutorialDiversionSurvey-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/33VJ-JJ8U].
429
Mueller v. State, 837 N.E.2d 198, 204–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
prosecutor’s preclusion of defendants from participating in pretrial diversion program based
solely on their asserted inability to pay the $230 in fees violated defendants’ rights to due
process and equal protection under federal Constitution).
430
Pre-trial Diversion Program, DEL. CNTY. CIR. CTS. OFF., https://delawarecocourts
.wixsite.com/info/diversion [https://perma.cc/RZ6E-VLTA].
431
Pre-trial Diversion, JOHNSON CNTY. PROSECUTORS OFF., https://www.jcpo.us/pretrial-diversion/ [https://perma.cc/XHK4-E2JG].
432
Pre-trial Diversion, ST. JOSEPH CNTY. PROSECUTING ATT’Y, https://www.sjcindiana
.com/697/Pre-Trial-Diversion [https://perma.cc/NQ4B-LWXX].
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IOWA CODE § 907.3(1) allows for deferred
adjudications which function as diversion, and
requires imposition of a civil penalty equivalent to the
fine required by §§ 903.1, 902.9, which amount to:
 $105–$855 for simple misdemeanors,
 $430–$2,560 for serious misdemeanors,
 $855–$8,540 for aggravated misdemeanors,
 $1,025–$10,245 for class D felonies, and
 $1,370–$13,660 for class C felonies.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2907 allows for district
attorneys to establish pretrial diversion programs and
requires the participant pay a supervision fee of $60*
(misdemeanor) or $120* (felony)433 and pay for any
urinalysis testing. Section 22-2909 allows the
diversion agreement to include payment of restitution,
court costs, and diversion costs, and allows for
diversion fees of up to $100. For DUI diversion, a
fine between $750 and $1,000 is required,434 and for
domestic violence diversion the participant must
participate in an assessment and treatment at
participant expense.
City of Wichita has a several diversion programs
including:
 Traffic diversion with costs of $272 (low-level
infractions) $322 (speeding over 15 mph);435
 First-time low-level offenses (e.g., petty theft,
possession of marijuana, minor in possession)
which costs $500;436
 DUI Diversion which costs $1,500.437

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6607(c)(3)(A) (Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567(b)(1)(A) (Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.) (outlining that
community service can be substituted for the fine).
435
CITY OF WICHITA, PRE-TRIAL TRAFFIC DIVERSION INFORMATION SHEET (2019), https://
www.wichita.gov/Law/LawDocuments/Traffic%20Diversion%20Application.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KH68-R4FA].
436
CITY OF WICHITA, CITY OF WICHITA CRIMINAL DIVERSION PROGRAMS (NON-DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE) (2020), https://www.wichita.gov/Law/LawDocuments/Criminal%20Diversion
%20Application.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF3G-L8YY].
437
CITY OF WICHITA, PRETRIAL DUI DIVERSION INFORMATION SHEET (2020), https://www
.wichita.gov/Law/LawDocuments/DUI%20Diversion%20Application.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/3DAN-T5EN].
434
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Jefferson County Attorney’s Office has a diversion
program with the following costs:438
 $208 for traffic cases
 $258 for class C misdemeanors
 $308 for class B misdemeanors
 $408 for class A misdemeanors, DUI first
offense, and Domestic Battery
 $193 (court costs) plus $250-$1,000 (diversion
fee) for felony offenses
 Additional costs may include fines,
fingerprinting, urinalysis testing, lab fees, court
appointed attorney’s fees, and restitution.
The Kansas Office of the Attorney General also has
an established diversion program with a diversion fee
of $400 due upon the filing of the agreement; court
costs, fines, lab and urinalysis fees, as well as a
possible $75 restitution monitoring fee may also
apply.439
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.250 allows for the
establishment of pretrial diversion programs in each
judicial circuit; the court “shall assess a diversion
supervision fee* sufficient to defray all or part of the
cost” of participation.
 Jefferson County Attorney’s Office offers DUI
diversion for first time offenses. There is a $300
program fee (which must be paid in full within
thirty days of entering the program) and court
costs must also be paid.440

Criminal/Major Traffic Diversion Program, JEFFERSON CNTY. ATT’Y’S OFF. (Jan. 7,
2019), https://www.jfcountyks.com/DocumentCenter/View/5379/2019_Diversion-Applica
tion-and-Information-DUI-and-CR?bidId= [https://perma.cc/8TF2-LENZ].
439
Diversion Notice/Policy, KAN. ATT’Y GEN.’S OFF. (Aug. 2019), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/
default-source/publications/oag-diversion-policy.pdf?sfvrsn=4122d21a_8
[https://perma
.cc/Z33D-YKJY].
440
DUI First Offenders Diversion Program, LOUISVILLE, KY. CNTY. ATT’Y, https://
louisvilleky.gov/government/county-attorney/dui-first-offenders-diversion-program [https://
perma.cc/R3RV-S7BN].
438
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Louisiana lacks a statutorily created general pretrial
diversion program, but many prosecutor-created
diversion programs exist.441
 The District Attorney’s Office for the 22d
Judicial District offers a DUI diversion program
with an enrollment fee of $1,500, a monthly
supervision fee of $50, $30 fee for a victim
impact panel, as well as drug/alcohol evaluation
and treatment, an 8–14 week-long drug education
program at participant expense, and an Alcohol
Abuse Safe Driving education course, all at
participant expense.442
 Jefferson Parish District Attorney offers a variety
of diversion programs; these require payment of
an enrollment fee, and assessment fee, and
“program participation fees, which exclude any
fees for outside referral services.”443
ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1902 allows for deferred
dispositions, which function as diversion, and allows
for an administrative fee of up to $50 a month during
the term of deferment.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-220 allows a court
to place a defendant on probation before judgement—
allowing for diversion. Subsection (b)(2) of that
provision permits a court to impose a fine, monetary
penalty, or restitution as a condition of probation
before judgement.
According to a 2016 Report about diversion in
Maryland, the following courts had the following fees

441
But see LA. STAT. ANN. § 16:17(E) (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.), which
acknowledges the existence of general pretrial diversion programs. See also LOUISIANA
LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, INFORMAL AUDIT OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY DIVERSION PROGRAMS
(2020), https://app.lla.state.la.us/PublicReports.nsf/0/9C028732B72167D58625861C005FA2
72/$FILE/00021BED.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3E5-JE3X] (noting the existence of forty
criminal, thirty-six DUI, and thirty-six traffic diversion programs).
442
22ND JUD. DIST. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., APPLICATION FOR PRE-TRIAL INTERVENTION
DIVERSION PROGRAM, https://damontgomery.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/DWIRequire
ments.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS8T-PELS].
443
Adult Diversion, JEFFERSON PARISH DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.jpda.us/
departments/other/adult-diversion/ [https://perma.cc/UR7K-64UX].
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for diversion (the report focused on drug court
diversion):444
 Baltimore City District & Circuit Courts have
diversion programs without a fee,
 Frederick County has an alternative sentencing
program with a $80 fee to participate,
 Harford County has a diversion program without
a fee, but the participant must pay drug testing
costs,
 Howard County has a diversion program where
participants must pay $170 for a drug/alcohol
education class and $15–$40 for drug testing,
 Montgomery County has a diversion program
without a fee,
 Prince George’s County has a diversion program
with a fee that varies depending on insurance
coverage and other factors,
 Washington County has a program with a $15.45
insurance fee and any fees associated with the
individual case programs and conditions,
 Worcester County has a program with no fee.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276A, §§ 1–12 establishes a
pretrial diversion program, with § 10 establishing a
diversion program for veterans and servicemembers
of the military. Section 12 explicitly states that
district attorneys (and police departments) have
authority to establish diversion programs aside from
the ones delineated by statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
276B, §§ 1–5 establishes restorative justice programs
that result in diversion.
 Essex District Attorney’s Office has a drug
diversion program with no fees mentioned on the
district attorney’s website description; drug
treatment is provided in coordination with

ACLU MD., DIVERTED INTO DEPORTATION 20–30 (2016), https://www.aclumd.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/immigrant_justice_diversion_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AY2L-ZLGT].
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MassHealth (part of Massachusetts’ endeavor to
provide nearly universal healthcare).445
 Middlesex District Attorney’s Office has a young
adult diversion program with no fees or costs
mentioned in the website description.446
 Worchester County District Attorney’s Office has
a diversion program with a requirement to pay
$100 in court costs unless such sum is waived or
converted to community service.447
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7411 allows a court to
defer judgment and place a defendant in a drug case
on probation—functioning as diversion; the court
“may order the individual to pay a fee” for the
program and the participant “shall pay the costs of the
screening, assessment, and rehabilitative services” if
ordered.
 Kent County has a diversion program for nonviolent offenses where the defendant has no
previous felony conviction and no more than two
misdemeanor convictions; participants must pay a
$15 application fee, a $400 diversion fee, a $75
values class (if applicable), and restitution (if
applicable).448
 Wayne County has a felony diversion program
for first-time offenders; beyond payment of
restitution, there does not seem to an additional
fee for this program.449

445
Essex Drug Diversion, ESSEX CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.mass.gov/
service-details/essex-drug-diversion [https://perma.cc/V2R5-4DXD].
446
Juvenile and Young Adult Diversion Programs, MIDDLESEX CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF.,
https://www.middlesexda.com/beyond-courtroom/pages/juvenile-and-young-adult-diversion
-programs [https://perma.cc/44XY-Z62Q].
447
Diversion Program, OFF. WORCESTER CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y, https://worcesterda.com/
prevention/diversion-program/ [https://perma.cc/HC7L-REPS].
448
See Diversion, KENT CNTY., https://www.accesskent.com/Courts/CourtServices/
diversion.htm [https://perma.cc/JRC8-5NMT]; see also Court Services FAQs, KENT CNTY.,
https://www.accesskent.com/Courts/CourtServices/faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/L4N5-5RKN].
449
Diversion Section, WAYNE CNTY. PROSECUTOR, https://www.waynecounty.com/
elected/prosecutor/diversion-section.aspx [https://perma.cc/2B7L-YG5R].
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MINN. STAT. § 401.065 directs the establishment of
diversion programs by every county attorney
participating in the Community Corrections Act.
 Hennepin County has a diversion program for
solicitation of prostitution diversion with a
program costing $750.450
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-15-105 authorizes district
attorneys to establish pretrial intervention programs
which function as diversion. Section 99-15-121
dictates that diversion requirements include full
payment of restitution and expenses incurred by
participation in the program.451
 The District Attorney’s Office in the 16th Circuit
has a diversion program costing $1,200 (with
$200 due at the time of enrollment)—if the
participant fails out of the program, no fees are
refunded; participants may also have to pay
restitution, child support, and other court fines.452
MO. REV. STAT. § 557.014 grants prosecuting
attorney authority to create diversion programs.
 Platte County has a diversion program for “first
time, non-violent offenders” with a program fee
of $300.453
 Jackson County has a diversion program called
“NewStart 2020” that is funded by the Jackson
County Legislature rather than solely by
participants.454

AMARA LEGAL CTR., supra note 109.
But the Mississippi Supreme Court has previously held that conditioning diversion on
payment can in certain circumstances violate an indigent defendant’s equal protection rights.
See Moody v. State, 716 So.2d 562, 565 (Miss. 1998).
452
DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF. FOR 16TH CIR. OF MISS., PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION 2, https://54506278ef79-4f1d-8967-4f7e899fea1d.filesusr.com/ugd/5e94df_6c05a3fca0b34cdba3
019f0c5fb07a6d.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKF9-YBM3].
453
Pat McGonigle, Platte County Rolls Out Diversion Program for Non-Violent and First
Time Offenders, FOX5KC (May 13, 2021, 9:17 PM), https://fox4kc.com/news/platte-countyrolls-out-diversion-program-for-non-violent-first-time-offenders/ [https://perma.cc/H5CQSL54].
454
David Medina, Some Jackson County Non-Violent Offenders to Get Second Chance
Under New Diversion Program, KSHB (Oct. 26, 2020, 12:28 PM), https://www.kshb.com/
news/local-news/some-jackson-county-non-violent-offenders-to-get-second-chance-undernew-diversion-program [https://perma.cc/AD7L-MQD3].
451
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Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

Circuit Attorney’s Office of St. Louis also has a
diversion program which receives federal grant
funding, but also charges non-indigent
participants a $30 monthly program fee.455
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-130 establishes authority
to create pretrial diversion programs.
 Missoula County has a drug court diversion
program with a cost of up to $300 a month.456
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3602 grants county and city
attorneys authority to establish pretrial diversion
programs in conformity with the requirements laid
out in § 29-3603.
 The National Safety Council of Nebraska
administers diversion programs in Douglas
County (felonies) and in the City of Omaha
(misdemeanors); the program cost is $250, $440,
or $640 (depending on level of services and time
in program) plus the cost of drug testing ($39
each test).457
 Platte County has a diversion program for traffic
offense and other offenses that costs $40 plus a
$30 a month fee.458
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 174.031–.034 establishes a
“preprosecution diversion program;” § 174.032(6)
dictates that a defendant in the program “shall pay the
cost of any program of treatment required by this
section to the extent of his or her financial resources.”

Felony Redirect Program, CIR. ATT’Y’S OFF., http://www.circuitattorney.org/felony
%20redirect%20program.aspx [https://perma.cc/M3CD-RDWG]; see also Joel Currier,
Federal Grants to Fund Diversion Programs at St. Louis City and County Prosecutors’
Offices, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/
crime-and-courts/federal-grants-to-fund-diversion-programs-at-st-louis-city-and-countyprosecutors-offices/article_8f242fb9-d476-5598-b699-a48a70bccb90.html [https://perma.cc/
99FD-RD59].
456
MISSOULA CNTY., JAIL DIVERSION MASTER PLAN 52 n.121 (2016), https://www
.missoulacounty.us/home/showdocument?id=28364 [https://perma.cc/4KR5-H83Y].
457
Diversion Programs, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL NEB. CHAPTER, https://www.safe
nebraska.org/safe-home-play/diversion-programs/ [https://perma.cc/ST2W-P6L8]; Diversion
FAQ, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL NEB. CHAPTER, https://www.safenebraska.org/safe-home-play/
diversion-programs/diversion-enrollment [https://perma.cc/TB2U-S474].
458
Platte County Adult Diversion, PLATTE CNTY., https://plattecounty.net/webpages/adult
_diversion/adult_diversion.html [https://perma.cc/RTP8-9ELM].
455
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New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

459

The Clark County District Attorney’s Office has a
Bad Check Diversion Unit; restitution and
administrative costs are paid by the person
accused of passing a fraudulent check.459
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490-G:2 authorizes drug
courts, § 490-H:2 authorizes mental health courts, and
both programs allow for diversionary dispositions.
 Merrimack County has a diversion program
which has the following costs:460
o $200 (for violations),
o $450 (misdemeanors),
o $600 (felonies),
o $375 FAST (First-Time Alcohol and
Substance Abuse Training)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-12 establishes a state-wide
pretrial intervention program, primarily for first-time
offenders. Section 2C:43-13.1 creates a conditional
dismissal program, which functions as diversion; this
program has a $75 application fee which can be
waived based on indigency.
The Pre-Prosecution Diversion Act, N. M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31-16a-1–16a-8 (2020) directs each district
attorney to establish a preprosecution diversion
program (PPD); restitution is required by § 31-16a5(B).
 The 12th Judicial District offers a PPD program
which has a monthly fee of $85 for twelve
months (total of $1,020), a $100 cost for a oneday course, restitution, costs for drug testing, and
an eighty hour community service requirement
(which can be replaced by a $580 donation).461

Bad Check Unit, CLARK CNTY., https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/government/
departments/district_attorney/divisions/bad_check_unit/index.php [https://perma.cc/9X2KY9SK].
460
Felony, Misdemeanor, and Violation Diversion Programs, MERRIMACK CNTY., https://
www.merrimackcounty.net/departments/adult-diversion/13-adult-diversion
[https://perma
.cc/YX2X-9FZW].
461
OFF. OF THE DIST. ATT’Y FOR TWELFTH JUD. DIST., PRE-PROSECUTION DIVERSION
PROGRAM CLIENT INFORMATION PACKET 2, 5–10, (2020), http://12th.nmdas.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/PPD-Client-Info-Pkt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L26-6SGE].
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New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

The 2nd Judicial District offers a program with a
monthly fee of up to $85, but the fee will be
waived for those with “an income at 200% or
below of the federal poverty line.”462
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55 establishes a
program for adjournment contemplating dismissal
(ACD) and § 170.55 establishes a marijuana ACD
program.
 Chenango County has a traffic ticket diversion
program which generally has a $200 application
fee (some offenses like speeding twenty-one
miles over the limit and cell phone use while
driving have a $300 application fee).463
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1341(a1)–(a6) establishes
deferred prosecution and conditional discharge
programs for certain offenses where defendants are
placed on probation before judgment and the case is
dismissed if the defendant complies with conditions
of probation. Section 15A-1343 lays out conditions of
probation, which include payment of a supervision
fee of $40 a month unless exempted by the court, and
to pay costs of court, fine, restitution, and the costs
for appointed counsel.
 City of Charlotte has a youth diversion program
for misdemeanors which has no cost for
participation.464
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 32.2 allows for pretrial diversion
agreements which may include a condition that a
defendant make restitution, “pay to the court fees or
costs allowed by law,” and “pay to others additional
amounts as agreed upon by the parties.”
N.D. CENT. CODE. 12.1-29-07 allows sentences in
purchasing prostitution cases to include an offender

462
OFF. OF THE DIST. ATT’Y FOR SECOND JUD. DIST., PRE-PROSECUTION DIVERSION (PPD)
GENERAL GUIDELINES AND INSTRUCTIONS 1, https://berncoda.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/
12/PPD-Guidelines-and-Instructions-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AER6-S6KC].
463
Chenango County Traffic Diversion Program, CHENANGO CNTY., http://www.co.
chenango.ny.us/district-attorney/traffic-diversion.php [https://perma.cc/4NVC-9P6P].
464
Youth Diversion Program, CITY OF CHARLOTTE, https://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/
Organization/Pages/SupportSvcs/YouthDiversionProgram.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MGA6DKXU].
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education program and an order that the defendant
pay the costs of the education program. There is a
diversion program for those charged with purchasing
prostitution which includes a $500 education program
at participant expense.465
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.36 allows a
prosecuting attorney to establish pretrial diversion
programs for non-violent offenses; a condition of the
diversion program is to “pay any reasonable fee for
supervision services established by the prosecuting
attorney.”
 Stow Municipal Court has a diversion program
for underage consumption of alcohol charges that
costs $550.466 A minor marijuana offense
diversion program also costs $550.467
 City of Columbus has a diversion program for
theft with no stated costs in press coverage.468
 Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office has a Felony
Diversion Program with a $500 supervision fee
(which is due within two weeks of being accepted
into the program); indigent defendants can pay
$300 ($150 within two weeks, and the remaining
$150 within six months).469
 Licking County has a diversion program with
minimum court costs of $83 and “a diversion
supervision fee of $150;” participants may also be

N. D. ATT’Y GEN.’S OFF., DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM, https://attorneygeneral.nd
.gov/sites/ag/files/documents/HTC-DemandReductionProgram.pdf [https://perma.cc/56L84TPA].
466
Underage Alcohol Consumption Diversion, STOW MUN. CT., https://stowmunicourt
.com/info/underage-alcohol/ [https://perma.cc/GL27-GZHV].
467
Minor Marijuana Offense Diversion, STOW MUN. CT., https://stowmunicourt.com/
info/marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/4FTN-C6H5].
468
Glenn McEntyre, Columbia Launches Diversion Program for Misdemeanor Theft,
Shoplifting Cases, 10TV (Sept. 6, 2019, 6:44 PM), https://www.10tv.com/article/news/local/
columbus-launches-diversion-program-misdemeanor-theft-shoplifting-cases-2019-sep/5302125b617-5f56-4e0c-981e-3fe18c4718d9 [https://perma.cc/YP85-ZQ4M].
469
WAYNE CNTY. PROSECUTOR’S OFF., THE WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
FELONY DIVERSION PROGRAM 3 (2020), https://www.countyprosecutor.com/sites/default/
files/April%202020%20Full%20FDP%20Packet.PDF [https://perma.cc/L87S-Y7QE].
465
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required to pay restitution, treatment costs, and
fees associated with community service.470
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 471–471.11 establishes drug
and DUI courts with diversion programs. Upon
successful completion, the court may waive payment
of court costs, fees, fines, and driver license
reinstatement fees. Section 305.1 also allows for
deferred prosecution programs more generally.
 Oklahoma has a statewide diversion program for
individuals driving uninsured vehicles with a
$174 enrollment fee.471
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 813.200–813.270 et seq.
establishes a DUI diversion program which costs
$490 (filing fee), $150 (assessment fee), plus the cost
of treatment.472
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.925 establishes a bad check
diversion program with costs of restitution, a district
attorney fee (of up to $35 for each check passed), and
the cost of an education program provided by the
district attorney.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3807 directs each court to
establish and implement a program for “Accelerated
Rehabilitative Disposition” for DUI offenses which is
a diversion program.
 Lancaster County has a DUI diversion program
with a $600 processing fee; participants will also
pay “a fine, court costs, a fee for [an] alcohol safe
driving class, and a probation supervision fee.”473
8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-39.3 establishes a superior
court diversion program for certain felony and
misdemeanor cases. Participants are responsible for

LICKING CNTY. MUN. CT., DIVERSION PROGRAM 4, https://www.lcmunicipalcourt.com/
UserUploads/UserDocuments/DIVERSION%20APPLICATION%20PACKET.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K2L5-7457].
471
UVED Program, OK.GOV, https://www.ok.gov/dac/About_the_DAC/Inside_the_
Office/UVED_Program.html [https://perma.cc/FWZ6-DL4F].
472
OR. REV. STAT. § 813.240 (2011); see also OR. JUD. DEP’T, DUII DIVERSION –
SUMMARY OF FEES (FORM 6) (2019), https://www.courts.oregon.gov/forms/Documents/
DUII_Diversion_Form_6_Summary_of_Fees.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT7R-ZVFL].
473
ARD/DUI, LANCASTER CNTY., https://www.co.lancaster.pa.us/Faq.aspx?TID=27
[https://perma.cc/46DD-AZKU].
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South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

474
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payment for substance abuse and mental health
counseling, where required.474
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-22-30 (2018) directs county
solicitors to establish pretrial intervention programs,
and § 17-22-30 sets a $100 application fee and a $250
participation fee; participants may be required to pay
for costs of services but fees and costs can be waived
based on indigency.
 The 11th Judicial Circuit has a diversion program
for first-time non-violent offenders which costs at
least $350475 and a program for low-level traffic
offenses which costs at least $280.476
 The Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor’s Office has a
pre-trial intervention program with a $100
application fee, a $250 participation fee, a $250
expungement fee, and a filing fee of $35; the
participant must pay restitution if applicable.477
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-3-35, 23A-3-36 allow
for the creation of diversion programs and state no
required costs to defendants for participation in
diversion.
 Pennington County has a Young Adult Diversion
program with no fee to participate.478
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-15-105 establishes a
diversion program for first-time offenders;
participants must pay court costs and $10–$35
monthly fee during the period of diversion.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 411.071–411.0775.
establishes a deferred judgment program which
functions as diversion.

R. I. SUPER. CT., DIVERSION PROGRAM 2 (2021), https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/
SuperiorCourt/PDF/DiversionProgramInformation.pdf [https://perma.cc/86ZZ-MMLN].
475
Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI), SC.GOV, https://solicitor11.sc.gov/diversion-programs/
PTI [https://perma.cc/2DVW-6XC6].
476
Traffic Education Program (TEP), SC.GOV, https://solicitor11.sc.gov/diversionprograms/TEP [https://perma.cc/6J3V-AXDM].
477
Pre-Trial Intervention Program, FIFTH JUD. CIR. SOLIC.’S OFF., https://www
.scsolicitor5.org/diversion-programs/pre-trial-intervention-program/ [https://perma.cc/T7D2WA95].
478
Young Adult Diversion, PENNCO, https://www.pennco.org/?SEC=A9FBB723-B72B4B8E-8B52-9FF841E1067B [https://perma.cc/EK45-49KP].
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Utah

Comal County has a diversion program with a
$60 monthly supervision fee and an initial fee of
$100 (misdemeanors) or $200 (felonies).479
 Travis County has a DUI diversion program with
a $55 fee.480
 Harrison County is planning a diversion program
for first-time offenders charged with
misdemeanors which will cost $250 upfront and a
$60 monthly supervision fee (three months must
also be paid up front).481
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2-5 allows for diversion
programs, and allows for imposition of a diversion
fee that may not exceed the suggested fine for the
offense (and can be waived based on an ability to
pay), and requires the imposition of restitution where
applicable.
 Salt Lake City has a diversion program for
solicitation of prostitution with a $350 program
fee.482
 Salt Lake County has a second chance diversion
program for first-time offenders (which excludes
DUIs and violent or sexual offenses) which
includes six free hour-long classes.483
 Utah County has a second chance diversion
program with a $35 monthly supervision fee.484

479
See COMAL CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y, COMAL COUNTY DIVERSION PROGRAM GUIDELINES
(2019), https://www.co.comal.tx.us/CDA/Diversion/DiversionGuidelines.pdf [https://perma
.cc/YQ5M-EDFE].
480
Pre-trial Diversion, TRAVIS CNTY., https://www.traviscountytx.gov/countyattorney/criminal-trial/pre-trial-diversion [https://perma.cc/9T5R-X9S8].
481
Robin Y. Richardson, DA Aims to Build Up Pretrial Diversion Program for New Fiscal
Year, MARSHALL NEWS MESSENGER (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.marshallnewsmessenger
.com/news/da-aims-to-build-up-pretrial-diversion-program-for-new-fiscal-year/article_87af4
656-f972-11eb-9d4c-d7d32da39edf.html [https://perma.cc/65JP-ZD6M].
482
AMARA LEGAL CTR., supra note 109. But see id. at 103 (“Judges no longer
recommend/sentence individuals to the Johns Program because it’s unclear how the private
counseling services really work”).
483
Annie Knox, A 2nd Chance for First-Time Offenders, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 29, 2019,
10:00 PM), https://www.deseret.com/utah/2019/11/29/20938701/utah-first-time-offendersaclu [https://perma.cc/E4ZF-U969].
484
Id.
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VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 164 authorizes the Attorney
General to develop and administer an adult diversion
program in all counties; participants are required to
pay a fee not to exceed $300 (and will be adjusted
based on ability to pay).
 Lamoille County has a diversion program which
has a diversion fee of $300 (felony) or $175
(misdemeanor); an additional $5 service fee is
imposed for online payments.485
 Orange County’s diversion program has a
program fee that ranges from $100 to $300;
“[p]ayment plans, sliding scale and fee waivers
are available.”486
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-251 allows for deferred
prosecution in first-time drug offenses; the defendant
is required to obtain a substance abuse assessment to
determine appropriate drug treatment and “pay all or
part of the costs” of the program, including drug
testing (unless determined to be indigent).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.05.010–.190 allows for
deferred prosecution of misdemeanors;
§ 10.01.160(2) sets a maximum cost administrative
fee for deferred prosecution at $250.* Section
10.05.170 allows courts in granted deferred
prosecution to order supervision and levy a monthly
assessment fee (up to $100) upon the defendant.487
 Section 9A.88.120 allows the imposition of an
additional fee for individuals charged with
permitting prostitution who are given deferred
prosecution; the additional fee is $1,500 for firsttime offenders, $2,500 for second-time offenders,
and $5,000 for those with two or more prior
convictions.

485
See Pay Your Diversion Fee Here, LAMOILLE RESTORATIVE CTR.,
https://lrcvt.org/payments/ [https://perma.cc/BJ3W-EJ5C].
486
Court Diversion, ORANGE CNTY. RESTORATIVE JUST. CTR., https://ocrjvt.org/courtdiversion/ [https://perma.cc/JVE6-VMTA].
487
See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.64.120(1) (LexisNexis, Lexis through 2022 Reg.
Sess.) (setting maximum monthly assessment fee at $100).
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West Virginia

Wisconsin

Kitsap County has a felony diversion program
with a program fee of $850.488
 Clark County and Snohomish County both have
diversion programs with an unspecified program
fee.489
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-22 allows prosecutors to
enter into pretrial diversion agreements, while § 6111-22a(a) allows for deferred adjudication of
misdemeanor and felony charges.
Deferral for DUI cases is available for first time lowlevel offenders pursuant to § 17C-5-2b—this DUI
diversion requires payment of $100–$500 in court
costs490 and participation in an interlock ignition
program for at least 165 days (installation of $50–
$200, monthly rental fee of $50–$100).491
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.95 establishes a state-run
grant program to provide funding for diversion
programs for defendants who abuse alcohol or drugs.
 Washburn County has a Drug and Alcohol Court
with a fee of $750; this can be reduced to $375
through performance of 37.5 hours of community
service.492
 Dane County has a deferred prosecution program
which has no fee, but “treatment, counseling, and

488
Felony Diversion Eligibility Criteria, KITSAP CNTY., https://www.kitsapgov.com/pros/
Pages/FelonyDiversion.aspx [https://perma.cc/VW8Y-F5FK].
489
Adult Diversion, CLARK CNTY., WA, https://clark.wa.gov/prosecuting-attorney/adultdiversion; Felony Diversion Program, SNOHOMISH CNTY., WA, https://snohomishcountywa
.gov/5317/Felony-Diversion-Program [https://perma.cc/D5HZ-6NHX]; see also Felony
Diversion Overview, https://snohomishcountywa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/61306/FelonyDiversion-Overview [https://perma.cc/DQ23-H4QP].
490
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5-2b(h) (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.)
(citing § 17C-5-2(e)).
491
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5-2b(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.); see
also The Cost of a West Virginia Interlock, CAR BREATHALYZER HELP (Apr. 17, 2017), https://
carbreathalyzerhelp.com/the-cost-of-a-west-virginia-interlock/ [https://perma.cc/EB9F-9Z
UM].
492
See WASHBURN CNTY. DRUG & ALCOHOL CT., A NEW WAY TO HANDLE CRIMINAL
CASES INVOLVING DRUG/ALCOHOL ADDICTED OFFENDERS THAT WORKS! 2, https://www.co.
washburn.wi.us/images/custom/departments/criminal-justice/dac-brochure.pdf [https://perma
.cc/V32T-LGDV].
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educational program expenses are the defendant’s
responsibility.”493
 St. Croix County’s pretrial diversion program has
a fee of $160, and payment of restitution (where
applicable).494
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-301 allows for deferred
judgment of first-time offenders—functioning as a
post-plea diversion program. The only financial
statutory requirement is payment of restitution.
 Albany County, which includes Laramie, offers a
diversion program for “college-aged adults”
charged with low-level offenses. The program
requires payment of a $200 fee.495

APPENDIX B: COSTS OF EXPUNGEMENT496
This Appendix tabulates the real costs of “expungement” in each state
based on the state’s general expungement statute and administrative
requirements. For the purposes of this Appendix, “expungement” includes
sealing, conviction set aside, and dismissal remedies commonly referred to
as “expungements” even when they are not indeed traditional expungements.
Often there are specialty expungement schemes, for example, marijuana
expungement or expungement for victims of sex trafficking. Those specialty
expungement schemes are not included in this appendix. If the statute
contains no mention of the filing fee or other costs, that is notated with (“–
”). A $0 for the costs by statute indicates an affirmative statement that there
are to be no filing fees. In some cases, pricing is different for conviction and
non-conviction dispositions; in those situations, the table indicates the
pricing for expungement of a conviction. This table also indicates whether
the statutory costs associated with an expungement can be waived based on
indigence (*). This table does not include incidental costs like postage or the
493

Deferred Prosecution Program, CNTY. OF DANE, https://da.countyofdane.com/DAUnits/Deferred-Prosecution-Program [https://perma.cc/8NJP-3ZK7].
494
Pretrial Diversion: Program Tracks Offered, ST. CROIX CNTY., https://www
.sccwi.gov/299/Program-Tracks-Offered [https://perma.cc/S4UC-U6XF].
495
Daniel Bendtsen, County Starts Diversion Program for College-Aged Adults, LARAMIE
BOOMERANG (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.wyomingnews.com/laramieboomerang/news/
local_news/county-starts-diversion-program-for-college-aged-adults/article_ee8ea0b8-731454d5-a144-b937118a5380.html [https://perma.cc/Z3ZG-BEU9].
496
All statutes within this appendix are current through 2021 State Legislative Sessions
unless otherwise listed.
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cost to get a certified check or a credit card fee to pay a filing fee. The table
also includes the costs of criminal record checks even when they are not
statutorily required because they are often needed in order to get case
information necessary to fill out expungement paperwork or assess
eligibility.
Some expungement schemes require payment of all economic sanctions
included in the criminal sentence before the grant of an expungement. Other
schemes require the court to consider as a factor in the exercise of its
discretion whether the petitioner has paid all economic sanctions included in
the criminal sentence. Further detail of these mechanisms is designated as
follows:497
Π Explicit statutory mandate of payment economic sanctions in order
to be eligible
ζ Requirement that all terms of sentence be “completed,”
“discharged,” or “satisfied” to be eligible
Ψ Enumerated factors to be considered for the discretionary grant of
expungement include whether the terms of the sentence have been
“completed,” “discharged,” “satisfied,” or “complied” with
Φ Court’s authority is sufficiently expansive as to allow for the
existence of ongoing criminal debt to be the determining factor for
expungement
Ω Expungement only available for non-conviction records, generally
rendering criminal debt moot as to the offense
Δ Affirmative statement that expungement shall not be denied based
on failure to pay economic sanctions (except restitution which can still be the
basis for a denial)
Ξ Sentencing conditions must be satisfied, aside from financial
sanctions not paid due to indigence
€ Law or policy unclear as to whether criminal debt can be considered
in determining whether to grant expungement

497
This appendix is informed in large part by that in Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal
Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55, 154 app. (2019). The author also thanks Professor
Colgan for the suggestion to include an appendix to this article for a more comprehensive
accounting.
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State
Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD
Primary
Expungement Costs Set by
Statute
Statute
ALA. CODE
$500,*498 Π499
§ 15-27-1 to
21.
No general
expungement
law501
ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 13-905502
ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-901401 to 1419.
505

498

529

N/A

Additional Costs
 Fingerprinting
(varies)
 Background
Check ($25)500
N/A

$0, Ψ503



$0,506 Π507




Payment history
document
($30)504
Fingerprinting
(varies)
Background
Check ($24)508

ALA. CODE § 15-27-4 (2021).
ALA. CODE § 15-27-1(b)(1) (2021).
500
See ALA. L. ENF’T AGENCY, EXPUNGEMENT KIT, https://www.alea.gov/sites/default/
files/expungement-forms/Expungement-Kit.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NU4-227F].
501
Johnson v. State, 50 P.3d 404, 406 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
502
This is the provision for a conviction set aside; there is no true expungement in Arizona
for general offenses. There is expungement for simple marijuana possession cases that was
recently enacted. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2862 (2020).
503
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-905(C)(2) (Westlaw through First Reg. & Spec. Sess. of
55th Leg.); see also ARIZ. SUP. CT., FORM AOC CR41FORM31A-010120,
https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/34/Forms/AOCCR41FORM31A-010120.docx?ver=202001-10-094453-523 [https://perma.cc/2DFX-DKQE].
504
See, e.g., MARICOPA CNTY. SUPER. CT., INSTRUCTIONS: HOW TO COMPLETE THE FORMS
AND STEPS TO SET ASIDE CONVICTION OF GUILTY, https://superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/media/
4210/crsa12iz.pdf [https://perma.cc/AS2G-Z7DV]; Telephone Interview with Maricopa Cnty.
Clerk’s Off. (Dec. 3, 2021).
505
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1401 to 1419 (Lexis through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
506
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1419 (Lexis through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
507
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1405(a) (Lexis through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (describing
eligibility for sealing of misdemeanor or violation records).
508
Criminal Background Checks, ARK. STATE POLICE, https://www.dps.arkansas.gov/law
-enforcement/arkansas-state-police/services-programs/criminal-background-checks/ [https://
perma.cc/L4Y7-L2QW].
499
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Up to $150*509
(varies by
county), Φ



$65 or $224,*511
Π512



Colorado






Connecticut

CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN.
§ 54-142a et
seq.

$0,516 Ω




Fingerprinting
(varies)
Background
Check ($25)510
Criminal History
Search to obtain
case and arrest
numbers ($5
each)513
Copies of Court
Documents ($.75
a page)514
Certification fee
($20)515
Sherriff
Processing
($75)517
Fingerprinting
($15)518

509
This fee is paid upon the denial or grant of the dismissal (California’s equivalent of an
expungement) rather than as an up-front cost. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(d) (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
510
A background check is not generally required for an expungement but may be needed
to determine the case number for the petition. See Clean Your Record, JUD. COUNCIL CAL.,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/1070.htm?rdeLocaleAttr=en [https://perma.cc/6MNU-HKED]. If
required, a background check costs $25. See Criminal Records - Request Your Own, STATE OF
CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/fingerprints/record-review [https://perma.cc/MSG746XR].
511
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-705(f)(2)(A), 24-72-706(1)(h) (Lexis through Ch. 17 of
2022 Reg. Sess.) (indicating $65 fee). Interestingly, the instructions on filing the petition
indicate a filing fee of $224. See COLO. STATE CTS., INSTRUCTIONS TO SEAL ARREST AND
CRIMINAL RECORDS (2019), https://bit.ly/3Dg8FFe [https://perma.cc/Y6EE-D8H8].
512
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-706(e) (Lexis through Ch. 17 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
513
See COLO. STATE CTS., supra note 511; see also COLO. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.cbirecordscheck.com/Individual_New.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y6XL-6HPA].
514
See COLO. STATE CTS., supra note 511.
515
Id.
516
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(e)(2) (2017); see also 2021 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 2132 (S.B. 1019) (West) (effective 2023 and retaining $0 filing fee).
517
See STATE OF CONN., DEP’T OF EMERGENCY SERVS. & PUB. PROT., FORM DPS-0846-C
(2017),
https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/DESPP/files/dps-0846-c_criminal_history_record_
request_form_rev_12-01-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9F5-6453].
518
Id.
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Delaware

District of
Columbia

Florida
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11 DEL. CODE
tit. § 4371 et
seq.

$75,519 Π520



D.C. CODE
§ 16-801 et
seq.
FLA. STAT.
ANN.
§§ 943.0585,
943.059

–522, ζ



$75,*524 Ω




531
Fingerprinting &
Background
Check
($52.50)521
Background
Check ($7)523
Fingerprinting
(varies)525
Obtaining
certified copies
of case

519
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4374(j) (Lexis through 83 Del. Laws, c. 280) (delegating
to the Superior Court the task of establishing a “reasonable fee schedule for the filing of a
petition of expungement”); see also Civil and Criminal Fees, DEL. SUPER. CT.,
https://courts.delaware.gov/superior/fees.aspx [https://perma.cc/LLD4-SDQD] (establishing
a $75 filing fee for expungement petitions).
520
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4372(l) (Lexis through 83 Del. Laws, c. 280) (allowing judge
to waive economic sanctions or convert to civil judgment if non-payment is due to reasons
other than “willful noncompliance” if the petitioner is otherwise eligible for expungement).
521
See STATE OF DEL. FAM. CT., 1021 IP – ADULT EXPUNGEMENT INSTRUCTION PACKET
(2022), https://courts.delaware.gov/Forms/Download.aspx?id=118608 [https://perma.cc/
4JG7-GZFZ] (indicating certified criminal history is required); see also Obtaining a Certified
Delaware Criminal History, DEL. STATE POLICE, https://dsp.delaware.gov/obtaining-acertified-criminal-history/ [https://perma.cc/B6JY-FEWA] (noting costs of $52).
522
No filing fee mentioned in statute or court website, and the author confirmed there is
no filing fee in telephone call with D.C. Superior Court (202) 879-1362 on Dec. 6, 2021.
Telephone Interview with D.C. Super. Ct. (Dec. 6, 2021).
523
See Police Clearances (Arrest and Criminal History Section), METRO. POLICE DEP’T,
https://mpdc.dc.gov/service/police-clearances-arrest-and-criminal-history-section
[https://
perma.cc/HSD3-6TG6]; see also Community Defender Division, PUB. DEF. SERV. D.C.,
https://www.pdsdc.org/about-us/legal-services/community-defender-division [https://perma
.cc/R44L-RXE5].
524
This is the cost of the required Certificate of Eligibility from the Department of Law
Enforcement. See FLA. STAT. § 943.0585(2)(a)(4) (2019).
525
See, e.g., Request Police Reports & Records, MIAMI-DADE CNTY. POLICE, https://www
.miamidade.gov/global/service.page?Mduid_service=ser1470774597039291 [https://perma
.cc/C8TG-9HE4] (noting $15 fee for fingerprinting); Get Fingerprinted by the Orlando Police
Department, CITY OF ORLANDO, https://www.orlando.gov/Public-Safety/OPD/Records/GetFingerprinted-by-the-Orlando-Police-Department [https://perma.cc/A8G3-VPPM] (also
charging $15).
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Georgia

Hawaii

GA. CODE
ANN. § 35-337
HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§§ 831-3.2,
853-1, 706622.5
IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 192604(1)

Up to $50,527 ζ

ζ*528



Processing fee
($35 first time or
$50 after)529

–, Φ



Certified copies
of dismissal
record and other
court documents
(varies)530
Background
Check and
Fingerprinting
($20)531

Idaho


526

See, e.g., Certified Copies, MIAMI-DADE CNTY. CLERK CTS., https://www.miamidadeclerk.com/clerk/certified-copies.page [https://perma.cc/A96W-2CZG] (noting $2 search
fee and additional unstated costs for copies).
527
See GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(d)(1)(B) (Lexis through 2021 Reg. & Spec. Sess.); see
also GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUEST TO EXPUNGE ARREST
RECORD (2009), https://bit.ly/3ot6nyv [https://perma.cc/5ZWJ-BVXB] (noting $25 fee to GBI
and that local agency can charge up to $25 in addition).
528
See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 853-1, 706-622.5 (2020) (describing requirements for
deferred judgement diversion programs which allow expungement eligibility).
529
There is no court filing fee because expungement is handled by the Attorney General
and does not necessarily impact court records. See HAW. CRIM. JUST. DATA CTR., DEP’T OF
THE ATT’Y GEN., EXPUNGEMENT APPLICATION, FORM HCJDC 159(B) (2019), https://ag.hawaii
.gov/hcjdc/files/2019/05/REVISED-EXP-APPLICATION-2019-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA
K9-7QUT].
530
See IDAHO STATE POLICE, EXPUNGEMENT APPLICATION, https://isp.idaho.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/documents/ExpungmentApplicationNew.pdf [https://perma.cc/PE4H
-LQK8] (requiring certified copies of court order of dismissal or acquittal, as well as copies
of the criminal charging document).
531
A criminal background check is not required but may be necessary to determine
criminal history an applicant seeks to expunge. See IDAHO STATE POLICE, FINGERPRINT BASED
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK FORM (2018), https://isp.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/
3/documents/FPRequest.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWX9-WW58] (noting $20 fee).
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533
Fee to Illinois
State Police for
Expungement
Order ($60)534
Background
Check ($17)537
Fingerprinting
(varies)
Background
Check ($15)540
Civil penalty for
deferred
judgment cases541
Simple
Misdemeanor
$105–$855
Serious
Misdemeanor
$430–$2,560

20 ILL. COMP.
STAT.
§ 2630/5.2

$60,532 Δ533



IND. CODE
§ 35-38-9-0.5

$0,535 Π536




IOWA CODE
§§ 901C.3;
907.9(4)..

Iowa

–,538 Π539






532

705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/27.1b(t) (2021).
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 2630/5.2(d)(6)(C) (2021).
534
Fee Schedule, ILL. STATE POLICE, https://isp.illinois.gov/BureauOfIdentification/Fee
Schedule [https://perma.cc/99PQ-8RQ9].
535
IND. CODE § 35-38-9-1(c) (2019).
536
IND. CODE § 35-38-9-2(e)(3) (2020).
537
See State Police - Limited Criminal History Search, IND. STATE POLICE,
https://www.in.gov/ai/appfiles/isp-lch/faq.html [https://perma.cc/4KEG-XD37].
538
Statute does not list a filing fee amount. However, the author contacted clerks by
telephone in both Polk and Johnson County Court clerk’s offices on Dec. 6, 2021, to confirm
that applications can be filed without payment of a filing fee.
539
IOWA CODE §§ 903C.3(1)(d) (for misdemeanor convictions), 907.9(4)(b) (for deferred
judgment cases).
540
See IOWA SUP. CT., APPLICATION TO EXPUNGE MISDEMEANOR COURT RECORDS UNDER
IOWA CODE SECTION 901C.3, https://www.iowacourts.gov/collections/595/files/1273/embed
Document/ [https://perma.cc/A9NF-XGY3]. IOWA CODE § 901C.3) (Rule 2.86-Form 2,
https://www.iowacourts.gov/collections/595/files/1273/embedDocument/ [https://perma.cc/
FU6Z-QQZJ] (indicating application must include “an official Division of Criminal
Investigation Iowa criminal history records check”) (last visited Dec. 6, 2021); see also IOWA
DIV. CRIM. INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL HISTORY BILLING FORM, https://dps.iowa.gov/sites/
default/files/criminal-investigation/support-operations/BillingForm.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK
Z2-HGJL] (listing $15 cost for records check).
541
IOWA CODE §§ 907.14, 902.9, 903.1 (Lexis through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
533
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Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland



KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 216614, 22-2410
KY. REV.
STAT.
§§ 431.073–
.0795

$176,542 ζ

LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 971–
996

Up to $550,547
Additional $50
for those
convicted of
driving while
intoxicated548
N/A



$0550 (for nonguilty
dispositions),



No general
expungement
law
MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM.

$100 for

misdemeanors,544
$300 for
felonies545

Class D Felony
$1,025–$10,245
Class C Felony
$1,370–$13,660
Docket fee of up
to $19 per case543
Fee for
Certificate of
Eligibility for
expungement
($40)546
Background
check ($26–
$50)549

N/A

Filing Fee for
expungements of
eligible guilty

542
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2410(b)(3)(A) (Lexis through 2022 Reg. Sess.) (for nonconviction records), § 21-6614(g)(2) (for diversion and conviction records).
543
KAN. STAT. ANN § 21-6614(g)(2) (Lexis through Feb. 25, 2022) (for diversion and
conviction cases only).
544
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.078(7) (LexisNexis, Lexis through Feb. 6, 2022).
545
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.073(10)–(11) (LexisNexis, Lexis through Feb. 6, 2022)
(the filing fee is $50 but if the expungement is granted, an additional $250 shall be charged
and must be paid within eighteen months).
546
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.079(1); see also Expungement Certification Process, KY.
CT. OF JUST. (2021), https://kycourts.gov/AOC/Information-and-Technology/Pages/
Expungement.aspx [https://perma.cc/6CR9-6NX2 ] (listing the fee as $40).
547
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 983(A) (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
548
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 984(C) (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
549
How Much Does an Expungement Cost in Louisiana?, CRESCENT CITY L., https://
crescentcitylawfirm.com/how-much-does-an-expungement-cost-in-louisiana/ [https://perma
.cc/UQ2W-3Z53].
550
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 10-103.1(f); 10-104(b) (West, Westlaw through Joint
Resolution 1, 2022 Reg. Sess.).
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PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD
PROC. §§ 10101 to 10-111

MASS. GEN.
Massachusetts LAWS ch. 276,
§§ 100a–100u
MICH. COMP.
LAWS
§§ 780.621–
780.624
Michigan

– (for guilty
dispositions), Φ



–, Φ553



$50,555 Φ556





551

535
dispositions
($30*)551
Fingerprinting &
Background
Check ($20)552
Background
Check ($25)554
Background
Check using
ICHAT ($10)557
Fingerprinting
(varies)
Certified record
of convictions
(varies)

See Expungement (Adult), MD. COURTS, https://mdcourts.gov/legalhelp/expungement
[https://perma.cc/T4UP-8WXQ] (noting a $30 filing fee for eligible guilty dispositions which
can be waived based on indigence).
552
See Fingerprinting Services, MD. DEP’T. OF PUB. SAFETY, https://www.dpscs.state.md
.us/publicservs/fingerprint.shtml [https://perma.cc/5KDL-YK7L]. A background check is not
required but may be necessary to identify charges and convictions to be expunged. See MD.
JUDICIARY, EXPUNGEMENT: INFORMATION ABOUT REMOVING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL OFFENSE OR
INFRACTION 12 (2021), https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/court-forms/ccdccr072br.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T7U9-GVS7].
553
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100G(d)-(e) (2020).
554
A copy of one’s criminal record is recommended but not required with the
expungement petition. See Request to Seal Your Criminal Record, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.,
https://www.mass.gov/how-to/request-to-seal-your-criminal-record [https://perma.cc/M235NR6K]; see also MASS. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERVS., CRIMINAL OFFENDER RECORD
INFORMATION (CORI) PERSONAL REQUEST FORM, https://www.mass.gov/doc/adult-personalrequest-form/download [https://perma.cc/F46A-3TWL] (noting $25 fee which can be waived
for indigency).
555
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621d(9) (2022) (this fee goes to the department of state
police so that they can do a fingerprint-based background check).
556
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.621d(13) (2022).
557
Legal self-help resources suggest obtaining a copy of your Michigan Criminal History
to be able to fill out the application for a “set aside.” See Checklist – How to Apply to Set Aside
an Adult Conviction, MICH. LEGAL HELP, https://michiganlegalhelp.org/checklist/565
[https://perma.cc/2Y78-GJGR]; see also Internet Criminal History Access Tool, Frequently
Asked Questions, MICHIGAN.GOV, https://apps.michigan.gov/Home/FAQS [https://perma.cc/
9BH4-4KXS] (noting $10 search fee).

536

Minnesota

KIMPEL
MINN. STAT.
§§ 609a.01–
609a.04

$285,*558 ψ559
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Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

MISS. CODE.
ANN. §§ 9919-71 to 72
MO. REV.
STAT.
§ 610.140
MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 4618-1102 to
1111

Background
Check ($8 for
state, $33 FBI
and state)560
Fingerprinting
($10)561

$150,562 Π,563 Φ

$250,*564 Π565



–, Ψ567



Background
Check ($1420)566
Fingerprinting
(varies)568

558
MINN. STAT. § 609A.03(1) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 357.021(2)(1) (2021). There is a
process through the prosecutor’s office if a person seeking expungement gets prosecutor
approval that has no associated costs. See MINN. STAT. § 609A.025 (2021).
559
The court is required to consider, among other factors, “the amount, if any, of
restitution outstanding, past efforts made by the petitioner toward payment, and the measures
in place to help ensure completion of restitution payment after expungement of the record if
granted.” MINN. STAT. § 609A.03(5)(11) (2021).
560
MINN. DEP’T. OF PUBLIC SAFETY, BACKGROUND CHECK FEES, https://dps.mn.gov/
divisions/bca/Documents/Background-check-fees.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2H4-972G].
561
Id.
562
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-71(1) (Lexis through Mar. 3, 2022).
563
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-71(2)(a) (Lexis through Mar. 3, 2022) (for felony
convictions only; no statutory requirement for misdemeanor conviction expungements).
564
MO. REV. STAT. § 488.650 (Lexis through 2021 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
565
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 610.140(5)(3), (7) (Lexis through 2021 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
566
Criminal history record is not required but is often needed to accurately fill out the
expungement petition. See Criminal Record Check, MO. STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, https://
apps.mshp.dps.mo.gov/MSHPWeb/PatrolDivisions/CRID/crimRecChk.html [https://perma
.cc/4EWV-FG4J].
567
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-1107 (Lexis through 2021 Sess.) (requiring completion of
sentencing terms “including payment of any financial obligations” or a collateral consequence
on military service for a presumption in favor of expungement to apply).
568
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-1104(3) (Lexis through 2021 Sess.) (requiring
fingerprinting as part of the process of petitioning for expungement).
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Background
check ($15.50)570
Probation
fees*571
o Enrollment
($30)
o Monthly
($25-35)
o Drug
testing,
electronic
monitoring
and other
service
fees
(varies)572
Court filing fees
(varies, e.g. $50,
$100, $255,
$245)574
State
Background

NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 292264, 29-3523

–, ζ569

NEV. REV.
STAT.
§§ 179.2405–
179.301

–, €573



Nebraska

Nevada





569

NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2264(1)–(3) (2021).
Criminal History Reports, NEBRASKA.GOV, https://www.nebraska.gov/apps-nsplimited-criminal/ [https://perma.cc/9FDZ-RD92].
571
Expungement in Nebraska is generally reserved for cases where defendants
successfully completed probation or deferred judgement programs supervised by probation.
See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2262.06(1), (3) (2005); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2293 (2019)
(requiring same administrative and programming fees for deferred judgement cases).
572
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2262.06(8), 29-2262(2)(m), 29-2262(2)(o) (2019).
573
There is a statutory presumption that records should be sealed if the applicant satisfies
statutory requirements, unless the applicant was dishonorably discharged from probation.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.2445 (2019); see also Matter of Tiffee, 485 P.3d 1249, 1251 (Nev.
2021) (presuming petitioner eligible based on compliance with statutory criteria).
574
See, e.g., L.V. MUN. CT., SEALING OF RECORDS 5 (2021), https://files.lasvegasnevada
.gov/municourt/Record-Sealing-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT48-Z3U4] (noting $50
fee); RENO MUN. CT., INFORMATION FOR SEALING CRIMINAL RECORDS IN NEVADA 2,
https://bit.ly/3y24vzP [https://perma.cc/L9MQ-5JW8] (noting $100 fee); SECOND JUD. DIST.
CT., STATE OF NEVA., WASHOE CNTY., OFFICIAL FEE SCHEDULE 7 (2021), https://www.washoe
courts.com/Forms/GJ/18.%20General%20Forms%20Information/Filing%20Fee%20Schedul
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F4D-QBTE] (noting $255 fee); Official Fee Schedule, THIRD JUD.
DIST. CT., LYON CNTY. (2019), https://www.lyon-county.org/DocumentCenter/View/7505/
District-Court-Fee-Schedule?bidId= [https://perma.cc/W99E-LL3P] (noting $245 fee).
570
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New
Hampshire

New Jersey

N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 651:5
N.J. STAT.
ANN.
§§ 2c:52-1 to 32.1

$300,*577 ζ578



$0,580 Ξ581



Check and
Fingerprinting
($27)575
SCOPE (criminal
history from law
enforcement
agency that
arrested
petitioner on
charge seeking to
be expunged)
($11)576
Background
check ($25)579
Fingerprint
Based
Background

575
Required by NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245(2)(a) (2010); see also NEV. DEP’T OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, FORM DPS-006 3, https://rccd.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/gsdnvgov/content/FeesForms/
DPS-006.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU2V-NPFX] (noting $27 fee).
576
Not required but recommended for the record sealing process. Sealing Records, L.V.
METRO. POLICE DEP’T, https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/RecordsFingerprintBureau/Pages/
SealingRecords.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 2021); LEGAL AID OF SOUTHERN NEV., SEALED
RECORDS
17,
https://www.lacsn.org/images/PowerPoints/Sealed-Records-PowerPointLACSN.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2QF-4MYL].
577
Statute lists $300 of fees in total, but court form lists $325 total. Cf. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:5(IX)-(X) (Westlaw through Ch. 5 of 2022 Reg. Sess.) (listing three $100 fees),
CT. SERV. CTR., N.H. TRIAL CTS., ANNULMENT OF CRIMINAL RECORDS 3 (2020), https://
www.courts.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt471/files/documents/2021-04/annulmentchecklist.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KU93-8974].
578
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5(III) (Westlaw through Ch. 5 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
579
Not required, but suggested to get information needed to fill out annulment paperwork.
See How to Remove Your Criminal Record, N.H. LEGAL AID, https://nhlegalaid.org/self-helpguides/criminal-annulment/how-annul-process [https://perma.cc/AFF5-QUFJ]; see also
Criminal History Record Requests, N.H. DEP’T PUB. Safety, https://www.nhsp.dos.nh.gov/our
-services/criminal-records/criminal-history-record-requests [https://perma.cc/E88G-A4FB]
(setting fee at $25).
580
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-29 (West, Westlaw through L.2021, c.400 & J.R. No. 9).
581
Id. § 2C:52-1(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through L.2021, c.400 & J.R. No. 9)..
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New Mexico

New York

PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD

N. M. STAT.
§ 29-3A-1

–, Π 583




N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW
§ 160.59

–,586 Φ587





582

539
Check
($44.13)582
$132 filing
fee*584
Background
Check ($15)585
Criminal
Certificate of
Disposition ($5
or $10)588
Background
Check ($95)589

Not required but recommended by legal services providers. See NJ Criminal History
Records Information, N.J. STATE POLICE, https://www.njsp.org/criminal-history-records/
[https://perma.cc/Z85T-DQGS] (noting $44.13 fee).
583
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3A-5(A) (West 2019).
584
See, e.g., N.M. FIRST JUD. DIST. CT., GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT EXPUNGING
ARREST RECORDS AND COURT RECORDS CONVICTION 4, https://realfile3016b036-bbd3-4ec4ba17-7539841f4d19.s3.amazonaws.com/c5cafd18-0d2a-4a88-840e-29f09c00ec07?AWSAcc
essKeyId=AKIAIMZX6TNBAOLKC6MQ&Expires=1647895279&Signature=bdYs5IG%2
BhkReU5oSXeCPT0Nucqo%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3
D%22Expungement-Conviction.pdf%22&response-content-type=application%2Fpdf [https:
//perma.cc/37W5-4EPR].
585
Recommended, not required. Fingerprinting and Background Checks, N.M. DEP’T
PUB. SAFETY, https://www.dps.nm.gov/top-links-for-nm-residents/fingerprinting-and-back
ground-checks [https://perma.cc/3DJL-U24S].
586
According to the New York Courts website, there is no filing fee. See Forms &
Instructions – Application to Seal a Criminal Conviction after 10 Years – CPL 160.59, N.Y.
STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://www.nycourts.gov/FORMS/cpl_160.59_sealing_application/
index.shtml [https://perma.cc/R9P5-XX8B].
587
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.59(7) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2022) (listing
factors to be considered).
588
See Forms & Instructions – Application to Seal a Criminal Conviction after 10 Years
– CPL 160.59, supra note 586 (listing completion of the Request for Criminal Certificate of
Disposition as Step 1); N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., CRIMINAL CERTIFICATE OF DISPOSITION
REQUEST FORM (2021), https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFs/forms/criminal/pdfs/CoD
RequestForm-fillable.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX4N-37R4] (noting $10 for courts in New York
City and $5 for all other courts).
589
Not required, but may be helpful to ascertain criminal history and eligibility. See
Criminal History Record Search, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://ww2.nycourts.gov/
apps/chrs/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/V334-7MUZ].

540

North
Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

590
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N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A145.5

$175,*590 Π591



N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 1260.1-01 to -04
OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.
§§ 2953.31–
.36
OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22, § 18

–,593 Π594



$50,*596 ζ597



Fingerprinting
($22)598

–, Π599



Background
Check and
Fingerprinting
($19)600

Background
Check and
Fingerprinting
($14)592
Record Check
($15)595

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-145.5(g) (Lexis through 2021 Reg. Sess.)
Id. § 15A-145.5(c3)(5) (requiring a finding that no restitution remains outstanding
before a grant can be given).
592
Recommended but not required. See Personal Review, N.C. STATE BUREAU
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.ncsbi.gov/Services/Background-Checks/Personal-Review
[https://perma.cc/L7FX-HJMC].
593
Statute does not set a fee, and telephone call with the District Court Clerk’s office for
Cass County indicated there is no filing fee for the petition to deal in that court. Telephone
Interview with District Court Clerk, Cass Cnty. (Dec. 8, 2021). It was perhaps less promising
that there were no court forms on the North Dakota Court’s website and that the clerk did not
know offhand whether there was a filing fee indicating petitions to seal are not filed frequently.
594
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-60.1-04(1)(c)–(d) (Lexis through 2021 Spec. Sess.) (requiring
restitution be paid and terms of probation completed).
595
Not required, but recommended to locate records. See id. § 12-60-16.9 (setting fee at
$15).
596
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C)(3) (West 2021).
597
Id. § 2953.32(C)(1); see also State v. Aguirre, 41 N.E.3d 1178, 1182 (Ohio 2014)
(interpreting “final discharge” of sentence which triggers statutory waiting period as requiring
payment of restitution—thus rendering payment of restitution an eligibility requirement for
expungement).
598
Recommended not required to ascertain complete criminal history. See OHIO ATT’Y
GEN., BCI CIVILIAN BACKGROUND CHECK PROCEDURES (2019), https://www.ohioattorney
general.gov/Files/Forms/Forms-for-BCI-Criminal-Records-and-Background-Chec/Back
ground-Check-Forms/BCI-fingerprint-card [https://perma.cc/UCN2-2FR6] (noting $22 fee).
599
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 18(A)(15) (2014) (requiring completion of sentence and full
payment of restitution).
600
Recommended, not required. See OKLA. STATE BUREAU INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION REQUEST FORM (2019), https://osbi.ok.gov/sites/g/files/gmc476/f/
documents/OSBI_CRIMINAL_HISTORY_REQUEST_fillable_FORM_02-2019.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/7VTE-LQ5M] (listing $19 fee).
591
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Oregon

601

OR. REV.
STAT.
§ 137.225

$281,604 ζ605




541
Court filing fee
(apx. $175)601
Processing fee
paid to Ohio
State Bureau of
Investigation
($150)602
Process fee paid
to local law
enforcement
agency ($150)603
Fingerprinting
(varies)
Fee to
Department of
State Police
($80)606

Expungements in Oklahoma, LEGAL AID OKLA., https://oklaw.org/resource/
expungement-q-a [https://perma.cc/LU6L-4FJV].
602
Criminal History Record Expungement, OKLA. STATE BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://
osbi.ok.gov/criminal-history/expungement [https://perma.cc/Q32F-J3GW] (listing $150
processing fee).
603
May not be required for all local agencies. But see OKLA. CITY POLICE DEP’T, PUBLIC
RECORDS FEES, https://www.okc.gov/departments/city-clerk/records-request-form/publicrecords-fees [https://perma.cc/D29U-KWTL] (listing $150 fee for expungement of records
when authorized by court order).
604
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 21.135(2)(g), 137.225(2)(d) (2022); see also OR. JUD. DEP’T.,
CIRCUIT COURT FEE SCHEDULE (2021), https://www.courts.oregon.gov/Documents/2021
_CircuitFeeSchedule_public_eff-2021-09-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX8L-HBGC] (listing
$281 for motion to set aside a conviction, but $0 for motion to set aside non-conviction
dispositions).
605
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.225(1)(a) (2022); see, e.g., OR. JUD. DEP’T, MOTION TO
SET ASIDE CONVICTION AND RECORDS OF ARREST, https://www.courts.oregon.gov/forms/
Documents/CLA-EN-Criminal-Misc-Expungement-Motion_Declaration.docx [https://perma
.cc/KM8G-QLBX].
606
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.225(2)(c) (2022).

542

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

607

KIMPEL
18 PA. CONS.
STAT.
§ 9122.1

$132,607 Π608

12 R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 121.3-1 to -4

–,611 Π612
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Criminal Record
Check ($22)609
Additional courtspecific filing
fees (varies)610
Obtaining
certified court
records ($3)613
Bureau of
Criminal
Identification
Report ($5)614

42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1725.7(a) (2016).
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.1(a) (2016) (directing that a petition may not be granted
“unless the person who filed the petition, upon payment of all court-ordered restitution, also
paid the fee previously authorized to carry out the limited access and clean slate limited access
provisions.”).
609
Recommended, not required. See PENN. STATE POLICE, REQUEST FOR CRIMINAL
RECORD CHECK FORM SP4-170 (2017), https://www.psp.pa.gov/Documents/Public%20
Documents/criminal_history/CRC%20Request%20SP%204-164.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG
Z6-X6MF].
610
See, e.g., LEHIGH CNTY. CLERK OF JUD. RECS.—CRIM. DIV., 2020 FEE SCHEDULE
(2020), https://www.lccpa.org/criminal/CriminalCourtFees.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPX5M36C] (listing filing fee for adult expungement as $262.05 including the statutory $132 fee);
Expungements, CHESTER CNTY. CLERK OF CTS., https://www.chesco.org/3405/Expungements
[https://perma.cc/EJ23-YWPG] (listing $167 filing fee).
611
The statute does not set a fee, and telephone call with the criminal clerk of the 6th
District Court Clerk in Providence, RI indicated there is no filing fee for the petition in that
court. Telephone Interview with 6th District Court Clerk, Rhode Island. (Apr. 7, 2022). But
see 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-3(e) (2021) (requires that expungements for decriminalized
offenses be at no cost to the petitioner).
612
12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-2(a) (2018); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-3(b)(1) (2021)
(both requiring that petitioner does not owe any “outstanding court-imposed or court-related
fees, fines, costs, assessments, or charges,” unless such amounts are reduced or waived by
order of the court).
613
R.I. JUD. RES. CTR., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 3 (2013), https://www.courts.ri.gov/
JudicialRecordsCenter/PDFs/PoliciesProcedure.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H4M-9STP] (listing
$3.00 fee).
614
Recommended, not required. See Background Checks, R.I. ATT’Y GEN.,
https://riag.ri.gov/about-our-office/divisions-and-units/bureau-criminal-identificationbci/background-checks [https://perma.cc/PYH7-YY95] (listing fee for BCI report as $5).
608
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South
Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD
S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1722-910 to-960
S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 23a3-26 to -37

$310,615 €

$72,*616 Φ617




TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 4032-101 to -105

543

$100,*619 Π620



Background
Check
($26.75)618
Fingerprinting
(varies)
Background
Check ($29)621

615
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-22-940(A) (Westlaw through 2022 Act. No. 125) (listing $250
administrative fee); id. § 17-22-940(E)(1) (listing $25 fee to South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division for verification of criminal record); id. § 17-22-940(F) (listing $35 filing fee as
required by § 8-21-310(C)(4)—this fee is not required for expungement of non-conviction
records that were not part of a guilty plea diversion agreement).
616
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-28 (Westlaw through Feb. 23, 2022) (requiring
payment equal to the filing fee for a civil action); id. § 16-2-29(3)(a) (setting civil action filing
fee at $25); id. § 16-2-39 (setting court automation surcharge at $40 for all civil filings); id.
§ 14-6-1 (setting law library fee at $7 for civil filings); see also S.D. UNIFIED JUD. SYS.,
SCHEDULE OF COURT COSTS 2 (2021), https://ujs.sd.gov/uploads/docs/ScheduleCourtCosts
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K5W-8P48] (showing $70 as total filing fee for civil actions); S.D.
UNIFIED JUD. SYS., MOTION FOR EXPUNGEMENT – INSTRUCTION SHEET, https://ujs.sd.gov/
uploads/forms/Expungements_Instruction.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PQD-K8YB] (listing filing
fee as $70).
617
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-30 (Westlaw through Feb. 23, 2022) (giving the court
discretion to grant expungement “upon a showing by the defendant or the arrested person by
clear and convincing evidence that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well
as the defendant or the arrested person will be served by the entry of the order”).
618
Recommended, not required. See S.D. ATT’Y GEN., STATE ONLY BACKGROUND CHECK,
https://atg.sd.gov/LawEnforcement/Identification/stateonlybgcheck.aspx [https://perma.cc/
XE9A-DR3X].
619
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-32-101(a)(1)(B) (Lexis through Ch. 598 of 2022 Reg. Sess.)
(citing § 8-21-401). This is a local fee and some counties have waived it to allow expunctions
to be filed without a filing fee. See WREG STAFF, Shelby County to Waive $100 Expungement
Fee Starting in July, WREG.COM (May 13, 2021), https://www.wreg.com/news/shelbycounty-to-waive-100-expungement-fee-starting-in-july/ [https://perma.cc/N58K-GHAZ].
620
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g)(2)(C)(i) (Lexis through Ch. 598 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
621
Recommended, not required. See Background Checks, TENN. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.tn.gov/tbi/divisions/cjis-division/background-checks.html [https://perma.cc/D6
E8-WZKT].

544

Texas

Utah

Vermont

KIMPEL
TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN.
§§ 411.071–
.0775.622
TEX. CODE
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ANN. art.
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(nonconviction
records)
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§§ 77-40-101
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ANN.
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$90 for DUI
convictions,



Criminal Record
Report ($25)625
Certified court
records
Filing fee
(~$280)*626

Certificate of
Eligibility Fee
($65)629
Criminal
Conviction

622
This chapter discusses Orders of Non-Disclosure (criminal record sealing) as well as
the deferred judgment programs that often precede such an order. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 411.071–0775 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
623
Id. §§ 411.072(c), 411.0745(b).
624
See, e.g., id. §§ 411.0735(b); 411.0736(b).
625
Recommended, not required. TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CRIME RECS. DIV.,
PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW OF PERSONAL CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION CR-63
(2021), https://www.dps.texas.gov/internetforms/forms/cr-63.pdf [https://perma.cc/37PE-32
AM].
626
See TEX. OFF. OF CT. ADMIN., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE MODEL PETITION
FOR ORDER OF NONDISCLOSURE 4 (2017), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1439446/
instructions-for-completing-petition-for-nondisclosure-under-section-4110731.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L56X-28BR] (“The filing fee is the amount of the court’s regular civil filing fee plus
an additional $28.00. Typically, the total filing fee is about $280.00. However, the amount
varies from county to county.”); see also DALLAS CNTY. DIST. CLERK, ITEMS NEEDED FOR
FILING EXPUNCTIONS, https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/district-clerk/Items
NeededforFilingExpunctions.pdf [https://perma.cc/T647-B35U] (listing $292 filing fee).
627
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-2-301(1)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Second Spec.
Sess.) (“The fee for filing a petition for expungement is $150.”); see also Expunging Adult
Criminal Records, UTAH CTS., https://www.utcourts.gov/howto/expunge/ [https://perma.cc/
Z4TQ-XMRA] (indicating fee can be waived).
628
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105(4)(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Second Spec.
Sess.).
629
Required by id. § 77-40-106(1)(a). See UTAH DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, BUREAU OF CRIM.
IDENTIFICATION, APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR CERTIFICATE OF ELIGIBILITY (2021), https:
//bci.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2021/06/Expungement-Application-6-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3EW5-C5N2] (listing $65 fee).
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630

545
History Records
($30)632
Filing fee ($8091 varies by
court)635
Fingerprinting
($10)636
Copy of the
warrant or
indictment
(varies)637
Criminal History
Record Check
($15-30)638

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1431(e) (Lexis through Act. No. 81 of 2021 Adj. Sess.) (“The
$90.00 filing fee shall apply for a motion to seal a criminal history record of a violation of 23
V.S.A. § 1201(a) [DUI convictions] pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7602(a)(1)(C), but shall not apply
for any other motion to seal or expunge a criminal history record pursuant to 13 V.S.A.
§ 7602.”). But see id. § 7282(b) (allowing the waiver of surcharges (but not restitution) “as
part of an expungement or sealing proceeding where petitioner demonstrates an inability to
pay.”).
631
Id. § 7602(b)(1)(C).
632
Recommended, not required. See VT. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, VT. CRIME INFO. CTR.,
PUBLIC REQUEST FOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION INFORMATION (2018), https://vcic.vermont.gov/
sites/vcic/files/files/record-check/PublicRequestForm_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4ZK-UQ
UH] (listing $30 fee).
633
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(B) (Lexis through Act 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.)
(exempting those seeking expungement based on being victims of identity theft from payment
of the general filing fee, but not specifying the fee amount).
634
Id. § 19.2-392.2(A). Beginning in 2025 at the latest, convictions will be eligible for
expungement, but at present only non-conviction records are eligible. See H.D. 2113, 2021
Leg., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021).
635
See Circuit Court Civil Filing Fee Calculation, VA.’S JUD. SYS., http://webdev.courts
.state.va.us/cgi-bin/DJIT/ef_djs_ccfees_calc.cgi#ID_CALC_FRM [https://perma.cc/Q9PJ9TAT].
636
Required by statute. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(E) (Lexis through Act 14 of
2022 Reg. Sess.); see also Fingerprinting for Non-Criminal Purposes, VA. STATE POLICE,
https://vsp.virginia.gov/services/fingerprinting/ [https://perma.cc/2ELL-WFLX] (listing $10
fee for fingerprinting); SUP. CT. OF VA., PETITION FOR EXPUNGEMENT, FORM CR-1473 (2015),
https://www.vacourts.gov/forms/circuit/cc1473inst.pdf [https://perma.cc/GUK6-35LU].
637
Required if reasonably available. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(C) (Lexis through Act
14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
638
Recommended, not required. See Non-Criminal Justice Interface, VA. STATE POLICE,
https://vspapps.vsp.virginia.gov/catspublic/public/publicHome.html [https://perma.cc/BPL7-
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WASH. REV.
CODE
§§ 9.94A.640,
9.96.060

–,639 Π640

W. VA. CODE
§ 61-11-26
WIS. STAT.
973.015645

$300,642 Φ643



–, ζ646





Filing Fee (varies
by county)
Background
Check and
Fingerprinting
($58)641
Criminal Record
Check644
Criminal Record
Check ($0)647

CF4F] (listing $15 fee for Criminal History Search). The form must also be notarized which
can cost an additional $15. Id.
639
Statute makes no mention of a filing fee and the author confirmed in telephone calls
with the Kings County Superior Court Clerk’s office and cashier’s office that there was no
filing fee. (Dec. 10, 2021).
640
See WASH. REV CODE § 9.94A.640(1) (2019) (requiring the sentence be “discharged”
and citing § 9.94A.637, which states that for a sentence to be discharged the defendant must
have “completed all requirements of the sentence, including any and all legal financial
obligations.”); see also id. § 9.96.060(2)(g) (2019) (requiring three years to have passed since
“the person completed the terms of the sentence including, any financial obligations”).
641
Recommended, not required. See WASH. STATE PATROL, REQUEST FOR CONVICTION
CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD, FORM 3000-240-569 (2019), https://www.wsp.wa.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/Request_for_Conviction_Criminal_History_Record_7-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/869S-Q77K].
642
$200 filing fee and an additional $100 when the expungement is granted to the West
Virginia State Police for the cost of processing the order. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-26(n)
(West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess.) (citing § 59-1-11(a)(1).)
643
See id. § 61-11-26(h); see also id. § 61-11-26(d)(7) (requiring petitioner to indicate
whether restitution remains outstanding and, if so, to attach a copy of that order to the petition
for expungement).
644
Recommended, not required. West Virginia contracts with IdentGo.com to process
criminal record checks. See Criminal Records, W. VA. STATE POLICE, https://www.wvsp.gov/
Criminal%20Records/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/5DFK-DF5E].
645
There is no general expungement or sealing remedy in Wisconsin—this is a specialty
expungement statute for only for those who were either under 25 years old at the time of their
conviction or were victims of human trafficking.
646
See WIS. STAT. ANN. 973.015(1m)(a) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 12, 2021); see also
WIS. CT. SYS., PETITION TO EXPUNGE CRIMINAL COURT RECORD OF CONVICTION, FORM CR266 (2020), https://www.wicourts.gov/formdisplay/CR-266.pdf?formNumber=CR-266&
formType=Form&formatId=2&language=en [https://perma.cc/BPD6-B3K6] (requiring
petitioner to swear under oath that they “have successfully completed [their] sentence in this
case, including payment of all court-ordered financial obligations”).
647
See Background Check & Criminal History Information, WIS. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/background-check-criminal-history-information [https://
perma.cc/3YUL-CPKL] (indicating name-based criminal history checks are free).
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Wyoming

648

PAYING FOR A CLEAN RECORD
WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7-131401; 7-131501–1502

$300 for felonies 
and $100 for
misdemeanors,648 
Π649

547
Background
Check ($15)650
Fingerprinting
($5)651

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1501(b) (misdemeanor convictions), 7-13-1502(b) (felony
convictions) (Lexis through 2021 Sess.).
649
Id. § 7-13-1502(a)(i)(C) (requiring 10 years since restitution has been paid in full).
650
ATS FAQ, WYO. DEP’T CRIM. INVESTIGATION, https://wyomingdci.wyo.gov/criminaljustice-information-services-cjis/criminal-records-unit/ats-faq [https://perma.cc/3DXN-N4
5B].
651
Id.

